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INTRODUCTION

The conduct of foreign affairs in the United States has been
referred to as "an invitation to struggle" between the executive and
legislative branches "for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy." 1 This timeless observation perhaps most aptly characterizes
1. Edwin Corwin, constitutional scholar, made the following observation:
Where does the Constitution vest authority to determine the course of the
United States as a sovereign entity at internationallaw with respect to matters
in which other similar entities may choose to take an interest?... What the
Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer on the President certain
powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain other powers of
the same general kind on the Senate, and still other such powers on Congress;
but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining
the course of the American nation is left for events to resolve.
All of which amounts to saying that the Constitution, considered only for
its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to
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the debate, implementation and practice of the exclusive and shared
constitutional war powers of the political branches. Few other areas
rival the manifest constitutional tension continually exhibited on decisions concerning war.
Since the founding of our nation, significant constitutional issues have persisted regarding the exercise of the divided war powers
between the President and Congress. 2 Legislative efforts since the
late 1960s and early 1970s, principally through the enactment of the
War Powers Resolution' by the congressional override of President
Richard Nixon's veto,4 -have attempted to clarify the relative scope of
struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.
E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, 171 (1957) (emphasis in
original).
Professor Arthur Schlesinger, in describing the inherent conflict, noted that the issue was
"[hiow to reconcile democratic control of the warmaking power with the imperious requirements of foreign policy." The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a
Constitutional Impasse, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on War Powers of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Senate
Hearings].
2. In the famous Pacificus-Helvidius debate between Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison, the war and foreign policy powers of the executive and legislative branches were
argued. This 1793 dispute arose in the context of President George Washington's proclamation
of neutrality in the war between England and France. See 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 432-89 (H. Cabot Lodge 1904 ed.) (writing seven essays signed under the name of
Pacificus) [hereinafter PACIFicus]; 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138-88 (G. Hunt
1906 ed.) (writing five Letters of Helvidius as a response to the Pacificus essays) [hereinafter
HELVIDIUS]. Hamilton argued that the neutrality proclamation was an act assigned to the
executive branch. Madison responded that the positions taken by Pacificus constituted an encroachment upon legislative war and foreign policy authorities.
3. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(1982)). See also Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, Title IV,
94 Stat. 1975, 1981-82 (1980) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 413-415 (1982)) (providing for congressional oversight of intelligence activities).
4. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973), reprinted
in 119 CONG. REC. 36,175-76 (1973) (Senate veto override debate).
Based on earlier congressional consideration in 1973, it was not clear whether the House
of Representatives would be able to secure the requisite two-thirds vote to override the veto.
However, the Senate was well over the veto level in each of its votes. Although the House
subsequently overrode the veto, the initial House vote on the bill fell 32 votes short of the
requisite override number. House approval of the conference report was only four votes shy of
the number necessary to override a veto, with 74 absentees. The Senate was 13 votes over the
requisite two-thirds. Finally, the House narrowly overrode the veto by only four votes. See 119
CONG. REC. 25,119 (1973) (Senate passage of S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 72 to 18); id. at
24,707-08 (House passage of H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 244 to 170); id. at 33,569
(Senate adoption of conference report, 75 to 20); id. at 33,873-74 (House adoption of conference report, 238 to 123); id. at 36,198 (Senate override of veto, 75 to 18); id. at 36,202-21
(House override of veto, 284 to 135).
The override of President Nixon's veto on the War Powers Resolution was also "the first
time in nine attempts [in 19731 that both houses had overridden a veto." Madden, House and
Senate Override Veto by Nixon on Curb of War Powers; Backers of Bill Win 3-Year Fight,
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authority of the branches to act in matters concerning war or hostilities. Since 1973, this statute has served as the primary vehicle
through which Congress has attempted to consider the legal and policy ramifications of U.S. military involvement in hostilities or imminent hostilities. However, it must be recognized that the War Powers
Resolution was, in large part, a product of its time-a time that
witnessed a legislative branch attempt to exert greater influence on
foreign affairs matters5 (especially after the Vietnam experience)'
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
5. This view has been expressed in retrospect by, among others, Elliot Richardson, former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General. See, e.g., War Powers: Original Purposes
and Applications: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International Security
and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 House Hearings]. In his testimony, Mr. Richardson stated:
The WPR was the culmination of Congressional efforts to curtail Presidential
authority to commit American troops into combat, beginning with the 1967 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings and Report, [and] during this period, a more subtle and yet infinitely more important struggle was taking place
- a struggle for control of U.S. foreign policy.
Id. at 143.
This point was also noted during the 1973 debate. "Beyond reflecting the low political
estate to which President Nixon has fallen, the Congressional action [to override the veto]
represented the most aggressive assertion of independence and power by the legislative branch
against the executive branch in many years." Madden, supra note 4, at 20. Furthermore, one
commentator remarked, "Congress dealt President Nixon his biggest legislative defeat of the
year yesterday as it forced the war powers bill into law over his veto." Lyons, Congress Overrides Veto, Enacts War Curbs, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
During the veto override debate, Representative Green remarked that "[u]nfortunately,
many have portrayed the upcoming vote on the President's veto as one part of the ongoing
power struggle between the Congress and the President over war powers. In the heat of this
confrontation, the merits of the war powers bill have been overshadowed." 119 CONG. REC.
36,204 (1973). Albert (Peter) Lakeland, former Minority Staff Director, Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, added that "the primary motivation of the War Powers Act was a perception of a dangerous and overweening strength in the presidency as regards matters of war,
resulting in a profound disruption of constitutional imbalance." 1988 Senate Hearings,supra
note 1, at 101. Former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, commented that "the War Powers Resolution grew out of a lack of trust" between the Congress
and the President. 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 197.
6. Senator Thomas Eagleton passionately made this point during the Senate debate
stating:
This bill was not conceived in the abstract. It was not conceived in the ethereal.
It was conceived in blood - 50,000 dead and the whole litany of what occurred
in Southeast Asia. That is why we are debating this bill today - not because it
is a prosaic idea, but because of our recent tragic experience.
119 CONG. REC. 25,082 (1973). See also Lyons, supra note 5, at 1, col. 2 ("The law is the
culmination of a three-year effort by Congress to prevent the nation from slipping into another
Vietnam-type war.").
During the conference report debate, Senator Huddleston stated that the "original war
powers bills were, in effect, the outgrowth of our involvement in Vietnam." 119 CONG. REC.
33,566-67 (1973). Senator Taft also noted that "this [war powers conference report] bill is
unquestionably a product of the pain of our division over Vietnam." Id. at 33,567. Addition-
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and a weakened President (particularly in light of the Watergate
episode).' The proponents of legislative reform were largely moved
ally, Senator Eagleton remarked that "[t]his [war powers] legislation was motivated by the
most tragic mistake our Nation has made - the Indochina war." Id. at 33,555.
Similar sentiments were expressed during the House conference report debates. In particular, Representative Kemp noted:
As has been said in this body, time and time again, this legislation is reactive to
the Vietnam war - nothing more, nothing less. . . .I cannot help but feel that
this resolution is not being considered in the dispassionate air of reason, of a
historical perspective, or of an adequate knowledge as to its consequences.
Id. at 33,866-67.
It was very apparent that the Vietnam war elicited a great deal of sentiment. During the
House veto override debate, Representative Hanley suggested that the "[mlotivation for the bill
stems from the controversial Vietnam war which unfortunately divided the American people,
which in turn and justifiably so, produced overwhelming public demand that the Congress
reassert itself in the all-important matter of war and peace." Id. at 36,205. Further, Representative Drinan believed that "Itihis resolution will prevent any Tonkin Gulf resolution," id. at
36,207, and Representative Flowers added that "it is of the greatest importance that we prepare now the legislative framework to guard against any future 'Vietnams.'" Id. at 36,208.
Meanwhile, Representative Edwards pointed out that "[tihe legislation we are considering
today could have prevented the protracted involvement of the Vietnam war." Id. at 36,216.
Former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, John Tower, expressed
his opinion that "[tihe War Powers Act grew out of Congress' frustration with the war in
Vietnam and its desire to prevent such a situation from ever happening again." 1988 Senate
Hearings, supra note 1,at 65. Others such as General David Jones, former Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, concurred stating, "I am convinced that many Members of Congress voted for
[the War Powers Resolution] because of the Vietnam environment." 1988 Senate Hearings,
supra note 1, at 115. Similarly, Former Counsel and Legislative Assistant to Senator Barry
Goldwater, Terry Emerson, added that the War Powers Resolution was enacted during "a
very unusual moment in history" in the atmosphere of Vietnam and Watergate. 1988 Senate
Hearings, supra note 1, at 131-32. Senator Jesse Helms also noted that "the war powers
legislation was, in fact, a political protest by the Congress against American involvement in the
Vietnam War." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 142. Finally, Professor Ronald Rotunda of the University of Illinois College of Law remarked, "I think all the commentators
agree that the War Powers Act was a reaction to Vietnam, a war that lasted for about 7 years
under two or three different administrations." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 227.
7. Senator William Spong was the floor manager of the war powers bill in the Senate in
1972. He described the political climate surrounding the override of President Nixon's veto as
follows:
Democrats had a political reason to override the veto to reassert their strength
after the House had sustained five successive vetoes during 1973. The vote also
had been converted into a test of congressional against executive power by the
public dissatisfaction with the continued struggle in Vietnam and Cambodia.
Finally, the dismissal of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, the resulting resignation of Attorney General Elliot Richardson, and the growing
White House tapes controversy fostered partisanship among Democrats while
leading some House Republicans to want to disassociate themselves from the
President.

Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender? 16
WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 836 (1975).
Senator Tower also voiced his concern that the override veto was the result of a partisan
climate.
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to redress a perceived imbalance in the war powers between the executive an{d !legislative branches.'
The fact is that there is a partisan climate at this moment which argues well,
unfortunately, for the passage of legislation of this kind, because this is, I guess
we might call it, 'Kick the President Season,' and there is a mood here in Washington that is not conducive to cool consideration of the merits of legislation of
this kind.
119 CONG. REc. 25,090 (1973). Senator Tower restated his concern during the veto override
debate when he noted that "the President . . .is at a low ebb in popularity now, and many
people are calling for impeachment or resignation" and cautioned against acting to make executive foreign policy implementation "a victim of our emotions on Watergate." Id. at 36,179.
Senator Percy supported the argument asking, "Is this vote today just a reflection of the attitude of Congress on Watergate? Is the President losing his clout with Congress because of
that?" Id. at 36,193.
Similar concerns were raised during the House veto override debate. For example, Representative Dellums noted that "many people will regard this [veto override] as a victory against
the incumbent President because of his opposition." Id. at 36,220. Furthermore, Representative Straton observed that "this is probably the most difficult time for us to debate a measure of
this significance because what is involved here is not what we may happen to think of Richard
Nixon or Watergate or the special prosecutor." Id. at 26,205.
Former Senator Thomas Eagleton explained, "Bear in mind that this was the only time
in history [Congress] could have gotten such a bill because we were at the end of.that horrible
war in Vietnam and because there was in office a beleaguered President that we [could] clobber." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1,at 16. Similarly, Robert Turner, Associate Director of the Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia Law School, remarked, "[Tihere is a general consensus among people who have studied this that the
Resolution's supporters would not have had the votes to override had it not been for the anger
at President Nixon over Watergate." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 315. W. Taylor
Reveley, III summed up these statements, "But for Watergate at white heat, I don't think the
Resolution ever would have passed." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 316.
On the other hand, Representative Martin noted institutional reasons for support of the
veto override and commented "[M]y support of the war powers bill has nothing whatsoever to
do with the current difficulties of the President." 119 CONG. REC. 36,205 (1973). Others, such
as Representative Findley attempted to separate the vote to override the presidential veto as
independent of the emotionalism surrounding Watergate and President Nixon. Id. at 36,206.
Representative Dickinson noted that "[t]o enhance the argument to support the veto, some
have made the spurious assertion that this is in some way a vote of loyalty for the President
and this administration. This is just not the fact." Id. at 36,207. Clarifying his position, Representative Cleveland remarked, "I would not be surprised to find some Watergate votes cast
today . . . .I wish to make clear that my vote [to override the veto] is not one of them." Id. at
36,218. Additionally, Former Minority Staff Director, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Albert (Peter) Lakeland noted that "[t]he dwindling Vietnam war was specifically exempted from the Act's provisions." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1,at 107.
8. Commenting on this perceived imbalance in the war powers, Representative Biester
noted that the subcommittee bill is "realistic in its method of.restoring a balance to shared
executive-legislative war powers authority." 119 CONG. REc. 24,696 (1973) (emphasis added).
Also noting an imbalance in the war powers, Representative Du Pont observed that "the war
in Vietnam represents the culmination of a historical decline in the assertion of congressional
prerogatives in warmaking authority." Id. at 21,222 (emphasis added). Senator Bentsen also
made note of the need to "repair this erosion of the delicate executive-legislative balance." Id.
at 24,546 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Senator Hathaway remarked that the war powers
measure "does not seek to alter the constitutional balance of power between Congress and the
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Operation of the War Powers Resolution

The objective of the War Powers Resolution was to "insure that
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances."' While this goal of sharing
in the decision-making process on many matters involving the use of
United States Armed Forces remains -as essential today as it was two
centuries ago, the means for attaining it under the status quo have,
with increasing evidence,'become insufficient, ineffectual, and unduly
confrontational. In fact, in light of recent developments, it now appears that the statute itself may be frustrating the attainment of the
original purpose.
The War Powers Resolution is typically invoked when the
President submits a section 4(a) war powers report within fortyeight hours of a reportable event, usually the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into "hostilities." 10 The President is generally
obligated, under section 3 of the Resolution, to consult with Congress
prior to this introduction of military forces.1 Significantly, the filing
of the war powers report triggers a sixty-day clock. At the end of
this sixty-day period, the armed forces must be automatically disengaged from the hostilities, pursuant to section 5(b), unless: (1) Congress has authorized the continued use of the armed forces, (2) Congress has extended this period, (3) Congress is physically unable to
President; it simply seeks to restore it." Id. at 24,545 (emphasis added).
However, Representative Stratton questioned the purported need to restore the "balance
of power" in light of the congressional power of the purse. Id. at 21,216.
9. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (a) (1982) (emphasis added). This point was emphasized during the
conference report debates when Senator Benston remarked, "There can be and there will be
disagreement between the executive branch and the Congress but there should not be and must
not be distrust. We have to insure that responsibility for future foreign policy decisions be
shared." 119 CONG. REC. 33,555 (1973). Similar sentiments were expressed by Senator Stennis noting that "it is only as a result of both of these branches of the Federal Government
working together and accepting their responsibilities that the nation should be committed to
war." Id. at 33,560. Although Senator Javits expressed concern that the "underlying premise"
of the bill is "that Congress and the President should be equally accountable for the consequences if our Nation should again make a commitment to go to war," id. at 24,543, Senator
Dole described the war powers measure as establishing "a partnership" between the branches.
Id. at 25,116. The same notions of partnership were evident in the House when House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Morgan remarked, "Congress must not play a junior partner role where decisions involving the commitment of American troops is involved. Neither
should we attempt to force such a secondary role upon the President." Id. at 21,233.
10. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1982). See also infra note 106 where this section is reproduced and explained.
11. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982). See also infra note 95 where this section is reproduced.
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meet as a consequence of an armed attack, or (4) the President certifies that not more than an additional thirty days is needed as an
"unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety" of the United
States military forces. 2 Prior to the termination of this sixty-day period, Congress can act under section 5(c) to adopt a two-house legislative veto (or concurrent resolution) mandating an earlier removal
of the armed forces."3 The President is not afforded an opportunity
to sign or disapprove this section 5(c) measure and has no role under
section 5(b) legislation unless Congress sends a bill to the White
House. Specified priority procedures enable Congress to consider
section 5(b) or 5(c) legislation in an expedited fashion. 4 On numerous occasions, Congress and the President have clashed over the applicability of the Resolution to particular situations involving United
States Armed Forces.
B.

The Chadha Decision

The most direct and significant impact on the Resolution since
its enactment sixteen years ago resulted from the landmark 1983 Supreme Court decision in INS v. Chadha,'3 wherein the one-house
legislative veto in an immigration statute 6 was found to violate both
the Presentment Clauses17 and the bicameralism requirement 8 of
12. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982). See also infra note 80 where this section is reproduced
and infra text accompanying notes 116-20 for a discussion of the operation of this provision.
13. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982). See also infra note 261 where this section is reproduced
and infra text accompanying notes 121-23 for a discussion of the operation of this provision.
14. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545-1546a (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also infra text accompanying notes 414-37 for a discussion of the operation of these provisions.
15. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
16. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1982).
17. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7, cls. 2, 3 provide:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States; . . . Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be presented
to the President of the United States.
See also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-48 (discussing the presentment clauses).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."),
§ 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;..."), § 7,
cl. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to
the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by
him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.").
See also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948-51 (discussing the bicameral requirement).
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the Constitution.' 9 Many have concluded that the holding in this immigration case affects nearly 200 statutes, including the central enforcement provisions of the War Powers Resolution.20 At the very
minimum, the Chadha decision has cast doubt on the vitality of the
Resolution on a different constitutional plane. Instead of the inherent, historical debate over the constitutional allocation of the war
powers between the President and Congress, the opinion has interjected a question of infirmity on grounds of noncompliance with the
separation of powers principles for the enactment of laws as prescribed by Article I of the Constitution.
While some argue that Chadha did not affect the War Powers
Resolution, 2 most have resolved that the two-house .legislative veto
19. The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of two appellate court decisions that pronounced the two-house legislative veto unconstitutional buttressed the holding of the Couri in
the Chadha decision. See Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff d sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
20.. In his concurrence, Justice Lewis Powell commented, "The Court's decision
apparently will invalidate every use of the legislative veto, including the two-house veto in the
War Powers Resolution." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 & n.l. Dissenting, Justice Byron White
noted, "Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.' " Id. at 967. In appendix I, Justice White included
section 5 of the War Powers Resolution as among some 56 statutes he believed were affected
by the decision. Id. at 1003.
Stanley Brand, General Counsel to the Clerk, House of Representatives, commented:
The Chadha decision is a broad and sweeping pronouncement by the Court
which, fairly read, places the concurrent resolution veto provisions in statutes
like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, the International Security Assistance and
Arms Control Act of 1976, and the War Powers Resolution in dire jeopardy, if
not in extremis, along with many other legislative review mechanisms.
The United States Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1983 House Legislative Veto Hearings].
. 21. See, e.g., 1988 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 11 (remarks of former Rep. Paul
Findley) (arguing that any contention that Chadha affected section 5(c) is "speculative at
best"); Buchanan, In Defense of the War Powers Resolution: Chadha Does Not Apply, 22
Hous. L. REV. 1155, 1177-79 (1985) (arguing that (1) because the president has no power to
engage in a sustained military commitment there can be no change in the legal status quo by
the legislative veto provision, and (2) Chadha is inapplicable since Congress did not delegate
any power to the executive); Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record and Future
Promise, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 579, 590 (1984). Zablocki, co-author of the Resolution, argues
that: (1) the separability clause leaves the Resolution in tact to any extent that Chadha may
affect section 5(c), (2) Chadha may not affect legislative procedural rules in the foreign affairs
area, (3) the presentment requirement need not be complied with since Congress has exclusive
power to commit troops to hostilities and has not delegated this power to the President, and (4)
the Resolution may be used as a cooperative tool by the executive and legislative branches. The
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in section 5(c) is now unconstitutional for violation of the presentment requirement of all legislation to the President.22 Notable, for
example, was the overwhelming assessment by the legal witnesses
testifying approximately one month after the Supreme Court decision before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that Chadha
adversely impacted the concurrent resolution provision of the War
Powers Resolution. 23 Others have asserted that section 5(b) is simiauthor added, "The full implications of the June 1983 Chadha decision for WPR implementation has yet to be realized. For the moment, a position that allows the possibility of minimal
effects on section 5(c) is advisable both in terms of congressional prerogatives and executive
compliance." Id. at 591. See also Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 129-34 (1984) (arguing that Chadha does not affect. section 5(c)
because this provision is extraordinary legislative power deciding whether or not to go to war;
section 5(b) is also unaffected since it is a legitimate exercise of Congress' placement of a
durational limit on authorization); Note, The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN.
L; REV. 1407, 1432 (1984) (distinguishing the legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution
from that invalidated in Chadha); Note, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1330, 1350 (1984) (noting that the concurrent resolution is constitutionally valid "since
Congress never delegated the presidential authority curtailed by such a resolution"); Note, The
ConcurrentResolution Provision of the War Powers Resolution: Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha and the Sources of Presidential War Making Power, 45 OHIo ST.
L.J. 983, 998-1000 (1984) (arguing that (1) the legal rights noted in Chadha cannot be altered by the concurrent resolution provision since they are subject to congressional ratification,
(2) presidential approval is not required since Congress has inherent power to end any military action, (3) Congress never delegated warmaking authority to the President, and (4) the
concurrent resolution is "equivalent to express denial of the ratification that is necessary to
constitutionalize the President's action").
22. See, e.g., 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 272 (remarks of Prof. Louis
Henkin, Columbia University School of Law) (noting that the Chadha decision "casts a heavy
shadow on section 5(c)"); 1988 House Hearings,supra note 5, at 146-55 (testimony of Elliot
Richardson, former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.
Supp. 333, 335 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting in dictum, "In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
decision in [Chadhal, however, it is conceded that [section 5(c)] does not have the force and
effect of law."); Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics Than
Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 577 (1984) ("Section 5(c) of the resolution . . . is clearly
invalid after the Supreme Court's decision. . . . To be sure, arguments can be made to the
contrary, but none is persuasive."); Note, Congressional Control of PresidentialWarmaking
Under the War Powers Act: The Status of a Legislative Veto After Chadha, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1217, 1239-41 (1984) (concluding that the concurrent resolution of the War Powers
Resolution after Chadha is constitutional under only one of three constructions and that under
the "most plausible" it is unconstitutional).
23. Particularly revealing is the analysis by Stanley Brand, General Counsel to the
Clerk, House of Representatives, who argued the Chadha case as well as two other legislative
veto cases before the Supreme Court. Mr. Brand told the committee:
Taking the war powers resolution only as an example . . . assuming arguendo
it is severable, Congress is faced with the very erosion of power sought to be
restored by the resolution, for the President may either commit troops with impunity, resting on a legal position that the concurrent resolution veto is inoperative, or having reported the commitment as required by the reporting sections,
ignore with equal impunity the war powers resolution's requirements to recall
those troops after 60 days, if Congress attempts to enforce the automatic termi-
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larly void under the principles enunciated in this case.24
Assuming that the "core" central enforcement provisions of the
Resolution have in fact been impacted by the Supreme Court's invalidation of the one-house legislative veto in Chadha, Congress must
ask itself what remains, other than a reporting and consultation statute. Moreover, while Chadha seems to have struck at the heart of
the statute, a related question arises whether the impact of Chadha
may also have tainted the whole.2 In other words, is the congresnation provision or to exercise the concurrent resolution veto provided by section
5(c).
1983 House Legislative Veto Hearings, supra note 20, at 6. In addition, Edward Schmults,
Deputy Attorney General, commented that section 5(c) does not comply with the presentment
requirement as noted in Chadha. 1983 House Legislative Veto Hearings, supra note 20, at
52. Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, added that section 5(c) "is clearly unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's holding in Chadha." 1983 House Legislative Veto Hearings, supra note 20, at 68. Professor Eugene Gressman, who argued the Chadha case on
behalf of the U.S. House of Representatives, remarked, "As presently structured, the concurrent resolution contained in Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution would seem vulnerable
under Chadha." 1983 House Legislative Veto Hearings, supra note 20, at 125. Finally, Professor David Martin expressed his belief that Chadha invalidates the legislative veto provision
in the War Powers Resolution. 1983 House Legislative Veto Hearings,supra note 20, at 140.
24. Former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, Elliot Richardson remarked, "I
find intrinsic difficulty with the notion that there is entailed somehow a form of delegation to
the President to deal with an emergency that can be withdrawn by the Congress." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 201. Similarly, Robert Turner, Associate Director of the
Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia Law School, stated, "This is a
direct effort by Congress to exercise the 'Commander-in-Chief' power vested exclusively by the
Constitution in the President." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1,at 851.
See also 1988 House Hearings,supra note 5, at 155-58 (testimony of Elliot Richardson);
Lungren & Krotoski, The War Powers Resolution After the Chadha Decision, 17 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 767, 782-86 (1984) [hereinafter After Chadha] (arguing that section 5(b) is unconstitutional under the Chadha decision since it is the functional equivalent of a one-house
legislative veto); Turner, The War Powers Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and
Unhelpful, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 683, 684 (1984) ("The idea that Congress can by silence or
inaction deprive the President of a fundamental expressed constitutional power - in a time of
national emergency, no less - is incompatible with our system of separation of powers.");
Note, The War Powers Resolution: An Act Facing "Imminent Hostilities" A Decade Later,
16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 947 (1983) ("The constitutionality of this automatic termination provision . . .is questionable."); 1983 House Legislative Veto Hearings, supra note
20, at 21 n.3 (statement of Stanley Brand, General Counsel to the Clerk, House of Representatives) (suggesting that the reach of Chadha may also affect section 5(b)). But see 1983 House
Legislative Veto Hearings, supra note 20, at 68 (statement of Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary, Department of State) (Section 5(b) "does not fall within the scope of Chadha. Its constitutionality is neither affirmed, denied, nor even considered in the Chadha decision.").
25. However, it should be noted that the War Powers Resolution contains a separability
clause. 50 U.S.C. § 1548 (1982). Such an express provision generally establishes a rebuttable
presumption of severability. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-35. See generally 1983 House
Legislative Veto Hearings,supra note 20, at 17-21, 39-40 (statement of Stanley Brand, General Counsel to the Clerk, House of Representatives) (noting that many legislative veto statutes
containing extensive delegations to the executive branch would not have been passed by the
Congress in the absence of the legislative veto provisions).
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sional position on war powers matters weakened by continual reliance on a statute containing a void provision and lacking an effective
means of enforcement? If the provisions affected by Chadha are to
be repealed, the debate should shift toward the goal of replacing
them. And, if these central provisions in the War Powers Resolution
are replaced, can the same objectives be attained through different
means?
C. Other Elements Requiring Reform
Notwithstanding the constitutional issues raised by the Chadha
decision, many questions also have been raised concerning the efficacy of those provisions left unaffected by Chadha. For example,
many interbranch disputes have centered on the meaning of "hostilities," the statutory term which triggers the applicability of the Resolution. A pattern of "reluctant acknowledgement" on the part of the
executive branch has been demonstrated with regard to the filing of
war powers reports. Most agree that the consultation provision, as
currently drafted, does not require meaningful or timely consultation
with Congress by the President concerning the involvement of
United States military forces in hostilities. Some have queried
whether Congress should rely on its power of the purse both in order
to assert its view on war powers matters and as an effective means of
enforcement. The statute permits "window periods" of adjournment
in which an adjourned Congress may be reliant on the President,
rather than itself, for reassembling in order to deliberate on a war
powers bill or report. There are even questions concerning the effectiveness of expedited procedures for considering legislation. Perhaps
as the best indicator of the lack of a meaningful enforcement mechanism within the statute, members of Congress have sought, with
greater frequency, declaratory and injunctive relief in the courts by
suing the President and other members of the executive branch over
the application of the Resolution.2 6
As a result of the divided nature of the constitutional powers
involved, experience with the War Powers Resolution, and recent
Supreme Court action rendering the primary enforcement provisions
of the Resolution invalid, it appears all but inevitable that Congress
and the President will once again clash in disagreement over their
respective war powers. Some believe the only remaining uncertainty
27
is when and where the next "constitutional showdown" will occur.
26.
27.

For a discussion of these cases, see infra note 207.
See Carter, supra note 21, at 107 (noting with regard to the statute that "a constitu-
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Although interbranch disagreement is, to a significant extent, an intrinsic byproduct of the shared constitutional war powers, until a
more adequate reform measure is adopted, the possibility for greater,
unnecessary confrontation between the branches regarding the introduction or involvement of United States troops into hostilities will
endure.
After sixteen years of experience, the time for statutory reform
appears ripe. Even some of the key congressional architects and central participants in the 1973 debate have recently called for reform.
A Senate Foreign Relations Special Subcommittee on War Powers
was established during the 100th Congress to begin to address the
issue and held several days of hearings. 8 In the other body, the
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science also held hearings.29 This congressional
activity may begin to form the foundation for statutory reform in this
critical national area.
D.

Overview

This article will explore several elements likely to be central to
any debate concerning reform of the War Powers Resolution. The
article does not try to take either a pro-congressional or pro-executive position at the expense of the other branch's authority. The premise underlying this article is that the constitutional war powers
scheme works best when both political branches fully utilize their
respective powers so that the institutional attributes of each may
bear on war powers issues confronting the nation. A result-oriented
approach favoring either branch cannot and should not be advanced
in light of the sundry possible unforeseeable circumstances to which
these powers might be applied. Neither a legislature subservient to
the whims of an imperial executive, nor an overbearing Congress
encroaching on presidential prerogative are desirable scenarios. Although the situation is frequently in flux, the desired constitutional
equilibrium of the divided war powers is best established when
neither branch plays a secondary role to the other in the decisionmaking process. Rather, the optimal locus is obtained when both
branches vigorously contribute to the process consistent with their
respective and unique constitutional roles. The underlying constitutional showdown seems inevitable in the not-too-distant future" and "the constitutional issue
will come up again and again until it is finally resolved").
28. 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1.
29. 1988 House Hearings,supra note 5.
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tional objectives are served by the Founding Fathers' declination to
allocate most of these powers to one branch at the expense of the
other. Instead, they assigned each branch a particular function on
these sensitive national issues.
Particularly since World War II, many have viewed Congress
as less than a full, co-equal partner with the executive branch on
war powers matters. Some have suggested that in light of an assertive executive branch, institutionally more adept at expeditious action, Congress is without a meaningful forum for expressing its
views on war powers matters. While the War Powers Resolution
does not rely on the full breadth of constitutional authority available
to Congress,8" as will be shown, there is sufficient room for an active
congressional role that comports with the constitutional scheme. This
article asserts that there is a strong constitutional basis for Congress
to exercise its war powers authorities pursuant to a war powers statutory mechanism.
The statutory structure of the War Powers Resolution serves as
an appropriate starting point for discussing reform since some provisions may only require slight modification. However, other aspects of
the law appear to require significant points of departure and alteration if the original objective of "collective judgment" by the political
branches is to be achieved in practice and fundamental concerns of
unconstitutionality are to be resolved. To this end, this article will
consider several areas in which the War Powers Resolution may be
improved. In each proposed area of reform, a comprehensive review
of the pertinent legislative history will first be explored in order to
establish a foundation for consideration of substantive reform proposals. It is practical to consider whether suggested reforms measure
up to the original objectives of Congress under the War Powers Resolution and where deviation from these goals is required. As will be
seen, much of what was debated in 1973 is helpful in considering
specific reform proposals today.
The areas of reform will focus on five central elements: (1) the
requirement of providing a statutory mechanism that ensures flexible, tailored policy responses (a) by avoiding, where possible, unjustified arbitrary, substantive components that result in major policy
changes solely by the passage of time, and (b) by focusing on procedural reform not substantive policy reform;," (2) an improved working definition of "hostilities" to better delineate the circumstances
30. See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 80-104.
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triggering application of the statute;8" (3) an effective procedural device, backed by the power of the purse, to replace the now defunct
central enforcement provisions of the War Powers Resolution;"3 (4)
provision for the reassembly of Congress by legislative leaders, sua
sponte, to consider war powers reports or legislation after constitutional adjournments of more than three days;" ' and (5) enhanced
procedures for expedited consideration of war powers legislation. 5
Before beginning this inquiry, the relevant constitutional war
powers of Congress and the President will first be noted in the context of the doctrine of separation of powers." Second, the necessity of
establishing a statutory infrastructure, in light of existing congres37
sional constitutional authority, will be explored.
II.

THE DIVIDED WAR POWERS OF THE CONSTITUTION

As an incident of sovereignty, a nation is recognized as having
the ability and means to commit the entirety of national resources to
defend itself effectively and make war where necessary. 38 In the governmental form of the United States, however, the war powers are
divided between and shared by the two political branches. The Constitution commits to Congress the power:
To . . . provide for the common Defence and general Welfare

of the United States;"
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; 0
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
32. See infra text accompanying notes 105-237.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 260-333.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 334-99.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 400-90.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 38-76.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
38. In the words of Justice George Sutherland:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties,
to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality.
United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (noting inherent right of self-defense); PAcIFIcus, supra note 2, at 457 ("Selfpreservation is the first duty of a nation.").
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
40. Id. cl. 10.
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make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

1

To raise and support Armies;'"
To provide and maintain a Navy;' 8
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces;"
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;' 5
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of Them as may be employed in
the Service of the United States .... ,"
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.""
Additionally, Congress has the power of the purse, as embodied
in the Common Defence and General Welfare Clause,' 8 the Spending Clause,' 9 and the Army Clause.5 0 This includes the power to
place constitutional conditions or limitations on the use of funds or
armed forces supplied by Congress.51 Finally, and often overlooked
Id. cl. 11. See 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON438-39 (1845) (debate of the Declare War Clause during the Constitutional
Convention).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. For an excellent discussion of this congressional
power, see Donahue & Smelser, The Congressional Power to Raise Armies: The Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions, 1787-1788, 33 REV. OF POLITICS 202 (1971) [hereinafter
The Power to Raise Armies].
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
44. Id. cl. 14.
45. Id. cl. 15.
46. Id. cl. 16.
47. Id. cl. 18.
48. Congress has the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States." Id. cl. 1. The General Welfare Clause has been recognized as an independent, substantive power. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 90 (1976); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
49. The Constitution specifies that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
50. The spending power that "Congress shall have power ... To raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years," is particularly applicable in the war powers area. Id. § 8, cl. 12.
51. One Attorney General described the power to condition in the context of the congressional provision of military forces:
Inasmuch as Congress has power to create or not to create, as it shall deem
41.

STITUTION
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as an important power, Congress has Rulemaking authority to govern the manner in which it considers all legislation, including war
powers measures."2
The war powers assigned to the President include:
The "executive Power";5 8
The power to serve as the "Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States; '
The power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed"; 5
Foreign Relations authority."
It is also clear from the Constitutional Convention debates that the
President has "the power to repel sudden attacks.""7
To be sure, these constitutional authorities have been given both
broad and narrow constructions," often depending on the context at
expedient, a marine corps, it has power to create a marine corps, make appropriation for its pay, but provide that such appropriation shall not be available
unless the marine corps be employed in some designated way ....
27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259, 260 (1909) (emphasis added).
52. The Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. For a discussion of the rulemaking authority, see
infra text accompanying notes 238-59.
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
54. Id. § 2, cl. 1.

55. Id. § 3, cl. 1.
56. Article II, § 2, cl. 2 provides, in pertinent part:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, . . . .
Section 3, of the same Article, provides that the President "shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers."
Alexander Hamilton, among others, asserted a broad construction of these clauses in the
foreign affairs application. See PACIFICUS, supra note 2, at 438-39. But see HELVIDIUS, supra
note 2 (James Madison criticizing this Hamilton construction).
57. 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 41, at 438 (remarks of James Madison and Elbridge
Gerry).
58. Exemplary of a broad interpretation of executive authority are the remarks of
Monroe Leigh, former State Department Legal Advisor, stating that the President's war powers include among other things:
[The] power to introduce troops pursuant to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United
States, its territories or possessions, or upon its armed forces, . . . to protect and
rescue U.S. nationals abroad, to protect U.S. embassies and legations, and under
certain circumstances to carry out our security commitments, . . . [and] to use

1989]

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

hand, public opinion concerning the war or combat situation, and
the institutional perspective of the political branch in issue. However, it is clear that the Framers intended these collective powers to
be broadly applied in order to meet unforeseeable circumstances. 59
Largely for this reason, these divided powers were and are incapable
of precise delimitation."0
From this catalogue of constitutional authorities, the War Powers Resolution principally and expressly relies upon three legislative
and one executive war powers. The congressional Declare War
Clause is explicitly referenced in the statute in the purpose and policy section, the reporting requirement section, and the section requiring automatic disengagement of troops in the absence of congressional action.61 The Necessary and Proper Clause is also noted in
the purpose and policy section as one of the constitutional authorities
on which the statute is premised. 2 A third congressional power, the
Rulemaking authority, is implicitly utilized to expedite legislative
American forces to forestall any direct and imminent threat of attack upon the
United States, to suppress civil insurrection, and to implement the terms of an
armistice or cease-fire designed to terminate hostilities involving U.S. forces.
War Powers Resolution: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Senate Hearings]. A similar construction was
recently echoed in the testimony of Abraham Sofaer, State Department Legal Advisor, noting
that the enumeration of executive authority in section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution omits
the following:
[T]he protection or rescue from attack, including terrorist attacks, of U.S. nationals in difficulty abroad; the protection of ships and aircraft of U.S. registry
from unlawful attack; responses to attacks on allied countries with whom we
may be participating in collective military security arrangements or activities,
even where such attacks may threaten the security of the United States or its
armed forces; and responses by U.S. forces to unlawful attacks on friendly vessels or aircraft in their vicinity.
1988 Senate Hearings,supra note 1, at 1053. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982) (congressional view of the scope of executive war powers as stated in § 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution). For a reproduction of section 2(c), see infra note 64.
59. Alexander Hamilton noted, for example:
These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satitfy them. The
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the
care of it is committed. This power ought to be co-extensive with all the possible
combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the
same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defence.
THE FEDERALIST, No. 23, at 200 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
60. See, e.g., infra note 102.
61. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541(c) (1982) (purpose and policy), 1543(a) (reporting requirement),
1544(b) (automatic termination).
62. Id. § 1541(b).
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consideration."3 Finally, the purpose and policy section explicitly
states the circumstances when Congress believes the Commander-inChiefs authority is lawfully employed. 4 The Resolution also qualifies its application, stating that no provision "is intended to alter the
constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President." 5 From
this review of the statute and the constitutional authorities already
enumerated, it is apparent that Congress did not expressly rely upon
its full constitutional authority in the war powers area in enacting
the War Powers Resolution."
The constitutional scheme suggests that the federal war powers
were intended to be separated among the branches. As a general
principle, this broad divorcing of authorities serves to check the exercise of potentially abusive authority by diffusing it.0 Concerning the
division of war powers, the Supreme Court long ago framed the constitutional issue with regard to the application of the respective war
powers of the branches in this manner:
63. Id. §§ 1545-1546a (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
64. Section 2(c) of the statute provides:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commanderin-Chief to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories
or possessions, or its armed forces.
Id. § 1541(c) (1982).
For a discussion of the nature of this statement of executive authority relative to the rest
of the Resolution, see infra note 101.
65. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d) (1982).
66. Some commentators have noted the almost exclusive reliance of the statute on the
legislative power to declare war. For example, Elliot Richardson, former Secretary of Defense
and Attorney General, testified, "The War Powers Resolution appears to rest on only one of
Congress' powers: the power to declare war." 1988 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 185.
In comparison to the War Powers Resolution, one reform proposal, the Hostilities Act,
specifies in a finding and purpose section most of the congressional war powers on which it
relies. See H.R. 3912, §§ 2(b), (c), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), 134 CONG. REC. H250
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988). See also 134 CONG. REC. H253-54 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (sectionby-section analysis).
67. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (noting
that "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or body of magistrates"); Congress, the President, and the War Powers, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 House Hearings] (statement of John Stevenson, Legal Adviser to the State Department) (noting that "the
Federalist papers show that the principle of shared authority grew out of a desire to restrain
precipitous or impetuous entry into war"); 1988 Senate Hearings,supra note 1, at 189 (remarks of former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General Elliot Richardson) ("The separation of powers always recognized the potential for stalemate or paralysis. It was a conscious
price paid for the avoidance of tyranny.").
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Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to
provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with
vigor and success, except such as interferes with the command
of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and
duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief. Both these
powers are derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined
by that, instrument. Their extent must be determined by their
nature, and the principles of our institutions. . . . But neither
can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the
proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the President."'

In practice, the contours of these divided powers are often opaque
and frequently in fact shade into significant areas of overlap."' This
form of concurrent authority was characterized by Justice Robert H.
Jackson as delineated by a "zone of twilight.""0 Then Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist echoed this theme before a Senate panel:
The Framers did not set up a checkerboard of rigidly marked
alternately colored squares with one color assigned to the President and the other to Congress. They designed a more flexible
plan for joint responsibility which left room for "play at the
joints." Indisputably belonging to Congress alone is the decision
as to how much money shall be appropriated to the raising and
supporting of the United States military forces. Indisputably belonging to the President alone is the power to repel sudden attacks, the power to determine how hostilities lawfully in progress shall be conducted, and the power to protect the lives and
68. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866).
69. Generally, the separation of powers are not recognized as mutually exclusive. James
Madison wrote that "the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers
in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others." THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The Supreme Court has noted, the Framers
"saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would
preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). See also Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 659 (1989)
(noting that "the Framers did not require - and indeed rejected - the notion that the three
Branches must be entirely separate and distinct") (citations omitted).
70. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of toilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.") (emphasis added).
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safety of U.S. forces in the field. The middle ground is understandably less clearly delineated, but there are guideposts based
both on historic usage and the language of the Constitution
which shed light on the proper allocation of responsibility in
particular cases." 1

With regard to the separation of powers, the Supreme Court has
recently noted:
That this system of division and separation of powers produces
conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it
was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous and-open
debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide
avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power."

Under the general guidelines of the Constitution, Congress has
the primary authority to supply and regulate the military instrumen-

talities," s while the President essentially has the power to direct the
71. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy & Scientific Development of the Senate Foreign Affairs Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 238 (1970) [hereinafter 1970
Senate Hearings], reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 25,110, 25,111 (1973).
72. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). One author commented, "We will
never be able to define with any precision the meaning of executive and legislative, or show
where one branch fades and begins to blend into another." L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 323-24 (1985).
This point is particularly apt with regard to the war powers. John Quincy Adams remarked, "The respective powers of the President and Congress of the United States, in the
case of war with foreign powers, are yet undetermined. Perhaps they can never be defined."
J.Q. ADAMS, THE LIVES OF MADISON AND MONROE 58 (1850). Similarly, W.T. Mallison,
professor of law, stated:
The most striking feature of a survey of presidential and congressional war
powers is that the powers are so comprehensive that they overlap, and the most
important and difficult area is this overlappinq one. It is not reasonable or
practical to expect that overlapping powers will be resolved by simplistic
definitions.
1970 House Hearings, supra note 67, at 33 (emphasis added). Senator John Tower noted,
with regard to foreign policy, that "the Constitution itself offers no clear definition as to where
legislative authority ends and Presidential prerogative begins. . . .Nowhere in the Constitution is there unambiguous guidance as to which branch of government has the final authority
to conduct external relations." Tower, Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and
Implementation of American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229, 231 (1981). Elliot Richardson, former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, concurred noting that the war
powers of the President and Congress "in a very real sense overlap or blend." 1988 House
Hearings, supra note 5, at 136. See also infra note 194.
73. One recent reform bill expressly relied upon this collective congressional authority
by noting that "the United States Armed Forces are raised, supported, provided for, and maintained by the Congress in the exercise of its constitutional powers." H.R. 3912, § 2(b)(4),
100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H250 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988). Expounding on this
authority, the measure further noted that "the Congress has a role in determining whether the
United States Armed Forces it creates become involved in hostilities, and it may decide
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use of such means and the deployment of the established armed
forces and to make tactical command decisions. A separation was
clearly intended, as James Madison noted:
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things,
be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the
latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the
power of executing from the power of enacting laws.7 4
Thus, in the Constitution, there is an apparent division of labor with
respect to the supplying and directing of the armed forces.7 5
By virtue of the divided powers, it follows that there are particular authorities exclusively delegated to one branch and not the
other. However, somewhere along a continuum of exclusive authority, anchored on one side by the President and on the other by Congress, lies the "zone of twilight," as referred to by Justice Jackson,
and the locus of the "invitation to struggle," as characterized by Professor Corwin. The separation between the congressional responsibility for supplying the instrumentalities and the presidential responsibility for their direction establishes an inherent tension, ripe for
interbranch conflict and confrontation. However, within this realm
of concurrent authority there is also a legitimate and vital national
need for comity and accommodation between the branches and for
effective working relationships. Through accommodation, the
branches will be better able to pursue the ultimate objective of permitting flexible and efficient war powers responses in times of national crisis, consistent of course with the respective authority and
institutional advantage of each branch. It is upon this "field of confrontation and accommodation" that the nation proceeds to offensive
or defensive war.
Under a governmental system of divided authorities, with the
political branches in disagreement, war might be waged half-heartedly at best. The Vietnam experience is perhaps this country's most
whether to provide armed forces in circumstances where hostilities may later develop." Id.§
2(b)(7). See also 134 CONG. REC. H254 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis).
74. HELVIDIUS, supra note 2, at 148 (Letter No. 1 of Helvidius) (emphasis in original).
75. James Madison stated this point:
The separation of the power of declaring war, from that of conducting it, is
wisely contrived, to exclude the danger of its being declared for the sake of its
being conducted. The separation of the power of raising armies from the power
of commanding them, is intended to prevent the raising of armies for the sake of
commanding them.
15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 521 (eds. Mason, Rutland, Sisson 1985).
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profound example of this scenario. When the same departments are
in accord, the war effort could be prosecuted to its fullest potential,
only constrained by the management of the available resources. Vital
decisions are made against the backdrop of the divided war powers.
The price paid for a system founded on important "checks and balances" is the potential for great discord. Senator Taft made this
point in 1973 during the debate on the War Powers Resolution:
The events of the last 10 years in Southeast Asia have shown
that the question of war powers is more than a legal and
constitutional question, more than a question of the perennial
struggle for power between the three branches of Government:
It is a question of whether, in times of crisis, our country will
be united in the face of its enemies, or in a position to be divided against itself in bitter dispute. 6
Because absolute solutions are difficult to achieve in this area,
and because the branches are so interdependent on one another, comity is necessary to ensure sustained, effective national responses in
the war powers area. Thus, in the face of legal or political disagreement, and out of respect for the institutional prerogatives of the other
branch, the President and Congress must often cooperate and overlook disunity of principle in order to attain needed national policy
ends. Toward this aim and against this background, reform of the
War Powers Resolution is explored.
III.

THE NECESSITY OF A STATUTORY INFRASTRUCTURE

Before discussing specific areas of legislative reform, it is useful
to address the necessity of a war powers statute in the first place.
The point is occasionally made that since Congress has ample constitutional authority over war powers matters, a statutory mechanism,
such as the War Powers Resolution, is redundant.77 In this vein,
76. 119 CONG. REC. 33,567 (1973) (conference report debate).
77. This viewpoint has most frequently been articulated by members of the executive
branch. Former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General Elliot Richardson testified, "Our
real protection must ultimately depend on the willingness of each Branch to respect the responsibilities and prerogatives of the other - and that is a spirit which does not lend itself to
legislation." 1988 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 185. State Department Legal Advisor,
Abraham Sofaer, added:
[The War Powers Resolution] underestimates the power of Congress in the
sense that it is not needed to make clear that Congress has substantial power
under the Constitution in matters concerning war. And the Resolution is also
unnecessary in that it can grant Congress no more power in such matters than
the Constitution allows.
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1048. In addition, Secretary of Defense Frank Car-
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some have urged the complete repeal of the statute.7
Although the constitutional war power of Congress is certainly
substantial, including the collective power to supply military means
and the power of the purse, there are several arguments in favor of a
strong War Powers Act. In fact, even President Richard Nixon's
veto message on the War Powers Resolution intimated some positive
attributes obtainable from legislative enactment, particularly in the
area of consultation. 9
lucci remarked:
I have come to the conclusion that no conceivable statutory scheme regarding
war powers can improve on what we have had all along: an Executive which
can act, plan, command and manage efficiently and successfully; and a Legislature which can use the power of the purse both to steer the broad direction of
national policy and to terminate any Executive endeavor requiring an appropriation of funds to which the American people overwhelmingly object.
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1166.
Some legislators, however, have also echoed this view. Senator Thurmond, during War
Powers Resolution debate, noted that "the Congress has considerable authority in this area"
through the power of the purse "and I see no reason for new legislation which would limit the
President's ability to meet emergency situations." 119 CONG. REC. 25,104 (1973). Senator
Hruska agreed, noting that legislation is not needed to restore balance to the constitutional war
powers because the "Congress has been playing its role all along, through the use of the purse
strings, regulation of the size of the military, and expressions of viewpoints either in accord
with or in opposition to policies taken by the executive branch." Id. at 25,110. Further, Representative Kemp added, "[Tihe enactment of war powers legislation such as that before us today
is hasty and may be unnecessary. The Congress already has the power to control warfare, and
in recent years has begun to use that power. . . . We are only as powerless as we make
ourselves ..
" Id. at 33,866 (conference report debate).
During the veto override debate, Senator Bellmon reasoned, "Anytime the Congress genuinely wishes to force the withdrawal of American forces from any area of the world or from
any combat situation we can do so by withholding appropriations as we did in the Cambodian
bombing situation earlier this year." Id. at 36,195. Representative Buchanan added that a
congressional role on war powers matters is not required by the House bill and "was illustrated in the role of the Congress through the appropriations process to cut off the bombing in
Cambodia by August 15, 1973, which did, in fact, accomplish this result." Id. at 36,212.
78. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci testified that "the War Powers Resolution is a
failure and should be repealed." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1147. He added:
[Tihe most prudent step the Congress can take to clarify the issue of war powers and to maximize the effectiveness and legitimate exercise of authority by all
three branches of government is to repeal the War Powers Resolution and return to the only formula I know which will withstand the test of time, namely
the Constitution.
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1160. State Department Legal Advisor Abraham
Sofaer voiced the concurring opinion of the State Department that the statute "should be repealed altogether. We particularly urge repeal of Section 2(b), 5(b), 5(c) and 8(a)." 1988
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1067.
79. President Nixon made this point:
The responsible and effective exercise of the war powers requires the fullest
cooperation between the Congress and the Executive and the prudent fulfillment
by each branch of its constitutional responsibilities. House Joint Resolution 542
includes certain constructive measures which would foster this process by en-
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First, to the extent that some of the war powers are independent or exclusive, this article presupposes that each co-equal branch
will reserve for itself the capacity to vigorously exercise its assigned
powers to their fullest potential. This is, in part, an acknowledgment
of the divided nature of war powers and a recognition that each
branch serves a unique role by performing its separate institutional
functions. Accordingly, Congress may determine that a statutory
mechanism in the war powers area may serve as a necessary and
proper means for the better fulfillment of its independent constitutional authority. As will be seen, many of the proposed reforms may
be adopted pursuant to Congress' rulemaking authority. To the extent such reforms will be confined to the internal, housekeeping matters of the legislative arena, Congress, sua sponte, is establishing
procedures it concludes enable more effective legislative action.
Therefore, some significant internal reforms might not need to comply with the standard Article I procedure for enactment of legislation, including the bicameral and presentment requirements.
For example, as part of an internal procedural infrastructure,
Congress may wish to establish a formalized process by which it
makes sua sponte determinations concerning whether a situation of
hostilities exists in order to trigger congressional consideration of legislation and expedited procedures for examining such legislation. Additionally, where Congress adjourns for longer than the constitutional period of three days, Congress might provide a method for
hancing the flow of information from the executive branch to the Congress. Section 3, for example, calls for consultations with the Congress before and during
the involvement of the United States forces in hostilities abroad. This provision
is consistent with the desire of this Administration for regularized consultations
with the Congress in an even wider range of circumstances.
Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PuB. PAPERS 893, 895 (Oct. 24, 1973), reprinted in 119
CONG. REC. 36,176 (1973) (veto override debate).
Moreover, with regard to the automatic termination provision under section 5(b), the veto
message noted that:
[Tihe proper way for the Congress to make known its will on such foreign
policy questions is through a positive action, with full debate on the merits of
the issue and with each member taking the responsibility of casting a yes or no
vote after considering those merits. The authorization and appropriationsprocess represents one of the ways in which such influence can be exercised.
PUB. PAPERS 894-95 (Oct. 24, 1973) (emphasis added). See also 119 CONG. REC. 36,204
(1973) (veto override debate) (remarks of House Min. Leader Gerald Ford) (noting that President Nixon indicated in a telegram his interest in "designing ... a constructive war powers
bill . . . where there is a closer working relationship and a partnership between the" two
branches) (emphasis added). Accord 1988 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 210 (remarks of
Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State) (noting that consultation "is especially important
where there is shared power" between the branches).
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reassembling itself sua sponte to consider war powers matters that
arise during the adjournment
period.
Second, because the exercise of war powers frequently involves
"shared" or "concurrent authority," an effective statutory war
powers mechanism might promote comity more effectively by fostering
an improved legislative-executive branch environment for making
war powers decisions. Resolution of many war powers issues, despite
the potential for an interbranch constitutional "showdown," may ultimately result from accommodation or confrontation between the
two political branches. Thus, the political departments may resolve
that it is necessary and proper to establish procedural guidelines for
making war powers decisions in this constitutional area, often involving concurrent authority or falling within the "zone of twilight."
Along these lines, improvements to the consultation and reporting requirements might provide enhanced communicative channels
and dialogue between the branches on these delicate and time-sensitive matters, thereby minimizing possible conflicts. Interbranch communicative reforms will help distribute information essential for the
meaningful exercise of each branch's constitutional function and will
promote the goal of collective judgment over these shared powers.
Experience under the statute also highlights a gap in statutory construction resulting from the application of divergent definitions of
"hostilities." The branches may wish to utilize the legislative process
to reach accord on a better statutory definition of this critical trigger
term. Although the establishment of a definitive definition may not
be fully possible, the branches may reach statutory agreement at
least on the essential qualitative and quantitative elements to be relied upon in making these decisions.
An effective reform measure must take into account both the
political and constitutional dimensions of the use of armed forces.
For example, the congressional use of efficient and effectively
designed expedited procedures may send a signal to the White House
that congressional sentiment on a particular war powers measure is
building. One proposal is to require forty-percent co-sponsorship of
war powers legislation before such expedited procedures could be invoked. This would serve to focus congressional deliberation on specific measures and would inform the President of serious congressional support on specific proposals.
In sum, to the extent statutory reform seeks substantive modification, it is unnecessary in light of the already established allocation
of the constitutional war powers. However, to the extent such reforms focus on procedural alteration to promote comity and an effec-
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tive decision-making process, such a statutory infrastructure may
provide attendant institutional benefits otherwise unobtainable in the
absence of such a statutory scheme.
However, any such reforms must be carefully crafted since an
inadequate statutory structure would be counterproductive and
would unnecessarily aggravate the war powers decision-making process-a process already fraught with the inherent tension of the constitutional separation of powers. The War Powers Resolution, in its
current form, is an example of a statute handicapping, rather than
enhancing, effective war powers decisions. In several regards, the
Resolution may now serve to provoke, rather than alleviate, confrontation resulting from, for example, the taint of Chadha-impacted
provisions, the arbitrary sixty-day automatic disengagement provision, and uncertainty over the circumstances triggering "hostilities."
Thus, while statutory reform has the potential to inhibit the attainment of a more effective decision making process, a properly
designed statutory mechanism or infrastructure may also formalize
and improve the process of making substantive policy decisions. As
we turn to this topic, preliminary consideration is given to the necessity of establishing a statutory infrastructure or process that permits
the development of policy to be adapted to the unique and unanticipatable "hostilities" situations that may be presented.
IV.

ALLOWING FOR TAILORED RESPONSES

A requisite feature of any competent war powers measure is
that it allow for flexible action by either the legislative or executive
branch. Because it is not possible to foresee all potential uses of the
war power, any reform legislation should be careful not to foreclose
options or telegraph potential pre-established courses of action. In
other words, any war powers mechanism should preserve for the political branches the capacity to administer responses that are "tailored" to their necessity. In this manner, such statutory reform
would complement, rather than breach, the constitutional scheme.
The objective of establishing a statutory infrastructure that permits only policy action tailored to the merits of the situation may
best be accomplished by two means. First, any reform measure
should avoid, in the absence of substantial justification, blunt, arbitrary presumptions that may be too rigid or inappropriate for all
circumstances. While the elimination of all arbitrary statutory limitations might not be attainable, any such statutory restrictions should
first be justified by serving some identified, compelling need. Generally, this can be demonstrated by exploring less restrictive alterna-
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tives for accomplishing the same governmental end, if available. Second, any war powers legislation should focus on the process for
considering specific war powers measures, rather than on the adoption of substantive changes to the allocation of constitutional powers.
Such efforts for substantive reform generally are guided by the desire
to provide greater certainty to the concurrent authority within the
"zone of twilight." In light of the overlapping authority under
the
Constitution, any such exercise is fruitless. The emphasis should instead be on procedural, rather than substantive reform, by augmenting the process by which Congress and the President make decisions concerning the introduction and involvement of United States
Armed Forces in hostilities.
A.

Avoiding Arbitrary Elements

One of the prominent deficiencies of the War Powers Resolution is that it contains an inessential, arbitrary component that has
major policy ramifications triggered by the mere passage of time.
This is the sixty-day time limit for automatic removal of United
States Armed Forces from hostilities under section 5(b) of the statute
(in the absence of congressional authorization or presidential certification of the need for a thirty days extension concerning the safety of
the United States Armed Forces).8" In fact, several original sponsors
of the War Powers Resolution conceded that this time period was
"arbitrary." 8 1 However, Senator Jacob Javits, one of the principal
80. Section 5(b) of the Wars Powers Resolution provides:
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title, whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to
which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of
United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or
(3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United
States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional
thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing
that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed
Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing
about a prompt removal of such forces.
50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982). H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (conference
report) noted that "[Ihe termination period in the House joint resolution was 120 days; in the
Senate amendment 30 days." The conferees settled on a 60-day period for automatic disengagement of military forces.
81. Senator Eagleton noted, "Admittedly it is an arbitrary period." 119 CONG. REC.
24,544 (1973) (emphasis added). See also id. at 24,541 (remarks of Sen. Javits); S. REP. No.
220, 93d Cong., 1stSess. 28 (1973) ("The choice of thirty days [in the Senate bill], in a sense,
is arbitrary.") (emphasis added).
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architects of the War Powers Resolution, noted that an early
mandatory withdrawal period of the military forces was designed to
(1) involve Congress early in a situation of "hostilities," and (2) address the need for potential emergency action.8" Senator Javits also
noted that the pre-established time period could be foreshortened or
extended if Congress acted to do so. 8 This blunt instrument does not
satisfy the suggested "less restrictive alternative" standard since it
establishes a statutory presumption in favor of major policy disengagement, without affirmative congressional action, and therefore
may be inappropriate under the circumstances.
To be sure, this quantitative durational limit on the use of
armed forces in hostilities came under attack during the debate on
the War Powers Resolution. The criticisms presented in 1973 are
useful and persuasive in showing that such arbitrary provisions, considering their major substantive consequences, should generally be
left out of any statutory reform, unless a weighty countervailing justification is first established and in the absence of less restrictive alternatives. During the 1973 debate, it was argued that a statutorily
built-in time limitation under section 5(b) would be "inflexible," 8' 4
"could force Congress into a premature decision or end Presidential
action before a full assessment could be made of the situation, ' 85
The critics of this provision, including Senator Griffin, also noted its' arbitrariness during
the 1973 debate. 119 CONG. REC. 25,099 (1973). Senator Goldwater called the 30-day limit in
the Senate bill "unrealistic and . . . dangerous." Id. at 24,532. Likewise, Representative
Kemp remarked, "An arbitrarily fixed time limitation on Presidential authority contributes
nothing to the right of Congress to exercise its constitutional authority." Id. at 33,865 (conference report debate) (emphasis added). Representative Frelinghuysen stated simply that "this is
an arbitrarylimitation." Id. at 33,869 (conference report debate) (emphasis added). He added
later, "I should feel less sensitive about the arbitrary cutting off of a President's powers if
within the 60-day period there were some compulsion on Congress to take affirmative action"
rather than by changing national policy by inaction. Id. at 36,209-10 (veto override debate)
(emphasis added).
82. Id. at 24,541. See also S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973).
83. 119 CONG. REC. 24,541 (1973). See also id. at 24,544 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton).
84. Id. at 24,661 (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen). See also id. at 25,093 (remarks of
Sen. Ervin) (noting the provision was "impractical of operation").
85. Id. at 25,104 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond). Senator Thurmond explained, "It might
increase pressure to escalate hostilities in order to achieve the objective within this limited time
frame. It may precipitate a premature withdrawal of troops and cause more dislocations or
possibly endanger their lives." Id. Representative Kemp noted the time limitation "could seriously impede action or undermine negotiations in the future in a manner not desired by either
the President or the Congress at that time." Id. at 33,865 (conference report debate). Representative Cederberg described the possibility "in which a President had committed troops and
at the end of 90 days he could not militarily get them out safely, and the Congress had not
acted." Id. at 36,212 (veto override debate). Representative Hudnut warned that the 60-day
limitation "might well tempt some future aggressor to embark on a military collision course on
a belief that the United States would be paralyzed and unable to respond." Id. at 36,213 (veto
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"could lead to a piecemeal strategy in countering an attack or threat
of attack," 86 and might also be "excessively restrictive of the President's power." 8
Senator Griffin observed that it was best not "to prejudge the
circumstances in which our Armed Forces should be employed at
some time in the future" and that "the [time] period could be much
too long in some situations and too short in others."88 Congressman
Stratton warned that other countries would be aware that executive
action could be "negated in [60] days simply by inaction of the Congress" and such countries may consequently "not pay much attention
to" the President.89 Some members of Congress even opposed the
War Powers Resolution in part because they believed the limited
time period constituted a "blank check," 9 statutorily legitimizing exoverride debate).
86. Id. at 24,593 (remarks of Sen. Dominick). See also id. at 33,865 (conference report
debate) (remarks of Rep. Kemp) (noting "the 60-day limitation on Presidential action would
be unworkable as a practical matter and could generate pressures to escalate hostilities in order
to achieve objectives by whatever means possible within 60 days"). Accord Veto of the War
Powers Resolution, PuB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 36,176
(1973) (veto override debate) (noting "the provision automatically cutting off certain authorities after 60 days unless they are extended by the Congress could work to prolong or intensify
a crisis").
87. 119 CONG. REC. 25,104 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond). Senator Ervin concurred, noting that the bill precludes the President from "exercis[ing] his constitutional power
• . . for more than 60 days without the consent of Congress." Id. at 36,195 (veto override
debate). See also id. at 33,865 (conference report debate) (remarks of Rep. Kemp) (noting the
need for executive branch flexibility); id. at 36,195 (veto override debate) (remarks of Sen.
Bellmon) (same).
88. Id. at 25,100. Senator Eagleton imagined, "[T]hink of the first 90 days of the Vietnam War. What would have been the vote of Congress to bring [the military forces] out?" Id.
at 33,557 (conference report debate). Representative Frelinghuysen noted "that circumstances
may well require a longer period for the removal of our troops." Id. at 33,869 (conference
report debate).
The former and now current National Security Advisor, General Brent Scowcroft, explained the impact of this provision:
If the Resolution is triggered, the President then has an incentive to -get the
action completed within 60 or 90 days, regardless of the natural pacing of
whatever the issue is, and an opponent against whom the deployment is being
made has an incentive, (a) to trigger the Act, and then, (b) to try to stall for 60
to 90 days to see whether the United States will have to pull out.
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 118-19.
89. 119 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1973).
90. See, e.g., id. at 25,052 (remarks of Sen. Abourezk); id. at 33,560 (conference report
debate) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton). Senator Eagleton explained that the section provides "an
open-ended, blank check for 90 days of warmaking, anywhere in the world, by the President."
Id. at 33,556 (conference report debate). Senator Eagleton further commented, "The bill gives
the President . . . unilateral authority to commit American troops anywhere in the world,
under any conditions [the President] decides, for 60 to 90 days." Id. at 36,177 (veto override
debate). Representative Culver echoed that sentiment, noting that the bill gives the President
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ecutive use of armed forces during the sixty days.91 Some were concerned that such language would give the President an even greater
advantage in the exercise of war power. 92 Thus, section 5(b), in its
arbitrary disposition, may be unsuitable under many, if not most circumstances-conferring either too much time or not enough.
The exclusion of such fixed or predetermined constraints would
allow greater policy flexibility in the war powers decision-making
process. However, it is recognized that there are exceptions and at
least some durational time limits serve a significant end, in the absence of less restrictive alternatives, and should be incorporated into
a reform statute. Where such arbitrary predispositions might prove
to be essential, the necessity must be held to a high standard and
shown to be compelling. Statutorily arbitrary provisions, such as
those of section 5(b), that lead to major policy alterations without
"a blank check to wage war anywhere in the world for any reason ... for a period of 60 to
90 days." Id. at 36,221 (veto override debate).
91. Analyzing this provision, Senator Abourezk concluded, "The war powers bill establishes a 30-day limit [in the Senate bill] on 'undeclared' wars, initiated without congressional
approval." Id. at 25,052. Further, Representative Buchanan noted that "[t]here is clearly a
delegation for a 120-day period [in the House bill] to the President of the congressional
warmaking authority under the committee measure." Id. at 24,671. Representative Abzug
agreed, stating "I do not think we should give the President 120 days authority to conduct a
war, a power he does not have constitutionally." Id. at 24,684. In fact, Representative Holtzman commented, "[Tihe bill instead of limiting Presidential war powers enshrines the unilateral warmaking powers on the part of the President for 120 days" in the House bill. Id. at
24,698. According to Senator Eagleton, under this provision "all [the President] needs is a
whim or pretext or an intuitive reaction" and such deployment is "authorized in advance for
90 days, courtesy of the Congress." Id. at 33,557 (conference report debate).
Similarly, Representative Frelinghuysen warned, that "the President, for this fixed period, has virtually untrammeled authority." Id. at 33,869 (conference report debate). During
the veto override debate, Senator Eagleton concurred, stating, "If this becomes law we have
given a predated declaration of war to the President and any other President of the United
States, courtesy of the U.S. Congress." Id. at 36,189. Representative Young noted that the bill
"allows the President unlimited warmaking powers for up to 60 days in the absence of a
congressional declaration of war" which "is an even greater delegational of congressional responsibilities to the Executive than ever before in our history." Id. at 36,210. Representative
Dellums added that the bill "allow[s] any President a free hand for 60 days to commit troops"
and that "[t]his is a very high price to pay for the pleasure of shaking our fist at the President." Id. at 36,220.
Senator Javits, however, pointed out that section 8(d) of the War Powers Resolution
negates any inference of delegation. Id. at 33,558 (conference report debate). See also id. at
33,869 (conference report debate) (remarks of Rep. Fascell) (same); id. at 33,869-70 (conference report debate) (remarks of Rep. Fraser); id. at 36,209 (veto override debate) (remarks of
Rep. Bingham).
92. Senator Eagleton, in the conference report debate, noted "the incredible powers of
persuasion the President has at his command at all times, and especially during periods of
crisis" and that the consequence of authorizing such emergency action "is a fait accompli,"
making "the authority of Congress to rescind [through automatic termination] shallow indeed."
Id. at 33,557 (conference report debate).
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affirmative action once the designated deadline has passed, may be
distinguished, for example, from procedural time limitations that
may be necessary to enforce deadlines for affirmative action. Illustrative of this second category are those time periods within which expedited congressional action is required," and those requiring that
executive war powers reports be submitted within forty-eight hours
of a reportable event under the Resolution."' These specifications are
admittedly arbitrary. However, they do not result in severe changes
in policy and may be warranted as provisions integral to the enforcement of the Resolution and to the assurance of proper and timely
consideration, thus meeting some compelling need. Therefore, some
deadline soon after the specified event must be imposed for a war
powers report to be meaningfully received and assimilated. Additionally, if Congress is to act expeditiously, it must prescribe similar
time constraints on debate and committee consideration.
As another example in which such procedural reforms may be
required, section 3 of the War Powers Resolution provides that
"[tihe President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before" the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities." Some believe that this ambiguous trigger for consultation may have proven too inflexible, thereby precluding adequate
consultation. Under at least one reform proposal, it has been recommended that consultation occur before the President's decision to introduce troops into hostilities, but in no event later than forty-eight
hours after such decision." Therefore, some arbitrary limitations
93. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545-1546a (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See infra text accompanying
notes 400-90 for a discussion of these provisions and reform proposals.
94. 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (1982). See infra note 106 for the full text of this section.
When Presidents have submitted reports under this statutory reporting requirement, no
dispute has focused on complying with the 48-hour requirement. In fact, in 1975 hearings, the
State Department noted that no constitutional challenge had been asserted to this provision.
See infra note 163.
95. Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution provides:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until
United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been
removed from such situations.
50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982) (emphasis added).
96. H.R. 3912, § 3(c)(2), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H250-51 (daily ed.
Feb. 4, 1988). See also 134 CONG. REC. H254-55 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section
analysis) (discussing proposed consultation and conference provision); 1988 House Hearings,
supra note 5, at 132 (testimony of Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State) (noting the "singular"failure of the War Powers Resolution to require "meaningful" consultation by the Presi-

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

(particularly those with primarily procedural effects) may be necessary in order to ensure and enforce expeditious action and timely
exchange of information. These restraints appear warranted as an
effective means of ensuring timely action, particularly in the absence
of less restrictive alternatives.
In stark contrast to these justifiable limitations are the arbitrary
restrictions, such as section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, that
may result in drastic alterations in policy and without any compelling necessity and with less restrictive alternatives available. The
statutorily mandated disengagement at the end of sixty days may represent a complete 180 degree change in the course of this nation's
foreign policy, solely upon the passage of the specified time period.
The exclusion of the arbitrary statute provisions best permits
policy to be tailored to the situation at hand. The avoidance of arbitrary time limits, where possible, provides both Congress and the
President wider policy options and greater room for flexible
response.
B.

Reform Focuses on Process

The central issue posed by reform efforts concerns the actual
decision-making process employed by the two political branches in
the exercise of the war powers. Can a more capable statutory mechanism be established that is consistent with the respective constitutional authorities of Congress and the President and that allows the
institutional advantages and attributes of each branch to bear on
these vital issues? In answering this question, it is important that
reform concentrate on the process for making policy decisions, rather
than on substantive changes in the manner in which the war powers
are exercised by the President and Congress.
During the War Powers Resolution debate, the Senate legislative effort concentrated on clarification of substantive war powers authority. Largely because of the perceived need to redress an imbalance in the exercise of the constitutional war powers, the Senate
sought to statutorily define the respective powers of each branch. On
two occasions, the Senate approved a measure that would have enumerated only three instances in which the President could act in the
absence of a congressional declaration of war.9" These limited emerdent with the Congress "about actions that could lead to involvement in hostilities abroad").
97. S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973) ("The bill, S. 440, is identical in
text to S. 2956 which was passed by the Senate on April 13, 1972 by a vote of 69 to 16."). S.
440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) passed the Senate by a vote of 72 to 18. See 119 CONG. REC.
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gency situations in the Senate bill allowed the President, without
prior congressional authorization, to (1) repel an armed attack on
the United States, (2) repel an attack against United States Armed
Forces, and (3) protect United States citizens abroad.9" A fourth provision was considered "perhaps the most significant part of the bill"
as it dealt with the delegation of congressional authority to the President, which power could not be held in the absence of legislative
action.99 These were the only four specified executive war authorities
the Senate would recognize as constitutional exercises of war power
by the President.
Unlike the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution, the
House approach was primarily designed to establish a procedural
mechanism for decision-making between the branches on the use of
the armed forces.1 00 As part of a compromise between these divergent efforts, the conferees adopted a provision in the purposes and
policy section of the bill that purported to explain the congressional
view of executive war powers, but which did not have the force of
10
law. '
25,119 (1973).
These measures were part of an effort to limit executive authority through definition. See,
e.g., War Powers; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 House Hearings] (statement of Sen. Javits) ("By carefully defining these powers
we not only limit them, we also permit ourselves to assess the President's implementing action
against a very specific benchmark citation."). See infra text accompanying notes 127-30 for
further discussion on this "authority test" approach.
98. S. 440, § 3, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 25,119 (1973). As noted in the
accompanying Senate report:
The first three categories are codifications of the emergency powers of the President, as intended by the Founding Fathers and as confirmed by subsequent historical practice and judicial precedent. Thus, [these provisions] delineate by statute the implied power of the President, in his concurrent role as Commanderin-Chief, with respect to emergency use of the armed forces.
S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973).
99. Id. at 23.
100. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 21,220 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Findley) (noting that in
contrast with the Senate approach, the "House Foreign Affairs Committee felt it would be
unwise to draw such rigid lines between the President and the Congress" and that the committee sought "to preserve the maximum amount of flexibility in the War Powers Resolution").
101. H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (conference report) ("Subsequent sections of the joint resolution are not dependent upon the language of [section 2(c)].").
Senator Fulbright commented that the compromise forged in section 2(c) "aroused the
greatest controversy" among the Senate and House conferees. 119 CONG. REC. 33,548 (1973)
(conference report debate). Senator Eagleton criticized section 2(c) as "nonoperative." Id. at
36,189 (veto override debate). Senator Eagleton further criticized section 2(c) for containing
"precatory words" because he felt that the "very heart of the Senate bill . . .has been placed
in the 'whereas' section." Id. at 33,555 (conference report debate). Senator Javits simply noted
that "subsequent sections of the joint resolution are not 'dependent' upon the language of
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The objective of focusing on the process of decision-making,
rather than on substantive reform, in order to allow for flexible, tailored responses, is consistent with the constitutional design in two
respects. First, it comports with the fact that much of this area involves "concurrent" authority and "zones of twilight." Second, it
takes into account that the Framers deliberately established comprehensive war powers that could be applied to a variety of unforeseeable circumstances. As Justice Joseph Story made this point:
[Elvery power ought to be proportionate to its object. The duties
of superintending the national defence and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence, involve a provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can
be assigned; and therefore the power of making that provision
ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation
and the resources of the community. 0 2
The primary objective of reform should be to improve the decision-making process. Thus, the focus should be on fundamental attributes that contribute to efficient and effective decision-making by
taking into account the full constitutional powers and institutional
advantages and needs of each branch. Such a procedural emphasis is
less likely to lock-in constitutional questions or hurdles, particularly
since many decisions in this area involve grey areas of institutional
authority.
As an example, section 5(a) of H.R. 3912 proposes a procedural
mechanism to be used by Congress in considering legislation that
would impose limitations on the use of United States Armed Forces
in actual, imminent, or potential hostilities, or legislation amending
or repealing previously enacted hostilities legislation.' 0 3 Since only a
process is established for consideration of such war powers legislasubsection (2)(c)." Id. at 33,557 (conference report debate).
See supra note 64 for a reproduction of section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution, 50
U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982).
102. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, §
934, at 687 (1891 ed.) (discussing the General Welfare Clause). See also supra note 59.
Abram Chayes, Harvard Law Professor, remarked, "[Tihe exact manner and circumstances in which these [war] powers were to be exercised [by the President and the Congress]
was left, wisely in my view, to the exigencies and circumstances of the concrete occasions in
which exercises of the powers would be sought." 1970 House Hearings, supra note 67, at
136. McGeorge Bundy, former special assistant for National Security Affairs, reasoned that
"no single general rule [on the respective war powers authority] is likely to meet all our needs,
and in particular I think it is dangerous to try to deal with the future." 1970 House Hearings,
supra note 67, at 3.
103. H.R. 3912, § 5(a), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H251 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1988). See infra note 319 for the full text of section 5(a) of H.R. 3912.
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tion, the policy particulars are deliberately left to be supplied at the
time of debate for the situation presented. Further, this proposed legislation sets forth an illustrative menu of funding limitations that
could be imposed to backup the section 5(a) hostilities limitations,
but does not automatically implement any of the possible identified
spending restrictions.1" 4
Most important, under this approach the focus is on policy.
This focus allows for greater resilience in the government's response
and for the likelihood that a particular measure will be suitably fitted to a given situation. The emphasis is then placed more on the
adequacy of the policy response in the decision-making process-where it should be-and less on the legitimacy of the exercise
of the constitutional authority of the President or Congress. While
the question of the legitimate use of authority cannot be eliminated
under the constitutional scheme of divided powers, it should not be
resurrected during each war powers debate. Although a specific action by the President or Congress might conceivably be of questionable constitutionality under a particular application, a reform mechanism focusing on the process of decision making would not be
facially unconstitutional, but only invalid (if at all) as applied to a
given context.
Clearly, statutory reform should complement, not detract from
the constitutional objective of preserving war powers responses commensurate with their need. An effective decision-making process can
therefore serve to highlight avenues of interbranch cooperation and
leave room for flexible policy actions tailored to the exigencies of the
moment.
V.

DEFINING AND DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF
HOSTILITIES

During a decade and a half of experience under the War Powers Resolution, the most hotly contested issue between the President
and Congress has been whether and when United States Armed
Forces have been introduced into "hostilities."' 0' 5 This "hostilities"
104. H.R. 3912, § 5(b), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H251 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1988). See infra note 320 for the full text of section 5(b) of H.R. 3912.
105. Compare, e.g., WAR POWERS REPORT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOuSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (May 20, 1987) (noting with regard to the Persian Gulf missile attack on the
U.S.S. Stark that "[olur forces are not in a situation of actual hostilities, nor does their continued presence in the area place them in a situation in which imminent involvement in hostilities
is indicated, although we are mindful of recent Iranian statements threatening U.S. and other
ships under protection"), reprinted in STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ARMS CONTROL, INT'L
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determination is a matter of great consequence since it is the primary
triggering event that brings the central provisions of the War Powers
Resolution into play, including the provision for potential congressional action following the introduction of troops into such hostilities.'" 6 Although this statutory question takes place in the context of
SECURITY & SCIENCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RELEVANT DOCUMENTS,

CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS

92

(Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS] with
Letter from House Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante Fascell to Secretary of
State George Shultz (Sept. 21, 1987) (noting that "there is a growing impression that the War
Powers Resolution is not being taken seriously by the administration" with regard to the
United States naval presence in the Persian Gulf). Id. at 94. See also Crockett v. Reagan, 558
F. Supp. 893, 897 (D.D.C. 1982), affd per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984), in which the district court stated:
[A]though [judicial] consideration of the merits [on whether the War Powers
Resolution has been violated by aid to El Salvador] might reveal disagreements
about the meaning of War Power Resolution terms such as 'imminent involvement in hostilities,' the most striking feature of the pleadings at this stage of the
case is the discrepancy as to the facts [between the executive and legislative
branch parties].
See also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION: A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 233
(Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY] (noting congressional sentiment that President Carter failed to comply with the statute concerning the 1978 Zaire Airlift).
106. Actually, there are three enumerated circumstances under which the President may
invoke the statute. Under section 4(a), the President is required to submit a report within 48
hours where:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which the United States
Armed Forces are introduced (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for
combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; and
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.
50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1982).
However, according to Senator Javits' colloquy during the conference report on the War
Powers Resolution, "Sections 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3), which concern sensitive peacetime deployments of the Armed Forces, are not covered by the automatic termination provisions of section
5." 119 CONG. REC. 33,550 (1973). In addition, Representative Zablocki noted that "[the
conference agreement eliminates the mandatory termination provisions on peacetime deployments but continues to require that the President report within 48 hours to Congress on deployments of U.S. Armed Forces under [hostilities] circumstances specified in the legislation."
Id. at 33,859 (conference report debate). Senators Javits and Eagleton remarked that only
section 4(a)(1) triggers the 60-day clock under section 5. Id. at 36,188-90 (veto override debate). See also H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) ("The conference report
requires presidential reporting on [peacetime] deployments but section 5(b) does not require
their termination.").
Section 4(a)(2) was intended to apply to:
the initial commitment of troops in situations in which there is no actual fight-
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the War Powers Resolution, it is only part of the larger, ongoing,
historical debate between the branches over the application of their
respective constitutional war powers.
It is difficult to ascertain when a state of war exists to warrant
the exercise of the President's or Congress' constitutional war powers. In fact, one Supreme Court Justice once distinguished a state of
"imperfect war," describing "acts of hostility or reprisal" in which
Congress has not recognized a state of war, from a state of "perfect
10 7
war," in which formal war is declared between two nations.
Others have wrestled with this perplexing issue: where should the
demarcation between executive and legislative war authorities lie?
Such determinations are compounded not only by the fact that the
war powers are divided between the branches, but also because, as
former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General Elliot Richardson
recently noted, "[iun the real world there are no bright lines between
acts short of war and acts amounting to war."1 8
ing but some risk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities. A
report would be required any time combat military forces were sent to another
nation to alter or preserve the existing political status quo or to make the U.S.
presence felt. Thus, for example, the dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 1962
and the quarantine of Cuba in the same year would have required Presidential
reports. Reports would not be required for routine port supply calls, emergency
aid measures, normal training exercises, and other noncombat military activities.
H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
The contemplated utilization of section 4(a)(3) was described as follows:
While the word "substantially" designates a flexible criterion, it is possible to
arrive at a common-sense understanding of the numbers involved. A 100% increase in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy - say from 50 to 100 clearly would not be an occasion for a report. A thousand additional men sent to
Europe under present circumstances does not significantly enlarge the total U.S.
troops strength of about 300,000 already there. However, the dispatch of 1,000
men to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000 would
mean an increase of 25%, which is substantial. Under this circumstance, President Kennedy would have been required to report to Congress in 1962 when he
raised the number of U.S. military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.
Id. at 8.
107. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37, 39-40 (1800) (Washington, J., opinion in
seriatim).
108. See 1988 House Hearings,supra note 5, at 139 (testimony of Elliot Richardson).
During the Senate Hearings, Mr. Richardson commented:
The real problem I think concerns situations that do not involve protracted conflict and fall somewhere in between specific, immediate actions, such as the
strike against Libya or the somewhat larger scale operation against Grenada,
and that entail substantial use of United States force over what looks on its face
like a potentially protracted period. The commitment of U.S. naval forces to the
Persian Gulf was that kind of situation.
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 189. Alexander Hamilton, in his Pacificus Essays,
which may kindle a war, and which,
quoted Burlemaqui, "There are a great many unjust acts
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Among the references to the war powers divided between the
President and Congress in the Constitution, 0 9 the terms "hostilities"
and "imminent hostilities" are never used. Nonetheless, these are the
standards employed under the War Powers Resolution in attempting
to address the appropriate roles for each branch in the involvement
of United States Armed Forces. During the Senate debates on the
War Powers Resolution, Senator Thomas Eagleton framed the central issue posed by the legislation as follows: "What we are really
talking about in this bill is hostilities. .

.

. How do we get in them?

How do we avoid them? Who participates, and under what circumstances?"' 1 0 The essential question, then, is at what level of United
States troop involvement and under what scenario should the congressional role be implicated.' The hostilities trigger remains today
as perhaps the most critical issue involving executive and legislative
participation on war powers matters.
A.

Current Law: Triggering the Statute

Two forms of hostilities are recognized under the War Powers
Resolution: (1) actual hostilities and (2) imminent hostilities. 12
Before either of these two states of conflict occurs, the Resolution
requires the President to consult with Congress; within forty-eight
hours of the introduction of armed forces into either actual or imminent hostilities, the President is also required to submit a report to
however, are not the war itself." PACIFICUS, supra note 2, at 448 (second Pacificus essay)
(quoting Burlemaqui, vol. I, bk. IV, ch. III, §§ 4, 5).
109. For a listing of the constitutional war powers, see supra text accompanying notes
39-57.
110. 119 CONG. REC. 25,082-83 (1973). This statement was made in the context of
Senator Eagleton's amendment to include CIA activity under the war powers bill by broadening the legislation terms "Armed Forces" to essentially include clandestine activities. Id. at
25,079 (amendment No. 366). See, e.g., id. at 25,080 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton) ("To leave
out of [the Senate bill] the clandestine operations that a President may wish to carry out by
using CIA or civilian personnel is to leave an enormous loophole.
...). This amendment
failed in the Senate 34 to 53. Id. at 25,092.
111. Senator Robert Dole characterized the war powers question before the Congress in
1973 in this way: "[I1f the contours of the divided war power contemplated by the framers of
the Constitution are to remain, constitutional practice must include Presidential resort to Congress in order to obtain its sanction for the conduct of hostilities which reach a certain scale."
Id. at 33,564 (conference report debate) (emphasis added). See also id. at 33,866 (conference
report debate) (remarks of Rep. Kemp) (proposing various factual scenarios and asking "after
all, who is going to determine if 'imminent involvement is clearly indicated?' "); 1988 Senate
Hearings,supra note 1, at 28 (remarks of Sen. Sarbanes) ("The question is whether and what
kind of a commitment you are going to allow without congressional involvement in the
decision.").
112. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (1982). See also supra note 106 for the text of this section.
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Congress pursuant to section 4(a)(1) of the Resolution.11 Once a
hostilities report is submitted to Congress, the "core" provision of the
War Powers Resolution, section 5, is triggered.1 1 The statute also
specifies "peacetime deployment" circumstances under subsections
4(a)(2) (involving the introduction of armed forces into foreign territories equipped for combat) and 4(a)(3) (concerning a substantial enlargement of United States combat forces in foreign territories),
which do not implicate section 5."'
Under section 5(b) of the statute, the filing of the section 4(a)(1)
hostilities report with Congress starts a sixty-day clock, at the end of
which disengagement of United States troops is mandated, in the absence of (1) subsequent congressional authorization for continued
United States Armed Forces involvement, (2) an extension of time
authorized by Congress, (3) an armed attack on the Congress that
prevents it from meeting, or (4) presidential certification that thirty
additional days are needed to ensure safe removal of the military
forces." ' The sixty-day period commences "after a [hostilities] report
is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section
4(a)(1), whichever is earlier."17 The language reading "or is required to be submitted" was included, according to the House report,
in order to "take[] into account a situation in which the President for
whatever reason may decide not to submit a report. In that case, the
[sixty]-day period would begin after the [forty-eight] hour period referred to in [the reporting] section.""' As Senator Jacob Javits, a
principal Senate architect of the War Powers Resolution, explained:
"The 60-day clock begins to run from the time the report is due-48
hours after the causal event. Any delay in the submission of the re113. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542 (consultation), 1543(a)(1) (reporting) (1982). See supra note 95
for the full text of section 1542. See supra note 106 for the full text of section 1543(a)(1).
114. For a discussion that section 5, including the automatic withdrawal and concurrent
resolution subsections, was intended as the central enforcement mechanism of the statute, see
infra note 262.
115. For a discussion of the distinction between "hostilities" reports under subsection
4(a)(1) and "peacetime deployment" reports pursuant to subsections 4(a)(2) and (3), see supra
note 106.
116. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982). The 60-day period may be statutorily extended for up
to 30 additional days upon certification by the President that "unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of the United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such
armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces." Id. The extension period was "designed to specifically ...
meet a limited emergency contingency in which
U.S. Armed Forces might be trapped or so heavily engaged in hot combat on the 60th day as
to make their safe extrication by the 60th day impossible." 119 CONG. REC. 33,550 (1973)
(conference report debate) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
117. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
118. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1stSess. 10 (1973).
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quired report would be an infraction of the law and specifically
would not extend the 60-day time period." ' 9 In this manner, the
Resolution was intended to give Congress the opportunity to disagree
with the President, whether the filed report was filed pursuant to the
"hostilities" or the "peacetime deployment" provisions of section
4.120

Section 5(c), which is now of questionable constitutional validity
after the Chadha decision,12 1 contains a two-house legislative veto
(or concurrent resolution) by which Congress can remove United
States troops "engaged in hostilities.' 12 Because the statute affords
the President sixty days before mandating withdrawal (in' the absence of other congressional action), it was intended that the "[u]se of
the concurrent resolution device to foreshorten the time period
[would be] restricted to the initial 60-day period provided in section
5(b).' 28
The existence of hostilities, as determined under some objective
standard, is not a self-executing event which triggers the statute. A
finding that United States Armed Forces have been introduced into
hostilities must be. made by one of the political branches, typically
the executive branch. Under the terms and experience of the Act,
however, Congress usually (1) waits for the President to either consult with it or submit a report before the sixty-day clock commences
119. 119 CONG. REC. 33,550 (1973) (conference report debate).
120. Senator Javits commented during the conference report debate, "[W]e have the
right to determine, when [the President] sends a report, which he is obligated to do under three
broad categories set forth in section 4(a), whether it is a report which comes under the 60-day
time limit" as mandated under sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b). Id.
During the veto override debate, Senator Javits remarked, "If [the Congress] had some
different interpretation it would be up to us to decide whether we agreed with [the President]
or not, because the . . . 60-day limitation begins to run when he introduces the forces, not
when he says they are in imminent danger of hostilities." Id. at 36,188. In the conference
report debate, he noted, "[W]e have the discretion when we get a report as to whether we
consider it a report of hostilities under section 4(a)(1) or whether it is a report of peacetime
4
4
deployment under section (a)(2) or (a)(3)." Id. at 33,558. Senator Javits concluded that
"where the President does report, Congress may very well decide that the report is one covered
by section 4(a)(1) . . . and therefore does trigger the 60-day [automatic termination] period,
even though he may not think so." Id. at 33,551.
121. For a discussion of the impact of Chadha on the War Powers Resolution, see
supra text accompanying notes 15-25.
122. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982).
123. 119 CONG. REC. 33,550 (1973) (conference report debate) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
During the veto override debate, Senator Javits pointed out, "The 60 days can be curtailed by
concurrent resolution of the House and the Senate." Id. at 36,188. Representative Zablocki
noted during the debate on the conference report that "the conference version retains the
House-passed provision permitting Congress to terminate a Presidential action sooner than 60
days by passage of a concurrent resolution which would be immune from veto." Id. at 33,859.
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or (2) insists that the executive branch comply with the statute because Congress has determined itself that United States military
forces have been introduced into hostilities.
B.

Defining "Hostilities"

During consideration of the War Powers Resolution, different
viewpoints were expressed on whether the term "hostilities" should
be specified. Some legislators believed that hostilities should be defined in the statute, 2 4 while others argued that such enumeration
was impossible, inappropriate or would limit congressional options. 125 Senator Barry Goldwater, who opposed the War Powers
Resolution, argued that one of the bill's greatest deficiencies was its
lack of definition. "[A]bsent a definition of 'hostilities,' " he noted,
"there is no guarantee on the face of the [war powers] bill that
124. For example, Senator Dominick asked, "I wish someone would tell me how we
would define these two words ['imminent' and 'hostilities'] within the time period necessary to
give the President the authority to respond to a military threat." Id. at 24,593. Compare 1988
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 272 (remarks of Prof. Louis Henkin, Columbia University
School of Law) (noting the difficulty in drafting a definition but suggesting the addition of "a
section defining 'hostilities,' perhaps by linking them to acts of war under international war or
'activities that will probably involve U.S. forces in war or warlike activities' "); 1988 Senate
Hearings, supra note 1, at 319 (remarks of Prof. Michael Glennon, University of California,
Davis, Law School) (urging the necessity of a definition of hostilities).
125. Senator Jacob Javits, one of the primary authors of the War Powers Resolution,
was one of the strongest congressional advocates against adopting a definition for "hostilities."
See War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Senate Hearings]. Senator Javits commented,
"The bill does not endeavor to spell out a definition of the words 'military hostilities' but
adopts them as words of basic understanding." Id. at 28. He explained, "The definition of
military hostilities, I thought, should remain flexible because you can get involved in a big war
even through an action which might conceivably involve legation personnel or a Military Assistance Group." Id. at 481.
Others also urged a non-definition of "hostilities" or like statutory terms. For example,
Senator Taft commented with regard to his war powers bill S.J. Res. 18, "I have purposely
not attempted to define 'deployment and commitment to combat.'" Id. at 273. Alexander
Bickel, Professor of Law at Yale University concurred, stating:
It is at this point that my urge to codify vanishes. There is no way in which one
can define that term other than a good faith understanding of it and the assumption that in the future Presidents will act in good faith to discharge their
duty to execute the law.
1973 House Hearings, supra note 97, at 185 (emphasis added). Former Senator Charles
Mathias, Jr., explained, "It is hard to define the number, the character of these attacks on
American interests or threats to American interests; because they can change with circumstances, change with generations, and I think the War Powers Act is right in being silent in
any specific definitions." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 27-28.
Professor Charles Rice of the University of Notre Dame Law School concluded that the
term "hostilities" is "incapable of satisfactory definition [and] would be better left to political,
rather than to specified, statutory resolution." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 330.
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American forces can be introduced in crisis situations without a divisive confrontation between Congress and the President, unless Congress agrees with the President in advance of each deployment." 2 '
1. Other Definitions
In order to understand the complexities involved in this separation of powers and statutory construction issue, and before considering the statutory terms "hostilities" and "imminent hostilities," it is
useful to note other efforts made to articulate the point at which
executive and legislative war powers may be statutorily applied. For
example, the principal Senate author, Senator Jacob Javits, proposed
a trigger that would have focused not on the existence of a state of
"hostilities," but instead on the authority of the President. This "authority test" was adopted by the Senate during the 1973 War Powers Resolution debate, but did not survive the conference report. 1 1 7
The Senate version of the War Powers Resolution would have enumerated recognized circumstances of executive emergency war powers authority.' 28 Such a standard would have focused debate between
the branches on the issue of whether the President's use of armed
forces was ultra vires, as measured by the statutory specification.
Many critics of the Senate's "authority test" were concerned primarily that this approach would constitute an independent statutory delegation of authority to the President.' 2 9
In contrast, a quantitative approach was suggested by Senator
126.

Goldwater, The President'sAbility to Protect America's Freedoms-The WarmakLAW & Soc. ORD. 423 (ARIZONA ST. L.J.) (emphasis added), reprinted in
1973 House Hearings, supra note 97, at 433 n.79.
127. 119 CONG. REC. 33,557 (1973) (conference report debate) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
Senator Javits contrasted the "performance test" triggering mechanism in the House bill and
incorporated in the conference report with the "authority test" under the Senate bill and rejected by the conferees. Id. at 33,559. He noted that "unlike the Senate bill, the delineation of
authority in section 2(c) [of the conference report] is not the triggering mechanism for the
subsequent provisions of the bill." Id. at 33,550. See also supra note 97, for a discussion of the
"authority test."
128. Section 3 of the Senate approved bill provided for the emergency use of the armed
forces by the President in the absence of a declaration of war: (1) to "repel an armed attack
against the Armed Forces of the United States, its territories and possessions," (2) "to repel an
armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United States located outside of the United
States, its territories and possessions, and to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an
attack," (3) to rescue U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and on the high seas, or (4) "pursuant
to specific statutory authorization." S. 440, § 3, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 25,119
(1973). See also S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1973) (explaining section 3 of S.
440).
129. See e.g., supra text accompanying notes 90-92. See also infra text accompanying
note 191 for a discussion of Justice Robert Jackson's separation of power analysis.

ing Power, 1971

19891

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

J. W. Fulbright, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee who was also one of the strongest critics of the "authority
test."' 0 During Senate debate on the War Powers Resolution, Senator Fulbright proposed a provision for the congressional regulation of
peacetime deployment of United States troops by the President. His
amendment would have been triggered by the deployment of a "major unit of the Armed Forces of the United States," defined as "at
least a squadron of aircraft or its equivalent," or "any two or more
major combatant boats or vessels (other than ballistic missile submarines)" or "at least a brigade of troops or its equivalent." ''
Professor John Norton Moore also advocated a quantitative approach under his so-called "magnitude test," which would have required congressional approval for "the initial commitment to major
and sustained hostilities," while leaving room for independent executive action "[blelow that [specified] threshold."'3 2 The objective of
this approach was to be "more functionally responsive to the major
policy decision of the Constitutional Convention to require congressional authorization before the Nation becomes committed to major
hostilities abroad." ' As part of this proposal, Professor Moore suggested an "upper limit for independent presidential authority to
commit the Armed Forces to military hostilities of commitments involving 25,000 or more troops."'" 4 Others have also promoted such a
quantitative-based approach,"3 5 including, ironically, some of the
130. S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1973) (supplemental views of Sen.
Fulbright).
131. 119 CONG. REC. 25,086 (1973) (amendment No. 361, proposed section 8(d)). The
amendment also contained a two-house legislative veto, which is now considered to be a violation of the separation of powers in the legislative process. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) and supra text accompanying notes 15-25. Senator Fulbright's amendment was rejected
by the Senate. 119 CONG. REC. 25,092 (1973).
132. 1971 Senate Hearings,supra note 125, at 479 (statement of John Norton Moore,
Professor of Law, University of Virginia). See also 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at
465 ("This (magnitude] test is a rough effort to separate major hostilities from those not involving substantial casualties and commitment of resources ....");War Powers Legislation
Hearings Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 House Hearings] (statement of John Norton Moore); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 67, at 124, 126-27 (proposing that "congressional authorization might be required 'in all cases where regular combat
units are committed to 'sustained hostilities' ") (emphasis in original) (quoted in After
Chadha, supra note 24, at 773).
133. 1971 Senate Hearings,supra note 125, at 466 (statement of John Norton Moore).
134. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 132, at 94.
135. See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings, supra note 67, at 349-50 (statement of Rep. Anderson); 1971 House Hearings, supra note 132, at 67 (remarks John Stevenson, Legal Advisor, Department of State) (proposing congressional approval required for executive use of more
than 25,000 troops for more than 30 days); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 97, at 107
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Framers during the Constitutional Convention.""6
It should be noted that any of these proposals will not be
adopted without certain tradeoffs. A quantitative standard carries
with it the benefits of certainty and straightforwardness in ascertaining when the congressional role should be invoked. However, the
primary drawback of a purely quantitative approach is the exclusion
from consideration of potentially significant qualitative factors that
otherwise might be utilized in determining the existence of a state of
"hostilities." As Senator Eagleton noted, "[m]odern weaponry does
not require large numbers of men. A war could be started with one
pilot."' 13 7 Moreover, a quantitative approach may not only be overly
simplistic, but also arbitrary and inflexible as applied to unforeseeable circumstances.
During consideration of the war powers legislation, Senator
Eagleton, one of the early proponents of legislative reform but who
ultimately opposed the conference report and supported the President's veto," 8" urged a definition based on a determination of
(remarks of Rep. Leggett) (suggesting no state of war for less than 5,000 men "committed to
armed combat outside the United States for less than 10 days unless expressly so declared by
the Congress"); 1973 House Hearings,supra note 97, at 71 (colloquy between Rep. Findley
and Sen. Eagleton) (suggesting 10,000 troop level).
136. Some of the participants during the Constitutional Convention advocated the adoption of a specific limitation on the size of the army in order to mitigate concerns over the
.establishment of a standing army. For example, Elbridge Gerry stated that he "could never
consent to a power to keep up an indefinite number" of troops in the army and proposed to
expressly limit this number to no more than two or three thousand. 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note
41, at 442-43. Mr. Gerry was joined by Luther Martin in formally offering the following
amendment: "Provided, that, in time of peace, the army shall not consist of more than
thousand men." 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 41, at 443. This motion was unanimously defeated
after some discussion that such a specific limitation was unnecessary. Roger Sherman also
supported a "restriction on the number and continuance of an army in time of peace." 5 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 41, at 511. Ultimately, a two-year appropriation limitation on the congressional power to raise and support an army was adopted as a restraint on the creation of
standing armies. 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 41, at 511.
The concerns over the limitation of an army did not end with the conclusion of the Convention. Luther Martin noted that among his reasons for withholding his signature from the
Constitution was that the congressional power to raise and support armies was "without any
limitation as to numbers ...." 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 58 (eds. Storing &
Dry 1981) (Mr. Martin's Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland)
(emphasis in original). Subsequently, "In nearly every state ratifying convention it was proposed either to limit the number of troops which might be raised, or to require a two-thirds
vote of the Congress to raise any at all." THE POWER TO RAISE ARMIES, supra note 42, at
210.
137. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 97, at 71.
138. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 33,555 (1973) (conference report debate) (noting that
"[m]y opposition to this bill is one of the most difficult choices I have had to make as a U.S.
Senator" in light of three years effort in support of war powers legislation). During recent
Senate Hearings, former Senator Eagleton explained his opposition to the War Powers Reso-
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whether troops have become involved in "combat activities. 1 89 This
version was analogous to the "armed conflict" standard originally
employed by the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs prior to markup of the
War Powers Resolution.'" Finally, Professor Raoul Berger suggested that hostilities are ascertainable under an "I know it when I
see it" approach."' While this latter test would be the most difficult
to apply, it does serve to indicate that a subjective judgment is inherent in all such decisions. With these proposals in mind, this article
will next consider the divergent constructions of "hostilities" as applied by Congress and the President under the War Powers
Resolution.
2.

The CongressionalPosition

Although the War Powers Resolution defines neither "hostilities" nor "imminent hostilities," the legislative history does offer
some, albeit limited, background on what Congress intended to be
considered those circumstances critical enough to trigger the statute.
The House report accompanying the War Powers Resolution notes:
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was
lution, despite his earlier support for reform legislation: "I voted against what had been my
own bill. To me, it was untenable and perhaps even unconstitutional in its attempt to give the
President the sole power to wage war." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note, 1 at 365.
139. S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Senator Eagleton's bill for war powers
reform defined "hostilities" to include:
land, air, or naval actions taken by the Armed Forces of the United States
against other armed forces or the civilian population of any other nation; the
deployment of the Armed Forces of the United States outside of the United
States under circumstances where an imminent involvement in combat activities
with other armed forces is of a reasonable possibility; or the assignment of members of the Armed Forces of the United States to accompany, command, coordinate, or participate in the movement of regular or irregular armed forces or any
foreign country when such foreign armed forces are engaged in any form of
combat activities.
1971 Senate Hearings,supra note 125, at 196 (statement of Sen. Eagleton) (emphasis added).
140. See infra text accompanying note 142.
141. Professor Raoul Berger, Professor of Law at Harvard University, remarked during
House Hearings:
I would say about hostilities what Justice Potter Stewart said about hardcore
propoganda, "I cannot define it but I think I can recognize it; a cock fight or a
fight between two soldiers plainly is not hostilities." Maybe a fracas between 50
soldiers is not hostilities; but for example, if 1,000 men invade American soil,
that is hostilities. If 1,000 soldiers start firing rockets and bombarding American
soldiers on German soil I would say that is hostilities . . ..
1973 House Hearings, supra note 97, at 213.
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considered to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a
situation in which fighting actually has begun, hostilities also
encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have
been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of
armed conflict. "Imminent hostilities" denotes a situation in
which there is a clear potential either for such a state of con1 42
frontation or for actual armed conflict.
Ten years after this report, in 1983, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee contemplated these statutory terms in the context of
authorizing the involvement of United States Armed Forces in the
Multinational Force in Lebanon. Based on its experience under the
statute, the committee implicitly addressed the efforts of others to
restrict the definition of hostilities:
In short, the exchange offire with hostile forces would indicate
an outbreak of hostilities, and a high probability of such exchanges would suggest "imminent involvement." Brief non-recurring situations such as occasional sniper fire would not suggest the continuing dangers associated with an ongoing set of
hostile circumstances.
Arguments have been made that a hostile situation was not
indicated by the present circumstances because the Marines:
(a) Only returned rather than initiated fire;
(b) Acted only in self-defense;
(c) Remained essentially in one location, rather than taking
offensive actions;
(d) Performed a mission of "peacekeeping," "presence," or
"interposition."
However, there is nothing in the legislative history of the
War Powers Act to indicate that any of these circumstances
would alter the fact that "hostilities" are indicated. For the
same reason, it is not conclusive that an area commander may
have decided, as in the present situation, to make his men eligible for "hostile fire pay." Nor is it necessary or sufficient that
fatalities occur in order to conclude that hostilities are
involved.14
It is clear from this legislative history, as well as from practice
under the Act, that Congress intended a liberal, rather than restrictive, construction of the term "hostilities." This term was intended to
142.
143.

H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) (emphasis in original).
S.REP. No. 242, 98th Cong., lstSess. 8-9 (1983) (emphasis added).
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include and be more expansive than "a clear and present danger of
armed conflict" or "exchange of fire with hostile forces." Moreover,
the inclusion of the terms "imminent hostilities" assured that the
statute could be broadly applied to situations even before full "hostilities" had developed.
3.

The Executive Branch Position

Because the War Powers Resolution is not triggered until
United States troops are introduced into "hostilities," it is not surprising that the executive branch, in contrast, has applied a narrow
or strict definition of this statutory term. 44 Indeed, there is a built-in
incentive for the executive branch to apply a restrictive definition of
hostilities in order to avoid commencement of the sixty-day clock,
which may lead to automatic disengagement of United States Armed
Forces. Thus, when the statute has not been invoked, the executive
branch retains greater flexibility in its use of armed forces.
During the 1975 congressional oversight hearings, Monroe
Leigh, Legal Advisor to the Department of State, and Martin R.
Hoffmann, General Counsel to the Department of Defense, provided
the following executive branch definition of "hostilities":
As applied in the first three war powers reports [by the executive branch], "hostilities" was used to mean a situation in which
units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges offire with opposing units of hostile forces, and "imminent hostilities" was considered to mean a situation in which
there is a serious risk from hostile fire to the safety of United
States forces. In our view neither term necessarily encompasses
irregularor infrequent violence which may occur in a particu14
lar area. 5
144. See, e.g., SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 105, at 201-02, 281 (discussing as one of
three primary concerns over the future of the War Powers Resolution the executive branch
efforts to restrict the scope of the statute by applying narrow definitions of "hostilities"); Note,
A Tug of War: The War Powers Resolution and the Meaning of "Hostilities," 15 PAC. L.J.
265, 286 (1984) (noting that under the statute, "a narrow reading of hostilities places significantly more authority with the President in committing troops to foreign lands, rather than

ensuring the collective judgment of both Congress and the President") (emphasis in original).
145. War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on InternationalSecurity and Scientific Affairs, House InternationalRelations

Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House Hearings] (Letter of
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, and Martin Hoffmann, General Counsel,
Department of Defense, to House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on

International Security and Scientific Affairs Chairman Clement Zablocki (dated June 3,
1975)) (emphasis added). The working definition was supplied at the request of House Sub-
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The legal advisers added that in defining the term "hostilities,"
"there is of necessity a large measure of judgment which is required"
and whether hostilities are present is "definable in a meaningful way
only in the context of an actual set of facts."'" An example of an
executive branch hostilities determination came in response to a committee question on the April 12, 1975 report concerning the evacuation from Phnom Penh, Cambodia. During that evacuation, the "last
1 47
elements of the force to leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire.'
The executive branch legal advisors answered:
Whether or not this rifle fire constituted hostilities would seem
to us to depend upon the nature of the source of this rifle fire i.e. whether it came from a single individual or from a battalion
of troops, the intensity of the fire, the proximity of hostile weapons and troops to the helicopter landing zone, and other evidence that might indicate an intent and ability to confront U.S.
forces in armed combat. Our information concerning the source
of this rifle fire is not sufficiently detailed to enable one to draw
a conclusion as to whether this clearly amounted to
1 '48
"hostilities.'

The Department of State has continued to rely on this interpretation, arguing that hostilities are not present during any exchange
of fire that is not either sustained or "active." Thus, under this executive branch definition, the War Powers Resolution would not apply
to "sporadic," "infrequent" or "isolated" armed exchanges.' 4"
committee Chairman Clement Zablocki. Id. at 36-37.
146. Id. at 38 (Letter of Messrs. Leigh and Hoffmann to Subcommittee Chairman
Zablocki).
147. Id. (Letter of Subcommittee Chairman Zablocki to Messrs. Leigh and Hoffmann
(dated May 9, 1975)).
148. Id. at 39 (Letter of Messrs. Leigh and Hoffmann to Subcommittee Chairman
Zablocki).
149. For example, in response to Congressman William Broomfield's inquiry whether
the statute applied to the sending of United States military training personnel in 1981 to El
Salvador, the Department of State used the following definition:
The meaning of "hostilities" is not entirely clear in the context of a guerrilla
insurgency. We would interpret it to apply to any armed confrontation between
opposing forces involving an exchange of fire, whether in a conventional or a
guerrilla conflict. However, it would not apply to irregular or infrequent violence, such as sporadic terrorist attacks, which happen to occur in a particular
area. In any event, we have no reason at present to believe that U.S. military
personnel are about to be exposed to attack of either description.
127 CONG. REC. 3743 n.1 (1981) (extension of remarks of Rep. Broomfield) (emphasis
added).
More recently, in response to questions from Congressman Dante Fascell, Chairman of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, concerning United States Armed Forces involvement
in the Persian Gulf, the Department of State noted, "Isolated incidents involving defensive
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With regard to the hostilities question, the department also
noted that "[t]he size of the force is not dispositive in determining
whether [hostilities or imminent hostilities] has occurred."' 5 0 Without enumerating the particular factors to be weighed, the department
added that "the determination whether such involvement is so indicated depends on an assessment of all relevant facts and
circumstances.' 5'
4. Some Conclusions About These Constructions of
"Hostilities"
It is clear that Congress and the President have been applying
different constructions of the statutory terms "hostilities" and "imminent hostilities." As a result of these divergent definitions, several
disputes have arisen between Congress and the President over the
existence of hostilities.' 5 2
reactions by U.S. forces do not necessarily indicate that imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances." Letter to Chairman Fascell from Assistant Secretary of
State J. Edward Fox (dated Mar. 30, 1988) (emphasis added), reprinted in RELEVANT WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 98.
Additionally, some of the War Powers reports submitted by the President have noted the
possibility of "isolated acts of violence" occurring. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 61 (Aug. 24, 1982 report) (emphasis added) and at 62-63
(Sept. 29, 1982 report) (emphasis added).
. Finally, this distinction between "isolated" versus "active" acts of hostilities was also
noted in President Reagan's signing statement on the compromise Resolution concerning
Lebanon:
[In signing this measure], I do not necessarily join in or agree with some of
these [congressional] expressions. For example, with regard to the congressional
determination that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983, I would note that the initiation of
isolated or infrequent acts of violence against the United States Armed Forces
does not necessarily constitute actual or imminent involvement in hostilities,
even ifcasualties to those forces result. I think it reasonable to recognize the
inherent risk and imprudence of setting any precise formula for making such
determinations.
Statement on Signing the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 1444
(Oct. 12, 1983).
For further discussion of this executive branch application of the hostilities definition in
the war powers reports, see infra text accompanying notes 166-68.
150. RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 98.
151. RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 98.
152. In fact, one General Accounting Office report noted that "[a] request to designate
El Salvador as a hostile fire area [for purposes of entitling military personnel to hostile fire
pay, pursuant to 37 U.S.C. § 310] was approved in early 1981 and then reversed to avoid the
impression that the United States had combat forces in El Salvador." Letter from U.S Comptroller General Charles Bowsher to Senator Edward Zorinsky (July 27, 1982), reprinted in
GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE REPORT, APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN U.S. LAWS THAT
PERTAIN TO U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR (GAO/ID-82-53). See also
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The legislative history clearly establishes that Congress intended
a broad interpretation of the hostilities trigger to be applied. There
are three reasons for this conclusion. First, the House subcommittee
expressly rejected the terms "armed conflict" as too narrow. "Hostilities" was intended to include, only as a minimum standard, circumstances involving troops in "armed conflict" and "exchanges of fire."
Second, the legislative history states that exchanges of shots or fatalities were not circumstances necessary for the existence of hostilities.
Moreover, hostilities might exist in a situation of self-defense or during a peacekeeping function. Third, the term "imminent hostilities"
expanded the application of the statute to include circumstances involving "a clear potential" for "a clear and present danger of armed
conflict" or for "actual armed conflict," or even a "high probability
of an exchange of fire."
In contrast, the executive branch has employed a more restrictive definition with two components: (1) "an engagement in exchange of fire" (2) which is of some "active" or ongoing nature, but
not "irregular," "infrequent," or "isolated." The modification of
"active" to the "exchange of fire" standard would presumably exclude situations in which United States military forces did not return
fire, a circumstance clearly contemplated by the legislative history.
Even the determination of "imminent hostilities," under the executive branch view, is grounded in the potential of hostile fire. Moreover, the exchange of fire standard under the "imminent hostilities"
test is modified by the requirement of a "serious risk." By way of
comparison, the 1973 House report envisioned application of the
statute to circumstances involving "a clear and present danger of
armed conflict" but "in which no shots have been [necessarily]
fired." The executive branch has not elaborated on the quantitative
level of "armed exchange of fire" required to trigger the statute
under its interpretation.
Perhaps the greatest disparity between the branches centers on
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 897 (D.D.C. 1982) (discussing GAO report), affd per
curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
However, the executive branch has recently argued that such "imminent danger pay,"
pursuant to 37 U.S.C. § 310(a)(4), is a broader statutory standard than the hostilities language
under the War Powers Resolution. See Letter from Assistant Secretary of State J. Edward Fox
to House Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante Fascell (Mar. 30, 1988), reprinted
in RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 98. Compare
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 334 (remarks of Peter Weiss, Vice President, Center
for Constitutional Rights) (proposing amendment "that the awarding of hostile fire pay to
members of the Armed Forces constitutes prima facie evidence of the existence of hostilities or
imminent hostilities").
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whether "isolated acts of violence" are covered by the statute. The
executive branch would exclude such acts under its construction. In
keeping with the "active" versus "isolated" characterization of the
confrontation, more recently, the Reagan Administration reported to
Congress concluding that either certain incidents were "closed" or
"further hostile action" was not anticipated.15 One must query at
what point an "infrequent" exchange becomes a "frequent" or sustained confrontation. It is relevant that the 1983 Senate committee
report acknowledged that "occasional sniper fire" exemplified a
"non-recurring situation" that was not demonstrative of ongoing
hostilities. However, in the absence of other illustrative examples,
Congress should be concerned with whether the "isolated acts" exception employed by the executive branch might be large enough to
swallow the general "hostilities" standard originally intended under
the 1973 House report.
Further, as the executive branch has noted, several criteria come
into play in making "hostilities" determinations. Some of the factors
noted by the executive branch have included the size of the armed
forces involved in the exchange, the proximity of hostile forces, and
the nature of the confrontation. These factors have also been applied
with the caveat that none of them alone was dispositive. However, a
guideline of such factors has never even been illustratively catalogued. While it certainly would be difficult to undertake such an
exercise in enumeration, in the absence of even exemplary ground
rules, the status quo presents an invitation for disagreement between
the branches, at least as to which factors should be utilized in making "hostilities" determinations.
Admittedly, the legislative history does not provide much lucidity on the question of the meaning of "hostilities" or "imminent hostilities" under the statute. However, it must be recognized that the
subject of hostilities and armed conflict is not readily reducible to
specificity. Nonetheless, it is evident that Congress contemplated a
relatively expansive definition of "hostilities" when compared to that
applied by the executive branch. In its more restrictive construction,
the executive branch would exclude activity intended to be included
by Congress. A central focus in the current reform debate should be
on the definition of the trigger terms "hostilities" and "imminent
hostilities" in order to better address the circumstances to which the
statute is intended to be applied.
153.

See infra text accompanying note 168.
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Reporting History

While the legislative history highlights a statutory construction
gap between the branches on the "hostilities" and "imminent hostilities" terms, the submission of section 4(a)(1) hostilities reports also
reveals a significant divergence between the Congress and the President on when the statute should be invoked. For this reason, it is
useful to review the filed war powers reports during the sixteen-year
history under the Act.
There have been nineteen reports submitted by three administrations since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution. The first
three of President Gerald Ford's four reports in 1975 concerned the
evacuation from Vietnam, while the fourth involved the rescue of the
U.S.S. Mayaguez. The sole report filed by President Jimmy Carter
involved the rescue of hostages in Iran in 1980. Of the fourteen reports filed by President Ronald Reagan, six concerned United States
military presence in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988, three, during 1982 and 1983, related to the United States Marine participation
in the Multinational Force presence in Lebanon, two concerned confrontations in Libya in 1986 (although the second of these reports
did not reference the statute), one pertained to the Multinational
Force and Observers in the Sinai in 1982, another in 1983 concerned
the United States military assistance to Chad, and still another involved the United States action in Grenada in 1983.
To be sure, other incidents have occurred in which the executive
and legislative branches have disagreed over the applicability of the
section 4(a)(1) hostilities reporting provision. These interbranch disputes have included the United States military presence in El Salvador,154 Nicaragua, " Grenada,1 5 and the Persian Gulf, 157 as well as
154. See, e.g., Crockett, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982). See also S. REP. No. 470,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982).
155. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-145, § 1451, 99 Stat. 760 (1985) (senseof Congress
Resolution concerning United States involvement in Nicaragua); Continuing Appropriations,
Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 101k, 100 Stat. 3341-60 (1982); National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 1405, 101 Stat.
1179 (1987). See also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affd on
other grounds, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
156. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (invoking § 4(a)(1) of the
War Powers Resolution effective Oct. 25, 1983 with regard to United States military involvement in Grenada) (House adoption 403 to 23 on Nov. 1, 1983) (Senate adoption 64 to 20 on
Oct. 28, 1983). See Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1126 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that
the House and Senate passed resolutions declaring the War Powers Resolution applied to U.S.
troop involvement in Grenada) (citing 129 CONG. REC. S14,877 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983) and
H8933-34 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1983)).
157. See supra note 105 and infra notes 167-69.
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in other locations.' 58
1. Reluctant Acknowledgment
In light of the reporting history under the War Powers Resolution, the effectiveness of the statute concerning the involvement of
United States Armed Forces in "hostilities" or "imminent hostilities"
has been seriously questioned.1" 9 The executive branch has consistently demonstrated a great reluctance to indicate its compliance with
the statute. Of "six military crises" during his administration, President Ford, who voted against the War Powers Resolution when he
was House Minority Leader,' 60 stated retrospectively that "[i]n none
of those instances did I believe the War Powers Resolution
applied."''
President Ford filed all four of his reports "[iln accordance with
[his] desire" to keep Congress "informed on this matter and taking
note of" section 4 of the War Powers Resolution.' 62 During congres158.

See, e.g.,

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:

No. 88-529 F, 19-25 (Aug. 3, 1988) (E. Collier)
(listing instances not formally reported to the Congress), reprinted in 1988 House Hearings,
supra note 5, at 240-87; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE, ISSUE BRIEF No. 81050, 10-11 (updated July 27, 1988) (E.
Collier) (noting that there was no formal War Powers Resolution report for the evacuation of
civilians from Cyprus in 1974 and from Lebanon in 1976, the transport of European armed
forces to Zaire in 1978, the Aug. 19, 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident when the United States
downed two Libyan jets after a heat-seeking missile had been fired, and the Oct. 10, 1985
United States Navy interception of an Egyptian airliner carrying hijackers of the Achille
Lauro).
159. See, e.g., After Chadha, supra note 24, at 793-94.
160. See 119 CONG. REC. 24,707-08 (1973) (House passage of H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess.); id. at 33,873-74 (House adoption of conference report); id. at 36,202-21
(House override of veto). See also id. at 24,663-64 (House Min. Leader Gerald Ford statement in opposition to House bill); id. at 33,867 (statement in opposition to conference report);
id. at 36,204 (statement in support of President's veto). Compare 1988 Senate Hearings,
supra note 1, at 161 (remarks of former President Gerald Ford) (noting the former President
is"in firmer opposition to the so-called War Powers Resolution today than when the] was in
the White House or when [he] was in the Congress").
161. Lecture by Gerald R. Ford, the first John Sherman Cooper Lecture at the University of Kentucky, Louisville, entitled The War Powers Resolution: Striking a Balance between
the Executive and Legislative Branches (Apr. 11, 1977), reprinted in 1977 Senate Hearings,
supra note 58, at 327. See also 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 161 (remarks of
former President Gerald Ford) (noting that of "at least four and possibly six instances where
you might argue that the War Powers Resolution was effective . . .I never conceded that the
facts did fall under the umbrella of the War Powers Resolution").
162. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 40
(Apr. 4, 1975 report concerning transport of refugees from Danang), at 42 (Apr. 12, 1975
report concerning evacuation of United States nationals from Cambodia), at 43 (Apr. 30, 1975
report concerning evacuation of United States citizens and others from South Vietnam), at 45
(May 15, 1975 report concerning U.S.S. Mayaguez incident) (emphasis added).
FIFTEEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, REPORT
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sional oversight hearings, members of the Ford Administration responded to an inquiry into whether the "taking note" language
demonstrated less than full compliance with the reporting provision
of the statute. According to these legal advisers, "[tihis phrase connotes an acknowledgement that the report is being filed in accordance with section 4 of the War Powers Resolution." ' President
Carter continued this trend of attempted executive detachment from
the application of the statute in the sole report filed under his administration, noting his "desire that Congress be informed on this
matter and consistent with the reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution.

164

President Reagan, serving longer in office than his two immediate predecessors, filed the most reports and continued the executive
branch reporting pattern of reluctant acknowledgment of the War
Powers Resolution. Most of the Reagan reports were submitted with
the consistent with language initially employed by President
Carter." 5 The Lebanon reports also added that there was "no inten163. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 145, at 40 (Letter of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State, and Martin Hoffmann, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to Subcommittee Chairman Clement Zablocki (dated June 3, 1975)). The legal advisers
further noted:
No constitutional challenge to the appropriateness of the report called for by
section 4 was intended. As you are aware, President Nixon in his veto message
of October 24, 1973 indicated that portions of the War Powers Resolution, including section 5(b) and 5(c), are unconstitutional. No such position was expressed as to section 4.
1975 House Hearings, supra note 145, at 40.
164. RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 47 (Apr.
26, 1980 report concerning aborted rescue attempt in Iran) (emphasis added).
165. RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 57
(Mar. 19, 1982 report concerning the United States participation in the Multinational Force
and Observers in the Sinai) (emphasis added). Similar language is used in eleven other reports
filed during the Reagan administration. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCuMENTS, supra note 105, at 60 (Aug. 24, 1982 report concerning United States Armed Forces
in Lebanon), at 62 (Sept. 29, 1982 report concerning Lebanon), at 64 (Aug. 8, 1983 report
concerning United States Armed Forces in Chad), at 65 (Aug. 30, 1983 report concerning
Lebanon), at 84 (Oct. 25, 1983 report concerning Grenada), at 90 (Apr. 16, 1986 report
concerning bombing strikes in Libya), at 103 (Oct. 10, 1987 report concerning Iranian attacks
in the Persian Gulf), at 106 (Oct. 20, 1987 report concerning attacks in the Persian Gulf), at
108 (Apr. 19, 1988 report concerning attacks in the Persian Gulf); H.R. Doc. No. 210, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 4, 1988 report concerning attacks in the Persian Gulf); H.R.
Doc. No. 213, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 14, 1988 report concerning attacks in the
Persian Gulf).
See also Letter of Assistant Secretary of State J. Edward Fox to House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Dante Fascell (Mar. 30, 1988), reprinted in RELEVANT WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 99 (concerning congressional inquiry over the
invocation of the War Powers Resolution, noting that "the President reported to Congress
'consistent with the War Powers Resolution' on October 20") (emphasis added); 1988 Senate
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tion or expectation that the[] members of the U.S. Armed Forces
w[ould] become involved in hostilities," although "isolated acts of violence" could not be ruled out.166 One Reagan Administration report
even expressly found that the United States Armed Forces were not
involved in hostilities.1 6 7 Other reports concluded that "we regard
this incident as closed." 6 ' Some of the more recent reports concerning the presence of United States forces in the Persian Gulf, however, have taken a stronger tone, although noting an objective of a
"spirit of mutual cooperation toward a common goal." 69 For example, in one of these reports concerning attacks in the Persian Gulf,
President Reagan stated:
In accordance with my desire that Congress continue to be fully
informed in this matter, I am providing this report consistent
with the War Powers Resolution. While mindful of the historiHearings, supra note 1, at 265 (colloquy between Sen. Brock Adams and Secretary of Defense
Frank Carlucci, III) (noting that the Reagan Administration sent letters to Congress which
were consistent with the Act but did not trigger the statute).
But see RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 88 (in
Mar. 26, 1986 report concerning freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, President Reagan noted his "desire that the Congress be informed on this matter" but not referencing the War Powers Resolution), at 92 (May 20, 1987 report concerning missile attack on
U.S.S. Stark, and Secretary of State George Shultz noting the President's "desire to keep the
Congress fully informed" but not referencing the War Powers Resolution).
166. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 61
(Aug. 24, 1982 report), at 62 (Sept. 29, 1982 report), at 92 (May 20, 1987 report noting "we
have no reason at this time to believe that Iraqi forces have deliberately targeted U.S. vessels,
and no reason to believe that further hostile action will occur").
167. The May 20, 1987 report of Secretary of State George Shultz concerning the Persian Gulf noted: "Our forces are not in a situation of actual hostilities, nor does their continued presence in the area place them in a situation in which imminent involvement in hostilities
is indicated, although we are mindful of recent Iranian statements threatening U.S. and other
ships under protection." RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note
105, at 92.
168. See H.R. Doc. No. 210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 4, 1988 report noting
where the U.S.S. Vincennes and U.S.S. Elmer Montgomery fired upon small craft and "fir[ed]
in self defense at what [was] believed to be a hostile Iranian military aircraft" that "[t]here has
been no further hostile action by Iranian forces, and although U.S. forces will remain prepared
to take additional defensive action to protect our units and military personnel, we regard this
incident as closed") (emphasis added); H.R. Doc. No. 213, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988)
(July 14, 1988 report noting that where small boats in the Persian Gulf fired upon United
States helicopters, "[t]here has been no further hostile action by Iranian forces and, although
U.S. forces remain prepared to take additional defensive action to protect our units and military personnel, we regard this incident as closed") (emphasis added).
169. RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 101
(Sept. 23, 1987 report concerning Iranian minelaying in Persian Gulf). This language of "cooperation" has been utilized in three other recent reports. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 103 (Oct. 10, 1987 report), at 106 (Oct. 20, 1987
report), at 108 (Apr. 19, 1988 report).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

cal differences between the Legislative and Executive branches
of government, and the positions taken by me and all my predecessors in office, with respect to the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the [War Powers] Resolution, I look forward to
cooperating with Congress in pursuit of our mutual, overriding
aim of peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region. 70
From the filing of the first to the nineteenth war powers reports, there has been a persistent effort of detachment from (or pattern of reluctant acknowledgement of) the statute by the executive
branch. This propensity to avoid the submission of reports "pursuant
to" the statute was perhaps most evident during the Multinational
Force in Lebanon Resolution. Even when the two branches were
able to reach a compromise in applying the statute, President Reagan qualified his signing statement:
We must not let disagreements on interpretation or issues of
institutional powers prevent us from expressing our mutual
goals to the citizens of our nation and the world. I therefore sign
this resolution in full support of its policies, but with reservations about some of the specific congressional expressions."'
2.

Reporting Pursuant to Which Subsection?

Another problem with the executive branch reports is that they
have not always clearly stated which subsection of the War Powers
Resolution the report has been filed "consistent with." This likely
results from the fact that the sixty-day termination clock is triggered
only by a section 4(a)(1) hostilities report and not by a section
4(a)(2) report (concerning the introduction of armed forces while
equipped for combat), or a section 4(a)(3) report (regarding a sub17
stantial enlargement of U.S. combat forces in foreign territories). 1
Of the nineteen filed reports, the specific subsection has been cited
only four times, thrice consistent with subsection 4(a)(2), 17a and once
in accordance with section 4(a)(1 ).174 On three occasions the reports
170. RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 103
(Oct. 10, 1987 report) (emphasis added). Similar language has been employed in one other
report. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 101
(Sept. 23, 1987 report).
171. Statement on Signing the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 1444 (Oct. 12, 1983).
172. For a discussion of this operation of the reporting provision, see supra note 106.
173. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 40
(Apr. 4, 1975 report), at 42 (Apr. 12, 1975 report), at 57 (Mar. 19, 1982 report).
174. RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 45 (May
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have only referenced subsection 4 of the statute, leaving to congressional speculation which of three possible reporting subsections may
have applied under the circumstances. 7 Twice the Act was not even
mentioned.17 The more recent trend, begun by President Carter and
followed eleven times, 1 is to cite the statute without reference to
any subsection. Of course, on other occasions, Congress and the
President have disagreed whether a War Powers Resolution report
17 8
should have been filed.
Under the early practice of the War Powers Resolution, the executive branch construed the reporting provision as only requiring
"that 'a report' be filed in any of the subparagraph[s] . . .and
that
such report merely contain the information specified. ' 17 9 Moreover,
it is not always clear whether more than one of the subsections may
apply to a given circumstance. Concerning the April 30, 1975 Saigon
evacuation, the executive branch legal advisers informed Congress
that "since the operation had terminated by the time the report was
prepared, the question of possible congressional action under section
5 of the Resolution was moot; thus, a specific reference to [a] 4(a)(1)
[hostilities report] was not needed to call attention to possible action
under section 5."180
This interpretation of the reporting provision has been followed
by the Reagan Administration. Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer recently told the Special Senate Subcommittee on War Powers that
"Section 4 does not require the President to state the particular subsection under which reports are made, and no President has felt
compelled to do so." 1 According to Sofaer, not only is this determination difficult to make upon the commencement of deployment of
15, 1975 report).
175. RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 43 (Apr.

30, 1975 report), at 64 (Aug. 8, 1983 report), at 65 (Aug. 30, 1983 report).
176.

RELEVANT
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DOCUMENTS,

supra note 105, at 88

(Mar. 26, 1986 report), at 91 (May 20, 1987 report).
177. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 47
(Apr. 26, 1980 report), at 60 (Aug. 24, 1982 report), at 62 (Sept. 29, 1982 report), at 84 (Oct.

25, 1983 report), at 90 (Apr. 16, 1986 report), at 101 (Sept. 23, 1987 report), at 103 (Oct. 10,
1987 report), at 106 (Oct. 20, 1987 report), at 108 (Apr. 19, 1988 report); H.R. Doc. No.
210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 4, 1988 report); H.R. Doc. No. 213, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 14, 1988 report).
178. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 105, 154-58, 167-69.
179. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 145, at 39 (Letter of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State, and Martin Hoffmann, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to Subcommittee Chairman Clement Zablocki (dated June 3, 1975)).
180. 1975 House Hearings,supra note 145, at 39.
181. 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1058. See also 1988 Senate Hearings,
supra note 1, at 1395 (written responses of Abraham Sofaer to questions asked by Sen. Biden).
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military forces, but this construction also avoids potential executivelegislative branch confrontation.18 2
While Presidents have not felt obligated to specify the subdivision of the reporting section, their rationale may have been that the
statute was also designed to allow Congress to determine which reporting subsection comes into play once the President submits a report.18 However, to date, Congress has not demonstrated a strong
willingness to utilize this legislative vehicle to trigger the statute sua
sponte.
3. Reservation of Executive Authority
While all nineteen executive war powers reports have been filed
by "taking note of," "consistent with," in "the spirit of mutual cooperation," "mindful of executive and legislative branch differences,"
or "with no expectation of hostilities," Presidents have also been
careful to expressly reserve their constitutional war powers under
each submission. In each report, the deployment of forces has always
been pursuant to the President's Commander-in-Chief authority,
and usually also pursuant to the constitutional authority to conduct
foreign relations. 84 The Ford and Carter Administrations cited to
the constitutional executive power. 8 Reference to this authority was
apparently abandoned by the Reagan Administration, however.
While not a matter of direct constitutional authority, eight reports
have noted that the specific use of armed forces was made pursuant
to rights under international law, including the inherent right of selfdefense recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. 88
182.

1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1058.

183.

See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 41

184.
(Apr. 4, 1975 report), at 59 (Mar. 19, 1982 report), at 61 (Aug. 24, 1982 report), at
29, 1982 report), at 64 (Aug. 8, 1983 report), at 65 (Aug. 30, 1983 report), at 85
1983 report), at 101 (Sept. 23, 1987 report), at 103 (Oct. 10, 1987), at 105 (Oct.
report), at 108 (Apr. 19, 1988 report); H.R. Doc. No. 210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(July 4, 1988 report); H.R. Doc. No. 213, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July

63 (Sept.
(Oct. 25,
20, 1987
1 (1988)
14, 1988

report).

185. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 42
(Apr. 12, 1975 report), at 44 (Apr. 30, 1975 report), at 46 (May 15, 1975 report), at 49 (Apr.
26, 1980 report).
186. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 49
(Apr. 26, 1980 report pursuant to art. 51 of the U.N. CHARTER), at 90 (Apr. 16, 1986 report
pursuant to art. 51 of the U.N. CHARTER), at 101 (Sept. 23, 1987 report "in accordance with
international law"), at 102 (Oct. 10, 1987 report noting "[olur presence in the Persian Gulf
has been fully within our rights under international law"), at 105 (Oct. 20, 1987 report pursu-
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On two occasions, involving the transport, of refugees from
Danang in 1975 and the United States participation in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai in 1982, the use of armed
forces was made pursuant to statutory authority."8 7 Additionally,
Congress eventually authorized United States participation in the
Multinational Force in Lebanon,"' 8 and, as part of a "compromise
resolution,"' 89 statutorily extended this participation for eighteen
months.' 90 As Justice Robert H. Jackson noted with regard to such
statutory authorizations, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all the Congress can delegate."''
4.

Some Conclusions on the Reporting History

The war powers reporting requirement has established the
principal forum for Congress and the President to debate the "hostilities" issue and the invocation of the statute in particular contexts.
The primary problem is that the statute leaves the determination to
trigger the statute largely in the hands of the executive branch.
Given the status quo, Congress has essentially become an observer,
insisting on executive compliance when the legislature believes the
statute should come into play.
Given the reporting experience, it is also questionable whether
the reporting requirement has attained the original objective of "a
full and accurate report of events, combined with an authoritative
statement by the President of his judgment about the direction in
which the situation is likely to develop."' 9 2 Many of the war powers
ant to art. 51 of the U.N. CHARTER), at 108 (Apr. 19, 1988 report noting "exercise of our
inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51" of the U.N. CHARTER); H.R. Doc.
No. 210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 4, 1988 report pursuant to "Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter"); H.R. Doc. No. 213, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 14, 1988
report pursuant to "Article 51 of the United Nations Charter").
187. See RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 41
(Apr. 4, 1975 report noting Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), at 59 (Mar. 19, 1982 report
citing Pub. L. No. 97-132, Dec. 29, 1981).
188. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. V 1987).
189. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki (Sept. 27, 1983), reprinted in RELEVANT WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
DOCUMENTS, supra note 105, at 82.
190. Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, § 6, 97 Stat. 807
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note, § 6 (Supp. V 1987)).
191. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
192. S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973). See also H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d
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reports employ nearly boilerplate language, particularly those reports submitted by the same administrations. Most utilize similar
format and text, with little variation other than the date and the
incident involved. This "boilerplate" approach exemplifies the pattern of reluctant acknowledgment by the executive branch. The war
powers reports resemble legal forms with the pertinent blanks left to
be filled in on the proper occasion. Typically, the introductory paragraph of the reports briefly states the time, date and nature of the
incident triggering the report. Usually, a short description of the
course of action ordered by the President follows. Another section
generally specifies the executive branch authority for the action, with
a reservation of executive constitutional powers. Most reports also
contain a disclaimer that the report is not being submitted "pursuant" to the War Powers Resolution, but instead "consistent with"
the statute (or in other similar terminology as already noted). Perhaps most demonstrative of this "fill-in-the-blank" format were the
last two Persian Gulf reports, which were virtually verbatim in the
last two paragraphs. The only significant difference between the reports lies in the introductory paragraphs describing the facts of the
hostilities circumstance.1 98
This review of the reporting practice has demonstrated (1) the
manner in which the divergent constructions of hostilities have been
applied and (2) that Congress, under current law, has been generally
dependent on the executive branch to file a war powers report.
D.

Other Hurdles in Defining Hostilities

Based on this brief survey of the statutory construction and the
practice under the sixteen-year old statute, it is useful to consider
some additional factors affecting the parameters of any statutory definition of "hostilities" (or other such triggering mechanism based
upon an armed exchange or state of conflict). Critically, the statutory
questions associated with defining hostilities are interwoven with the
broader constitutional issues concerning the war powers. It must be
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (conference report) ("The objective is to ensure that the Congress by
right and as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it requires to carry out
its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to use of
United States Armed Forces abroad."); H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973)
(noting the reporting requirement would "provide the Congress with adequate information on
which to base its deliberations and possible action concerning the commitment of U.S. Armed
Forces by the President").
193. H.R. Doc. No. 210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 4, 1988 report); H.R.
Doc. No. 213, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) (July 14, 1988 report).
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recognized that interbranch disagreement over the existence of hostilities is often an inevitable and inherent by-product of the separation
of the war powers between Congress and the President. Moreover,
part of the problem in attempting a definition of hostilities is that the
respective war powers of the branches are not subject to specification."' As Justice Jackson noted, "there is a zone of twilight in
which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority,
or in which its distribution is uncertain."' 95 Since many of the war
power issues fall within this "zone of twilight," it is important to
recognize preliminarily that interbranch disputes will never be completely eliminated as a result of the pre-established constitutional
"invitation to struggle" between the branches to direct foreign policy.
A second significant attribute contributing to the complexity of
statutorily defining "hostilities" is the fact-specific or fact-intensive
nature of the inquiry. As already noted, one problem obviated by the
experience under the War Powers Resolution is that the legislative
and executive branches typically disagree over a common definition
of hostilities. However, even assuming interbranch accord on a definition, there may nonetheless be disagreement over the application
of that definition to a particular factual scenario.' 96 For example,
each branch may disagree as to whether the definition should include
hostilities that are sporadic, or only those that are sustained. As
Monroe Leigh has noted, "hostilities" and "imminent hostilities" are
"definable in a meaningful way only in the context of an actual set
of facts."' 9 "
Thus, any relevant definition of "hostilities" is subject to an ad
hoc application, including an assessment of both quantitative aspects
(such as the number of troops deployed or involved in the confrontation) and qualitative factors (including national security, foreign pol194. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 78 (statement of Monroe
Leigh) (noting that "neither this committee nor any other group of lawmakers or constitutional
scholars could produce a single definitional statement that clearly and adequately encompasses
every situation in which the President's Commander-in-Chief authority could be exercised").
195. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
196. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 897-98 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting
factual discrepancy between the pleadings by members of Congress and the executive branch
over whether a state of "hostilities" existed in El Salvador), affd per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). The case was found to be non-justiciable because of the judicial complexity of determining whether United States Armed Forces
were involved in "hostilities." Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 898.
197. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 145, at 38 (Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal
Advisor, Department of State and Martin Hoffmann, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to House Committee on International- Relations, Subcommittee on International Security
and Scientific Affairs Chairman Clement Zablocki (dated June 3, 1975)).
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icy, diplomatic, situational, and geographic considerations).1 9 Further, in weighing these elements in attempting to apply a definition
of "hostilities," "[r]easonable men might well differ as to the implications to be drawn from any such hypothetical situation."1'99 Perhaps Justice Jackson stated the matter best when he noted that
where the President and "Congress have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain[,] . . .any actual test of power is

likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." 2 °
Finally, in attempting to develop a definition of "hostilities,"
one can never lose sight of the political component involved in this
exercise. As the divided war powers embody the principles of separation of powers, it appears that the Framers left this question subject
to resolution between the executive and legislative branches-the politically accountable departments in the government. Ultimately,
there is no simple standard or formula to apply in deciding when a
state of war exists. It -must therefore be recognized that political
judgment is a significant element of the determination.2"' As General
Von Clausewitz is quoted to have said, "War is the continuation of
politics by other means. '"22
198. A recent consideration from the judicial perspective demonstrates this factual
complexity:
[T]he factual evaluation of "hostilities [and] . . .situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" is always hampered, to some degree, by a Court's lack of access to intelligence information and
other pertinent expertise. This is exacerbated by the ever-changing intensity of
"hostilities," especially when they are in their early stages.
Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340-41 n.53 (D.D.C. 1987).
199. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 145, at 38 (Letter of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State, and Martin Hoffmann, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to Subcommittee Chairman Clement Zablocki (dated June 3, 1975)).
200. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
201. One court concluded from a review of the legislative history that "the very absence
of a definitional section in the Resolution, coupled with debate suggesting that determinations
of 'hostilities' were intended to be political decisions made by the President and Congress,
suggest to this Court that fixed legal standards were deliberately omitted from this statutory
scheme." Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 340-41 n.53 (emphasis added).
During recent Senate hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell noted that the constitutional term "war" was intended by the Founding Fathers to be left
to application by "the political arena, not the judicial arena." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra
note 1,at 19. He concluded, "[W]e are fundamentally stuck with the political process." 1988
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 34. Senator Jesse Helms agreed, stating, "[Tihis is not so
much a constitutional argument as a political argument." 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note
1, at 227.
202. 119 CONG. REc. 24,549 (1973) (Sen. Montoya quoting K. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR
101 (A. Rapaport trans. 1968)). See also 1988 Senate Hearings,supra note 1, at 74 (remarks
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Courts considering the applicability of the War Powers Resolution have noted this political aspect. One recent judicial pronouncement observed:
[If a court] were to decide whether the President is required to
submit a report to Congress . . , the Court also would have to
decide whether United States Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf
either are engaged in "hostilities" or in "situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
20 8
circumstances.

This district court dismissed the action brought by members of the
House, concluding that "the determination of 'hostilities' under the
War Powers Resolution is a question for the executive and legislative branches," and that judicial intervention in this political process
"would impose a consensus on Congress. ' ' "2 Another district court
confronted with the question of the applicability of the War Powers
Resolution in El Salvador noted that as a consequence of the "subtleties of fact-finding," a determination of whether United States
Armed Forces have been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities "should be left to the political branches.

' 20 5

Perhaps only the

exercise of political judgment can best reconcile such frequently close
questions as whether a "hostilities" situation exists or should be classified as an "isolated" or "active" incident . 20 As a result of the political nature of "hostilities" decisions, it is important that any definition be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the political exigencies of
the moment.
Given the separation of powers dimension, the fact-intensive nature of the determination, and the political judgment component, it
of former Chairman of the Sen. Comm. on Armed Forces John Tower) (noting that "military
power is an instrument of diplomacy").
203. Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337.
204. Id. at 339.
205. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982). Accord Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983) (noting the court lacked judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving whether the United States' presence in
Central America violated the War Powers Resolution), af'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Professor Ronald Rotunda of the University of Illinois College of Law explained this point:
I think courts have no legal standards to judge when are hostilities imminent
enough or when is the emergency genuine enough. At the trial, will the President be called to reveal the sources of his clandestine knowledge in an effort to
persuade a trial judge that it is appropriate for the President to avoid setting
into play the procedures of the War Powers Resolution?
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 225-26.
206. For a discussion of this statutory dispute, see supra text accompanying notes 149
and 153.
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must be reconciled that there will never be complete resolution and
accord between the branches on all hostilities determinations. In fact,
each of these factors invites the opportunity for interbranch disagreement. However, in striving toward the objective of allowing for the
exercise of the "collective judgment," none of these hurdles suggests
that reform should not be pursued, or that it is insurmountable. As a
matter of comity between the branches, the lack of complete agreement in every instance should not preclude efforts toward the establishment of working definitions and standards in order for the
branches to effectively exercise their joint responsibilities.
E.

Reform Proposals
1. Necessity for Reform

Experience under the statute clearly demonstrates the necessity
for reform of the hostilities trigger provision. Not only have the
branches employed divergent constructions of the statutory terms
"hostilities" and "imminent hostilities," but a record of disagreement
has been established over when these terms apply to a given situation. Accordingly, under the status quo, there is room for improvement in clarifying the type of "hostilities" invoked under the Act.
The statutory objective of "collective judgment" is less likely to be
fulfilled given the divergence of definitions of "hostilities" between
the two branches. Moreover, to the extent that different standards
are applied, unnecessary confrontation may be provoked between
Congress and the President. In order to mitigate inessential clashes,
the branches should at least strive toward a more acceptable general
working definition.
Furthermore, Congress has been frustrated by some of the executive branch judgments as to when troops have been introduced into
hostilities. In the view of many legislators, Congress has often been
reduced to a sideline spectator waiting for the President to make a
finding that United States troops have been introduced into "hostilities." The President has been reluctant to make this determination,
however, given that submission of a "hostilities" report starts the
sixty-day clock leading to possible automatic troop disengagement.
Perhaps one of the best indicators of the need for statutory amendment and clarification is the fact that members of Congress have
more recently begun turning to the courts to resolve these questions."' In the analysis of one district court, "effective enforcement
207.

See, e.g., Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 333. One hundred and ten House members
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of the reporting requirement has been one of the primary problems
plaguing the War Powers Resolution." ' 8 One of the major war
powers reform proposals in the 100th Congress would even provide
for judicial review of war powers legislation. 0'
Consequently, two primary reforms are needed. First, Congress
must either establish an enhanced definition of "hostilities" or clarify
the particular forms of hostilities that will invoke the statute. Second,
Congress should provide statutory means for determining that
United States Armed Forces have been introduced into "hostilities,"
rather than waiting for the executive branch to trigger the statute.
2.

Searchingfor an Improved Definition

The central question posed by the first reform asks when the
statute should be triggered. Definition of the triggering event is important since it sets into motion executive consultation and reporting,
and potential subsequent congressional action. Ultimately, the scope
of the statute hinges on this trigger definition.
A host of issues is raised by this central question. What types of
armed exchanges should be encompassed within the statute? Does
Congress wish to become involved in minor conflicts that might be
characterized as isolated incidents? If not, what test should distinguish active hostilities from isolated incidents? What factors should
be assessed in making these determinations? For example, what
sought a judicial declaration and injunctive relief that the hostilities report section 4(a)(1) was
triggered on two occasions in the Persian Gulf. The "central issue" in the action was the
meaning and applicability of the undefined statutory "hostilities" and "imminent hostilities"
terms. Id. at 335 n.6. No constitutional issues were presented. Id. at 335 n.3. The action was
dismissed under the equitable discretion and political question doctrines.
In Crockett, 29 members of the House sought declaratory judgments and injunctive relief
on the applicability of the statute to military aid in El Salvador. The action was dismissed as
non-justiciable because of the complex factfinding questions presented for judicial resolution
and because Congress had not found that a hostilities report was required to be filed. Notably,
16 Senators and 13 members of the House opposed the action as amici curiae.
In Sanchez-Espinoza, 12 members of the House (in addition to 14 non-congressional
plaintiffs) sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging, inter alia, that United States involvement in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador violated the War Powers Resolution. The
district court declined to exercise jurisdiction on grounds that a non-justiciable political question was presented.
208. Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 339 n.42.
209. S.J. Res. 323, § 4(c), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) proposes:
Any Member of Congress may bring an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that the President or the United States Armed Forces have
not complied with any provision of law described in paragraph (1) or (2) of
section 6(a).
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qualitative and quantitative elements should be part of the hostilities
equation? Congress may wish to consider whether it wants to maintain the distinction between "peacetime deployments" of section
4(a)(2) & (3) and "hostilities" under section 4(a)(1). 210 Resolution of
these questions will significantly advance efforts to establish a general working definition of "hostilities," one that will be more consistently applied by both branches.
While it is true that no single "hostilities" definition is capable
of resolving all disputes between the political departments, clarification of a more acceptable working definition of hostilities would better promote the goal of mutual cooperation repeatedly suggested by
the Reagan Administration and the original objective of "collective
judgment" specified in the statute. Concurrent authority between the
President and Congress on many war powers matters makes the establishment of any definition difficult at best. In an area already involving "zones of twilight," any legislative definition should avoid
contributing to a further blurring of the lines of authority. It turns
out that Senator Goldwater was prescient. 2" 1' The absence of a clear
working definition invites greater interbranch conflict on the issue of
the applicability of the statute to certain hostilities situations.
One proposal, the Hostilities Act, H.R. 3912,2"2 seeks to con-

form the "hostilities" definition with existing legislative intent. The
bill attempts to codify the broader definition of hostilities intended by
Congress in the War Powers Resolution in the form of an illustrative definition of the term.2"' This legislation states that:
the term "hostilities" includes (but is not limited to) any armed
conflict plus any other situation (A) in which fighting has actually begun,
(B) in which there is a state of confrontation, in which no
shots have been fired, but where there is a clear and present
danger of armed conflict, or
(C) which involves the exchange of fire with hostile
forces.2" '
210. For a discussion of the distinction between "hostilities" and "peacetime deployment" reports, see supra note 106.
211. See supra text accompanying note 126.
212. H.R. 3912, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H250-59 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1988).
213. 134 CONG. REC. H259 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis). See

also supra text accompanying notes 142-43, discussing the legislative history of the "hostilities" term in the War Powers Resolution.
214. H.R. 3912, § 9(2), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H253 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
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In this manner, "hostilities" is expressly "intended to be broader in
scope than armed conflict. '"21"

Moreover, "imminent hostilities" are intended to include (but
are not limited to) a situation where there is:
(A) a clear potential either for
(i) a state of confrontation in which no shots have been
fired, but where there is a clear and present danger of armed
conflict; or
(ii) actual armed conflict, or
(B) a high probability of exchanges of fire with hostile forces."' 6
These illustrative definitions represent a step toward asserting
the original intent of the "hostilities" terms under the War Powers
Resolution. Thus, it becomes clearer under this proposal that Congress intends the application of the more expansive interpretation of
hostilities, rather than the restrictive construction of the executive
branch.
Nonetheless, Congress may wish to explore the possibility of
establishing greater guidance on the application of the hostilities
trigger by identifying those quantitative and qualitative factors that
should be weighed in making a "hostilities" determination. Since
many factors should be considered, perhaps a "totality of the circumstances" test would provide a better standard than that under current
law. Further, the scope of the statute could be broadened if Congress
more vigorously applied the existing "imminent hostilities" standard.
Another area of clarification concerns the troop logistics in
which "hostilities" are triggered. The War Powers Resolution reporting requirement is invoked "[iun the absence of a declaration of
war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced" into hostilities or specified peacetime deployment situations.2 17 The statute is presumably not implicated when previously
stationed military forces become involved in hostilities, as opposed to
being introduced into such circumstances. Accordingly, the terms
"introduction or involvement of United States Armed Forces" should
1988) (parenthesis in original).
215. 134 CONG. REG. H259 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis). See
also supra text accompanying notes 142-43, discussing the legislative history of the "hostilities" term in the War Powers Resolution.
216. H.R. 3912, § 9(3), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H253 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1988) (parenthesis in original).
217. 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (1982) (emphasis added).
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be substituted to account for both scenarios.21
While recognizing there is no perfect statutory definition, in its
effort to reform the War Powers Resolution, Congress should hold
comprehensive hearings to examine the constituent factors that
should be used in deciding when "hostilities" exist. Under current
law, the absence of a definition or clarification invites dispute. Ultimately, greater agreement on a working definition would serve to
advance comity between the branches.
3.

Congressional Determination
a.

Invocation

Because the hostilities report provision is not self-executing, it
requires the exercise of judgment by one of the two political
branches. As noted, the current statute is structured in favor of the
executive branch making such determinations. However, the executive branch has demonstrated a strong disinclination to trigger the
central enforcement features of the War Powers Resolution. In order
to overcome the executive pattern of reluctant acknowledgment of the
statute and the history of legislative dependence on the President to
trigger the statute, Congress should establish a mechanism for invoking the Act sua sponte. Accordingly, the statute should be amended
to allow Congress to make its own finding that "hostilities" exist and
that the statute is thereby invoked. In large part, a true test of congressional authority is measured by its willingness to act. Any statutory reform vehicle should be crafted to reflect this fact by providing
the mechanism by which Congress can take an affirmative stand on
the existence of hostilities.
The courts that have addressed the applicability of the War
Powers Resolution have dismissed actions brought by members of
Congress on jurisdictional grounds. One of the bases for denial of
relief in these cases has been that members of Congress did not pursue legislative remedies available to them. Thus, in Crockett, where
the district court was presented with the applicability of United
States involvement in El Salvador, the court noted that "Congress
[had] taken absolutely no action."2 9 In Lowry, which involved the
use of military forces in the Persian Gulf, the district court pointed
out that "Congress ha[d] debated and voted on the subject of this
218. This reform is proposed in The Hostilities Act legislation. See H.R. 3912, § 9(1),
134 CONG. REc. H253 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. H259 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1988) (section-by-section analysis).
219. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982).
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lawsuit," but had not invoked the section 4(a)(1) hostilities report
provision.22 Generally, then, although Congress has disagreed with
the President over the invocation of the statute, it has usually lacked
the will to challenge the President by going on the record to trigger
the statute. However, these courts have noted that a completely different scenario is presented where Congress passes legislation expressly finding that United States troops have been introduced into
"hostilities" and which the President refuses to acknowledge. In this
situation, a constitutional impasse could be presented for possible judicial resolution since Congress would have fully exercised its authority by exhausting available legislative remedies.2 21
Congress originally intended to be able to determine (1) when a
war powers report should be filed upon the introduction of military
forces into hostilities and (2) which reporting subsection of the statute should be triggered.2 22 During consideration of the War Powers
Resolution, the language "or is required to be [filed]" was added to
provide for the circumstance in which "the President for whatever
reason may decide not to submit a report."22 3 However, Congress
has rarely sought to exercise this contemplated authority and this
provision has lacked an effective enforcement mechanism.
On one occasion, Congress invoked the War Powers Resolution
in the absence of an executive hostilities report pursuant to section
4(a)(1). On September 29, 1983, in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, "Congress determine[d] that the requirements of
section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on
August 29, 1983" and further "authorize[d] the continued participation of the United States Armed Forces."2 24 While this is the only
occasion in which Congress actually triggered the statute, Congress
220. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 n.51 (D.D.C. 1987).
221. For example, the Lowry court noted:
If Congress had enacted a joint resolution stating that "hostilities" existed in the
Persian Gulf for purposes of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, but
if the President still refused to file a section 4(a) report, this Court would have
been presented with an issue ripe for judicial review.
Id. at 341. See also Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 899 (noting constitutional impasse scenario);
accord Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 203, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Congress has formidable weapons at its disposal - the power of the purse and
investigative resources far beyond those available in the Third Branch. But no gauntlet has
been thrown down here by a majority of the Members of Congress.").
222. See supra text accompanying note 120.
223. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973). For further discussion of this
language, see supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
224. Pub. L. No. 98-119, § 2(b), 97 Stat. 805 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541, § 2(b)
(Supp. V 1987)). See also id. § 2(a)(5).
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has more recently considered similar action on other occasions,2 25
and other legislators have introduced bills to apply the statute'to a
given circumstance.'
The congressional ability to determine when troops have been
introduced into hostilities has also been judicially recognized. 2 7 One
district court concluded that when the legislative and executive
branches disagree over the existence of hostilities, a "second trigger is
'
Moreover, in the absence
needed to bring the [statute] into play."228
of such a legislative determination, it is difficult to determine
whether such inaction reflects congressional sentiment that the statute should be invoked, and if so, when the sixty-day clock for auto225. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983) (invoking § 4(a)(1) of the
War Powers Resolution effective Oct. 25, 1983 with regard to United States military involvement in Grenada); 129 CONG. REc. H8933-34 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1983) (House adoption 403
to 23 on Nov. 1, 1983); id. at S14,877 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983) (Senate adoption 64 to 20 on
Oct. 28, 1983). See also S. 1174, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REC. S13,338, S13,398
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1987) ( ). (Sen. printed amend. No. 732) (Senate tabling Sen. Byrd amendment to Defense Authorization bill to apply War Powers Resolution to Persian Gulf on Sept.
18, 1987) (Oct. 1, 1987 Senate failure to invoke cloture, 54 to 45).
226. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 387, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (introduced by Rep. Solarz to invoke the War Powers Resolution on Oct. 16, 1987 concerning the Persian Gulf);
H.R.J. Res. 511, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (introduced by Rep. Gonzalez to invoke the
War Powers Resolution and remove United States Armed Forces from Honduras). See also
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 265 (remarks of Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci) ("There is nothing to prevent the Congress, on its own initiative, from taking an affirmative vote, and I would hope that it would do that from time to time, on its own initiative, in
implementing the War Powers Act.").
227. In Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), the district court
noted:
The questions as to the nature and extent of the United States' presence in El
Salvador and whether a report under the War Powers Resolution is mandated
because our forces haye been subject to hostile fire or are taking part in the war
effort are appropriate for congressional, not judicial, investigation and
determination.
The court further explained, "If Congress doubts or disagrees with the Executive's determination that U.S. forces in El Salvador have not been introduced into hostilities or imminent
hostilities, it has the resources to investigate the matter and assert its wishes." Id. at 899.
Finally, the court noted that "if Congress itself requires a report, the 60 days for consideration
of whether or not to authorize the action would begin at that point." Id. at 901. Accord
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsberg, J., concurring)
(noting that if Congress does not confront the President over a War Powers Resolution dispute, the court is disinclined to do so); Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.D.C.
1984) (in action contending war powers clause under the Constitution was infringed by United
States involvement in Grenada, noting doctrine of equitable discretion "is designed to prevent
those plaintiff legislators who have collegial or in-house remedies available to them, from asserting their constitutional or legislative claims in court") (citations omitted), appeal dismissed
as moot, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
228. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 900.
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matic termination should commence.22 9
Rather than wait for executive action, Congress should become
a more active participant on war powers matters by making determinations sua sponte that the statute should be invoked. With this decision exercised by the legislative branch, issues concerning executive
reluctance to acknowledge the application of the statute and to determine which subsection applies are virtually eliminated. Moreover, if
the President believes that Congress is likely to make a "hostilities"
determination, the executive branch may be more inclined to report,
consult, and share information with Congress. In this way, the executive branch may persuade Congress that the situation is not as urgent as may be perceived and immediate legislative action is unnecessary. More importantly, clearer lines of communication between the
branches may be promoted by the adoption of these proposals.
b.

Potential Hostilities

In addition to providing greater clarification on the type of
"hostilities" to be covered by the Act, Congress should also play a
greater role in this area by making sua sponte determinations on
what type of "hostilities" exist. A greater congressional role could be
provided by establishing a third category of hostilities termed "potential hostilities." Under this proposal, Congress could impose limitations on the use of armed forces when it determined a particular use
"would likely result in hostilities if United States Armed Forces
were introduced. 230 This approach is proposed under the Hostilities
Act reform legislation and is intended, in part, to afford Congress a
statutory role "before [Armed Forces] are introduced into or become
involved in actual or imminent hostilities."23
The title of H.R. 3912, The Hostilities Act, suggests that the
congressional and executive war powers may be utilized for different
forms of hostilities along a continuum, none of which are separated
229.

Id. at 901.

230. H.R. 3912, § 5(a)(1)(C), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H251 (daily ed.
Feb. 4, 1988).
231. 134 CONG. REC. H256 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis) (emphasis added).
Under the proposed Hostilities Act, the expedited procedures for consideration of "actual"
or "imminent" hostilities legislation are triggered by forty percent co-sponsorship of such legislation. H.R. 3912, § 5(d)(1)(A). However, a fifty percent co-sponsorship requirement is imposed for invoking expedited consideration of "potential" hostilities legislation, H.R. 3912, §
5(d)(1)(B), since such determinations are not deemed to be "as urgent as a situation as one
involving actual or imminent hostilities." 134 CONG. REC. H256 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988)
(section-by-section analysis).
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by a bright line, but instead which blend into each other. Under this
conceptualization, three forms of hostilities could be statutorily recognized, the first two borrowed from the War Powers Resolution:
(1) actual hostilities, (2) imminent hostilities, and (3) likely (or potential) hostilities. The President would be allowed to apply the statute under the first two categories. Congress could invoke the statute
for any forms of hostilities, including the potential hostilities category
for those situations Congress deemed worthy of imposing a prior restraint on the possible use of armed forces. This proposal recognizes
that the distinction between the three forms of hostilities is often a
difference of degree, not kind. The proposal also acknowledges that
"hostilities" determinations are the product of political judgment. It
also gives the legislative branch-as one of the two political departments-a statutory vehicle to make these decisions affirmatively.
Further, by allowing Congress to trigger the war powers statute, it may no longer be necessary to require an executive war powers report submission to invoke the statute. In fact, the executive
branch probably would not demonstrate great reluctance to file a
hostilities report if such a report did not trigger the existing durational clock. The Senate version of the War Powers Resolation in
1973 did not provide that the President's war powers report would
start the clock for automatic termination.2" 2 However, this approach
was rejected in favor of the House version connecting the filing of an
executive hostilities report with the durational clock. 2 33 Rather than
wait or argue for an executive branch report, Congress instead can
and should affirmatively invoke the statute sua sponte. Since Congress can only act through the will of a majority in both chambers,
calls by a few members of Congress to apply the statute would not
be meaningful in the absence of a full congressional finding that
"hostilities" exist. If Congress has the votes to challenge an executive
branch "hostilities" determination (or lack thereof) then it should
have a mechanism to make such judgments independently.
There are several constitutional bases for "potential hostilities"
determinations by Congress. First, the Constitution assigns to Congress the prerogative to declare war.23 4 A congressional limitation on
232. S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., IstSess. 27 (1973) ("The reporting requirements of
the bill apply independently of the provisions of section 5, 6, and 7.") (emphasis added).
233. H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (conference report) (contrasting
House and Senate approaches).
234. U.S. CONST. art 1,§ 8, cl.
11. See also HELVsDsUS, supra note 2, at 153 (Letters
of Helvidius, No. 2) ("The declaring of war is expressly made a legislative function. The
judging of the obligations to make war, is admitted to be included as a legislative function.").
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the use of armed forces in "potential hostilities" is a dimension of
that power, enabling Congress to determine matters of war and, concomitantly, matters short of war. Additionally, Congress is delegated
the responsibility to provide the national military means. As recognized under the proposed Hostilities Act provision, "if only Congress
can raise and support an army or provide and maintain a navy
under the Constitution, Congress may determine that in supplying
such forces it does not want them provided in certain situations,
which in its judgment may result in potential hostilities." ' 5
Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has imposed
geographic or other limitations on the use of armed forces. For example, in the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, a condition
was provided that "[p]ersons inducted into the land forces of the
United States under this Act shall not be employed beyond the limits
of the Western Hemisphere except in the Territories and possessions
of the United States, including the Philippine Islands."23 In the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, the United States
Marines were consigned to the Beirut area and, inter alia, could
2

only engage in self-defense.

87

In the final analysis, it is up to Congress to assert its constitutional authority. The statutory mechanism proposed here can facilitate congressional involvement, but it cannot supply the essential ingredient: congressional willingness to participate directly in this
decision-making process.
4.

Summarizing Hostilities Reform

The existence of a state of war or hostilities is not easily ascertained. This state of conflict is more aptly characterized as a point
along a continuum varying in shade between actual, imminent, and
potential hostilities. Ultimately, "hostilities" determinations-by either the executive or legislative branches-are essentially political
judgments, depending in large part on the unique facts presented.
The War Powers Resolution has fashioned a "hostilities" standard by which the two branches may try to judge the application of
the statute. For reasons already noted, the existing statutory test has
proven ineffective, provoking confrontation between the branches
235. 134 CONG. REC. H256 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis). See
also supra text accompanying notes 39, 42-43, 48-51, and 73, discussing the supporting constitutional authorities for the provision of armed forces by the Congress and the imposition of

conditions on their use.
236. Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 885, 886.
237. See S. REP. No. 242, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11-12 (1983).
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when cooperation or comity is needed in order for this nation to address effectively national security matters. Certainly, such interbranch disputes are an inherent by-product of the separation of powers. Nonetheless, experience under the statute suggests that the
Resolution invites further confrontation than is necessary.
The proposals do not completely discard the present statutory
mechanism, but instead seek to improve upon it. Comity would best
be promoted by the establishment of a common definition of hostilities. Moreover, in recognition that "hostilities" determinations are
influenced by significant political components and are often sensitive
to concurrent authority shared by Congress and the President, the
proposal would allow either of the "political" branches to invoke the
statute.
These proposals have attempted to take account of the shared
authority of the two branches in the war powers area, the fact-specific nature of "hostilities" determinations, and the political judgment component surrounding these decisions. Until the existing statutory construction gap is reconciled, undue confrontation may result
where comity is perhaps needed most.
VI.

ENHANCING THE PROCEDURAL MANNER IN WHICH

CONGRESS CONSIDERS WAR POWERS LEGISLATION THROUGH
THE CONGRESSIONAL RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

In addition to the substantive war powers delegated to Congress
by the Constitution,2"8 another potent, yet seemingly innocuous constitutional power is the congressional rulemaking authority.2" 9
Through this authority, Congress could legitimately exercise a
greater participatory role in the area of war powers. This procedural
power is one of only six exceptions to the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedure" for enacting legislation,2 4 which
238. For a discussion of the constitutional war powers, see supra text accompanying
notes 39-57.
239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]ach House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings."
240. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7
(bicameral requirement); id. § 7, cls. 2, 3 (presentment requirement).
The six exceptions to the regular requirement that all legislation comport with the Presentment Clauses and the bicameral requirement of article I of the Constitution are as follows:
(1) The power of the House to initiate impeachments. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
(2) The Senate power to conduct impeachment trials. Id. § 3, cl. 6.
(3) The Senate authority to approve or disapprove Presidential appointments.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
(4) The Senate power to ratify treaties. Id.

1989]

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

mandates "passage1 by a majority of both Houses and presentment to
24

the President.
Where congressional "action . . . ha[s] the purpose and effect
of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . .all

outside the Legislative Branch, 24 2 Congress is barred from using the
rulemaking power to bypass the constitutional requirement of presentment of legislation to the President. However, pursuant to this
congressional rulemaking authority, "[e]ach House has the power to
act alone in determining specified internal matters.''243 Therefore,
the rulemaking power is a "narrow, explicit, and separately justified" exception to the "step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process" of bicameral passage and presentment of all legislation to the
President.2 44 The scope of the congressional rulemaking authority is
"closely circumscribed [to the] legislative arena" and "only empowers Congress to bind itself."' 24 ' But where the effect of the rulemak-

ing action is limited to the House or the Senate or both, Article I
mandates no participatory role for the executive. Consequently, in
order to successfully argue that Congress exceeded its authority
under the rulemaking exception, the executive branch would have to
establish that the congressional act was not binding solely on the
legislative chambers, but was an act "essentially legislative in purpose and effect. "246
While the President has sole constitutional authority to serve as
Commander-in-Chief, the Article I lawmaking process and rulemaking authority in the war powers context derives its utility, in large
part, from the interdependence of the two branches on each other.
The symbiotic relation between Congress and the President in the
war powers area has two sources. First, the two branches share procedural responsibility for the enactment of any war powers legislation. "It is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared
by both Houses and the President.

' 247

Second, substantive authority,

(5) Proposed constitutional amendments passed by a two-thirds majority in each
chamber. Id. art. V. See also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n.21.
(6) The rulemaking authority of each chamber. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.2.
For a recent discussion by the Supreme Court of these exceptions, see generally Chadha,
462 U.S. at 955 n.21.
241. Id. at 958.
242. Id. at 952.
243. Id. at 956 n.21.
244. Id. at 956, 959.
245. Id. at 955 n.21.
246. Id. at 952.
247. Id. at 947. See also id. at 948 (noting that "[tihe bicameral requirement of Art. I,
§§ 1, 7, was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto and indeed
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resulting from the divided war powers, places executive branch dependence on Congress for the military resources over which the
President commands and directs.2 8 For example, only Congress can
send the President an appropriations bill, 249 raise and support an
army,2 50 and provide and maintain a navy. 5 ' Both the procedural
and substantive components of the relationship are grounded in the
separation of powers.2 52 It is when the procedural and substantive
aspects of this interdependence are conjoined that Congress is able to
legitimately exercise its greatest influence on issues pertaining to the
war powers.
Accordingly, as an internal and procedural housekeeping matter, the rulemaking authority can be used by Congress to monitor its
own manner of exercising its substantive authority on war power
legislation. Without the review or consent of the President, the
House and Senate may adopt special rules for the consideration of
legislation pertaining to war powers, including authorization and appropriation bills. Congress employed this power in the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970. There, the House and Senate made major changes both to their committee system and the manner in which
they conduct their business. The House report accompanying the Act
noted that "the rulemaking power of the Senate and House is a fundamental power, basic to the operation of the two Houses as a separate branch of the Government and expressly stated in the Constitution of the United States."2 5 ' Nearly a century ago, the Supreme
Court noted with regard to the rulemaking power:
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules
and proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
the two concepts are interdependent").
248. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 73.
249. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (Common Defense and General Welfare Clauses); id.
§ 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.").
250. Id. § 8, cl. 12.
251. Id. cl. 13.
252. The Court in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) noted, for example, that
the lawmaking "provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for separation of powers." The Court added that the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id. at 962 (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
253. H.R. REP. No. 1215, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1970).
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open to the determination of the house, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate or even more just. . . . It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the house, and within
the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of
34
any other body or tribunal."
In reliance on this authority in the war powers context, Congress has substantial discretion to conclude, both as an exercise of its
constitutional rulemaking authority and as a means necessary and
proper to fulfill its express substantive constitutional war powers,25
that matters concerning the use of United States Armed Forces
abroad mandate special rules for congressional consideration. Furthermore, by exercising this power, the goal of "collective judgment"
under the War Powers Resolution may be better fulfilled and Congress may be able to more effectively exercise its war powers. " 6 Significantly, pursuant to this constitutional authority, Congress can
make significant reform to the War Powers Resolution sua sponte.
Executive branch participation is not required, because these reforms
only modify internal congressional procedures by altering the mode
by which Congress exercises its substantive powers.
The following three subsections of this article suggest means by
which Congress may modify its rules based on this constitutional
procedural power in order to better attain these stated objectives.
First, Congress should develop a more effective enforcement mechanism by combining its power of the purse with its rulemaking authority.25 7 Second, the legislative branch should retain authority to
reassemble sua sponte after adjournment to consider war powers legislation or reports through its adjournment and rulemaking authority. " 8 Finally, Congress should use the rulemaking power to develop
improved expedited procedures for consideration of war powers
bills. " 9

254.
255.
note 47.

United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (emphasis added).
For the full text of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see supra text accompanying

256.

See supra text accompanying note 9.

257.

See infra text accompanying notes 260-333.

258.

See infra text accompanying notes 334-99.

259.

See infra text accompanying notes 400-90.
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PROCEDURAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM

Background: The War Powers Resolution

The primary means by which Congress intended to enforce its
position pursuant to the War Powers Resolution was through section
5(b). "2 This section mandates the removal of United States Armed
Forces involved in hostilities after sixty days, unless Congress authorizes their continued presence or the President certifies that the
safety of the troops requires an additional thirty days. Section 5(c)
also provides important enforcement authority. 6 ' That section requires troop removal through the two-house legislative veto (or concurrent resolution). These enforcement provisions were considered
the "core" or "heart" of the war powers statute. " 2
However, it is now almost uniformly accepted that the Chadha
260. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982). For the full text of this section, see supra note 80.
261. Section 5(c) provides:
Notwithstanding [section 5(b), providing for automatic removal of Armed
Forces after sixty-days], at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and
territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such
forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution.
50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982).
262. Subcommittee member Representative Fountain noted that the automatic removal
provision is "the key to effective war powers legislation." 119 CONG. REC. 21,213 (1973) (emphasis added). Another subcommittee member, Representative Du Pont, referred to then section 4 as "the fulcrum which will give the Congress the legislative leverage to assert its
warmaking authority" and the concurrent resolution provision as "the heart of the bill." Id. at
21,224 (emphasis added). Representative Legget perceived then section 4(b), providing for the
automatic removal of troops, as the "main section" of the bill because it "force[s] the President
to seek congressional ratification for any involvement of U.S. troops on or over foreign soil."
Id. at 24,706 (emphasis added). Senator Javits called section 5, containing the 30-day authorization period, the "heart and core" of the Senate bill, id. at 24,541 (emphasis added), and
Senator Muskie concurred. Id. at 24,547. Senator Talmadge expressed similar feelings, referring to the automatic removal provision as "the essence of the bill." Id. at 25,109 (emphasis
added). See also S. REP. No. 220, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 28 (1973) (referring to section 5 as
"the heart and core of the bill") (emphasis added); After Chadha, supra note 24, at 777
(noting similar remarks of other commentators).
Even during the legislative efforts to defeat some of the proposed amendments to the War
Powers Resolution, these provisions were considered the centerpiece of the war powers legislation. For example, Representative Zablocki argued against adoption of the Representative
Whalen amendment requiring congressional action for troop removal, noting that then section
"4(b) [providing for the automatic removal of troops] is the heart of the war powers resolution." 119 CONG. REc. 24,689 (1973) (emphasis added). Similarly, committee member Representative Bingham expressed his opinion that the Representative Whalen amendment "goes to
the heart of this committee measure." Id. at 24,690 (emphasis added). He noted that with
regard to the questions raised by the concurrent resolution provision, "[i]f we do not provide
specifically that a congressional veto over a Presidential war may be exercised by concurrent
resolution, we are not doing anything worthwhile" over current law. Id. at 24,612. *
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decision rendered at least section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution
unconstitutional as a violation of the requirement for presenting all
legislation to the President for review.268 Others have argued that
section 5(b) is also of questionable constitutional validity after this
decision.'" If Congress is to establish an alternative and effective
central enforcement mechanism, it must develop a procedure that at-

tains the objectives sought by sections 5(b) and 5(c), but through
constitutionally legitimate means consistent with the principles enunciated in Chadha. Before exploring a substitute, it is therefore useful
to

first

examine

the

original

legislative

intent

behind

these

provisions.
During the House debate on the War Powers Resolution, President Richard Nixon sent a telegram to then House Minority Leader
Gerald Ford notifying him that the Resolution would be vetoed if it
contained the automatic removal and concurrent resolution provisions.265 Although several legislators during the 1973 debate questioned the constitutionality of the concurrent resolution,2 66 the proponents of these provisions wanted to establish a legislative vehicle for
the exercise of congressional war powers through a simple majority
vote of both houses. They also sought to establish a procedure to
ensure that congressional actions taken could not be rescinded if
263. This view was held by at least two Supreme Court Justices who noted the Chadha
decision would, inter alia, adversely affect the War Powers Resolution. See, e.g., supra note
20. For a discussion of the effect of Chadha on section 5(c), see supra text accompanying notes
15-23.
264. Concerning the effect of Chadha on section 5(b), see supra note 24.
265. As read by then House Minority Leader Ford, President Nixon's telegram noted
in part: "I am unalterably opposed to and must veto any bill containing the dangerous and
unconstitutional restrictions found in [then] section 4(b) [automatic removal of troops] and 4(c)
[concurrent resolution] of this bill." 119 CONG. REC. 24,663 (1973). In fact, these objections of
President Nixon were included in his veto message. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution,
PUB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 36,175-76 (1973) (veto override debate).
266. Committee member Representative Dennis commented, "One of my quarrels with
the committee bill is that it locks that constitutional question [concerning the validity of the
concurrent resolution] into law and there is no escape from it." 119 CONG. REC. 24,655
(1973). Committee member Representative Mailliard noted that the concurrent resolution provision "does not comply with the constitutional requirement that anything with legislative effect be presented to the Chief Executive for his approval or disapproval," id. at 21,212, and
Senator Griffin raised the same issue, commenting that the concurrent resolution provision
appears to bypass the presentment requirement in the legislative process. Id. at 25,087-88.
During the veto override debate, Representative Dennis pointed to the "fatal defect" of the bill
in "bypassling] the normal constitutional legislative process by the use of a concurrent resolution, an effort I predict will never be sustained." Id. at 36,209. Representative Frelinghuysen
concluded, "[Then] Sections 4(b) and 4(c) do not aid in clarifying a twilight zone of authority
between Congress and the President. Rather they succeed in raising a host of new problems."
Id. at 21,216.
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Congress subsequently failed to override a presidential veto.26 Senator Jacob Javits characterized this problem as "the barrier of a Presidential veto." '6 8 The primary concern was that one-third of the
members plus one of either the House or Senate would be sufficient
to prevent a veto override and thereby thwart the clear majority of
both chambers of Congress.2 68 These apprehensions were also echoed
267. Representative Findley explained that the War Powers Resolution would "require
the President to disengage from hostilities at any time by a simple majority of both Houses."
Id. at 21,218 (emphasis added). Representative Du Pont noted, "Nowhere in the Constitution
do I see a requirement that two-thirds of both Houses are required to make a President disengage from hostilities that he initiated unilaterally, without prior consent of Congress." Id. at
21,223 (emphasis added). Representative Mailliard noted his concern that 50 Senators out of
535 total members of Congress could sustain presidential action by denying a veto override. Id.
at 24,657. Representative Biester praised the automatic removal provision which avoids a situation where "a minority of either House could continue the combat commitment which originally had been rejected by a definite majority in both Houses." Id. at 24,695-96 (emphasis
added). During the veto override debate, subcommittee member Representative Bingham argued that President Nixon's veto message "insists that he must be free to act so long as onethird plus one of either House agrees with him" and that the war powers bills were introduced "to correct this situation." Id. at 36,208 (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 33,548-49 (remarks during conference report debate). See also id. at 21,212
(remarks of Rep. Zablocki) (noting that the automatic disengagement provision cannot be negated by a presidential veto and that the provision "closes that 'little loophole' of a veto that
the President can use in vetoing actions of the majority of the Congress").
269. Regarding the automatic removal provision in section 5(b), floor manager Representative Zablocki noted that "a veto [should] not negate the outcome of a majority of Congress." Id. at 21,212. He added, "I do not think that one-third of either body . . .should
control the constitutional question of war powers." Id. at 24,689 (emphasis added). Representative Zablocki noted that the absence of the automatic disengagement provision "would give
one-third of either House the opportunity to continue the commitment of troops," permitting
"[tihe will of the majority [to] be thwarted." Id. at 24,654 (emphasis added). Committee member Representative Findley explained that the provision would "require the President to disengage from hostilities at any time by a simple majority of both Houses." Id. at 21,218 (emphasis added). Representative Morgan, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
supported the automatic removal provision noting that "nowhere in the Constitution is there
any provision that the Congress can only exercise its war powers by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses . . . [uinder the Constitution, the Congress can use its war powers by a majority vote
and make it stick." Id. at 24,705 (emphasis added). Senator Javits commented that "the veto
power gives the President an enormous tactical advantage" enabling him "to make war with
the support of only one-third of either House of Congress." Id. at 24,538 (emphasis added).
During the conference report debate, Senator Mathias recalled, "As the experience of Vietnam
has shown, it has been difficult for the legislature to terminate our involvement once U.S.
forces are engaged requiring a two-thirds vote to overcome a Presidential veto." Id. at 33,567
(emphasis added). Representative Holtzman commented in favor of the 60-day automatic cutoffs provision over appropriations cutoffs which are "lengthy, time consuming and subject to a
veto." Id. at 36,220.
With regard to the concurrent resolution provision in section 5(c), committee member
Representative Du Pont argued in support of the concurrent resolution provision stating "if we
have the power under the Constitution to declare war by a simple majority, then we have the
power under the Constitution to stop it by a simple majority." Id. at 24,666 (emphasis added).
See also id. (colloquy between committee members Representatives Du Pont and Biester).
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during efforts, which proved unsuccessful, to require affirmative congressional action by joint resolution allowing the President to sign or
veto any war powers measure."'7
As Senator Thomas Eagleton explained the operation of this
central enforcement provision, "Congress could stop the President by
a simple majority vote rather than having to use the power of the
purse and being forced to muster a two-thirds majority to override a
Presidential veto." ' ' Accordingly, under section 5(b) of the War
Powers Resolution, mere inaction by Congress would mandate disengagement by the end of the designated period. Similarly, the concurrent resolution embodied in section 5(c), intended to be used during
the initial sixty-day period after troops were introduced into hostilities,2 ' would go into effect without presentment of the legislation to
the President. Under this statutory structure, Congress sought to
place the burden on the President to obtain legislative authorization.
Congress could merely allow the automatic removal provision to be
triggered without any action on its part at all.'
Congressman
Clement Zablocki, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development and
During the conference report debate, Senator Brooke noted that the bill provides for a concurrent resolution "to demand a halt to military action" which "will not be subject to presidential
veto." Id. at 33,568. And during the veto override debate, Representative Green explained that
"the bill employs a concurrent resolution ... because [this device] is not subject to a Presidential veto." Id. at 36,204.
270. With regard to the requirement of a congressional vote after 90 days submission of
a presidential combat report, as proposed under the Representative Dennis substitute amendment, Representative Biester commented, "[T]he majority will of the Congress, unless it could
muster a two-thirds majority, would not be able to prevent the Presidential war." Id. at
24,660. Committee member Representative Fascell argued against Representative Eckhardt's
substitute amendment providing for joint resolution for disengagement of forces:
The Congress might be unable to get a two-third majority to override the veto.
Therefore, a one-third majority could thwart the will ofthe majority, thus leaving us in the exactly same position that we are in - with one big exception,
however - (the Eckhardt] amendment would be cited ad infinitum as congressional authority for the President to act as he saw fit.
Id. at 24,680.
271. Id. at 33,556 (conference report debate).
272. See supra text accompanying note 123.
273. Representative Biester remarked, "The burden of proof is on the President. He
must demonstrate that the continuation of such action beyond sixty days is warranted." 119
CONG. REC. 24,696 (1973) (emphasis added). Representative Findley explained:
Realizing that the standards are vague, the House bill requires the President to
explain and justify to Congress why he has assumed the power to commit
troops to hostilities. If Congress approves of the assumption of power, it may
ratify it. If it does not approve, it may let the powers lapse after sixty days, or
terminate them sooner by concurrent resolution.
d. at 21,220 (emphasis added).
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one of the primary authors of the legislation in the House, referred
to these two subsections as establishing a "two-barrel [shotgun]
approach.

2 74

Chadha, decided ten years after the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, made clear that this approach, at least that of section
5(c), is an unconstitutional violation of the Presentment Clauses. In
the aftermath of Chadha, perhaps the best enforcement mechanism
would result from combining Congress' procedural rulemaking authority with its substantive power of the purse. To the extent that
internal housekeeping rules would bind the legislative arena and
Congress could assert its plenary appropriations power, the legislative branch would thereby enhance, through constitutional means, its
ability to assert its position on war powers questions. Before this
approach is explored, a similar proposal in the agency rulemaking
field under the Grassley-Levin bill is reviewed.
B.

S. 1145, Section 807: The Grassley-Levin Model

One measure that will serve as a useful model in drawing upon
the congressional rulemaking authority and power of the purse, is
section 807 of S. 1145, the Rulemaking Procedures Reform Act of
1985."' This measure is referred to as the Grassley-Levin bill after
the measure's two principal Senate authors. 7 It is designed to es274. See After Chadha, supra note 24, at 785 (quoting 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 145, at 93). See also 119 CONG. REC. 21,212 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Zablocki) (noting
the War Powers Resolution is "a double-barreled attempt to deal with the issue of war powers in a legislative manner") (emphasis added); accord id. at 36,209 (veto override debate)
(remarks of Rep. Bingham) (subcommittee member noting that the concurrent resolution and
automatic termination provisions were to serve as "method[s of congressional control over
Presidential wars").
275. S. 1145, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S6267-70 (daily ed. May 15,
1985).
The same measure was introduced in the last Congress as S. 1560, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
133 CONG. REC. S10,850-52 (daily ed. July 29, 1987). Because there was no Senate Judiciary
Committee action on S. 1560 in the 100th Congress, this article references to S. 1145 from the
prior Congress in which hearings were held and the bill was favorably reported out of committee by a twelve to- five margin. See Rulemaking Procedures Reform Act of 1985, Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1145]; S. REP. No. 492,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The S. 1145 model is similar to Federal Trade Commission
authorization legislation considered in the 99th Congress. Cf S. REP. No. 492, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 n.4 (1986).
276. Subsection 807(b) is intended to serve as a substitute for the now unconstitutional
two-house legislative veto, while subsection 807(c) is designed as a post-Chadha replacement
of the one-house veto.
Section 807 of S. 1145 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, after the Senate and the
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tablish a constitutional replacement for the now defunct legislative
77
veto over the executive branch rulemaking process2
Operationally, section 807 would establish a special mechanism
for Congress to exercise its power of the purse whenever it disapproved an agency rule. The bill would allow a point of order to be
raised against any appropriations bill which does not prohibit funds
for the implementation of the agency rule after a disapproval resolution of the rule was passed. As the provision was drafted, the point
of order could be raised whether or not the President had received,
signed, or vetoed the disapproval resolution. Congress could also decide not to allow the point of order to be raised if it changed its
original position and decided to expend the funds for the agency
rule. This may be accomplished if Congress waives the point of order or by a majority vote.
In order for this proposal to pass constitutional muster, it must
be shown to be a valid exercise of congressional rulemaking authority that does not run afoul of the objectives served by the Presentment Clauses, something the one-house legislative veto in Chadha
failed to accomplish. It is therefore useful to review the rationale
underlying the Presentment Clauses and to consider whether the
Grassley-Levin device infringes the executive authority contained in
those constitutional provisions.
1. Considerations Involving the Presentment Clauses
During the Constitutional Convention, James Madison noted
that if the presentment requirement were limited to "bills," Congress
House of Representatives adopt a joint resolution with respect to a rule pursuant to this chapter, it shall not be in order in the Senate or the House to vote on
final passage of any bill or resolution making appropriations for the agency
which issued such rule unless such bill or resolution contains provisions which
prohibit the use of any funds appropriated by such bill or resolution to issue,
promulgate, enforce, or otherwise carry out such rule.
(c) In any case in which, prior to the effective date of this chapter, Federal law
provided that a rule subject to this chapter could not take effect if such rule was
disapproved by action of only one House of Congress, the provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall apply to such rule on and after the date on which
either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a joint resolution under
this chapter with respect to such rule.
277. Former Representative James Broyhill, an advocate of S. 1145, testified that the
measure would "fill the void that was left by the Supreme Court's [Chadha] decision" in the
agency rulemaking area. Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 18. Upon introducing the
same bill in the 100th Congress, Senator Grassley remarked, "This congressional review
mechanism is carefully drawn to meet the Supreme Court's objection to the legislative veto, as
expressed in the 1983 case, INS versus Chadha." 133 CONG. REC. S10,850 (daily ed. July 29,
1987).
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might innovate substitute legislative vehicles that would avoid executive review.

78

In order to protect against any such bypassing of pres-

idential consideration, the Framers amended the proposed Constitution to close up this potential loophole. Accordingly, every "Bill, '2 79
"Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary" must be presented
to the President. 80
The Chadha Court considered that three primary functions
were to be served by providing for this executive role in the lawmaking process. First, the President would be afforded a defense against
the Congress. 28 1 Second, the chances of enacting bad laws or improvident legislation would be lessened by the presentment requirement. 8 2 Finally, presidential review would "assur[e] that a 'national' perspective is grafted on the legislative process. ' "88
The only potential constitutional challenge to the proposal embodied in section 807 of S.1145 is that it violates the requirement of
presentment. With this background in mind, we turn to consideration of the presentment issue.
2.

Does Section 807 Contravene the Presentment Clauses?

James M. Spears, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Policy of the Department of Justice, testified that with some
technical amendments, S. 1145 would comport with the constitutional requirements for legislative enactment referenced in
Chadha 84 Nonetheless, Mr. Spears suggested that the conjoining of
278. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983) (citing 2 M. FARRAND, THE
1787, 301-02 (1911)); id. at 981 (White, J.,
dissenting). See also 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 41, at 431 (J. Madison).
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2.
280. Id. cl.
3.
281. However this defensive protection was not absolute, but rather qualified, as "[tihe
President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two-thirds of both
Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person."
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
282. Id. at 948. See also id. at 951 (summarizing that "[tihe President's participation in
the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the
whole people from improvident laws").
283. Id. at 948. See generally After Chadha, supra note 24, at 779-82 (discussing Presentment Clauses as debated in the Constitutional Convention and the underlying rationale for
these clauses).
284. See Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 29-30, 40, 41. See also Hearings on
S. 1145, supra note 275, at 23 (noting the Department of Justice's position that "the joint
resolution of disapproval mechanism proposed in Senate bill 1145 is constitutional").
This article only considers section 807 of S. 1145 as a model and does not consider other
provisions of the Grassley-Levin bill, including section 804, to which the Department of JusRECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
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the procedural point of order with the appropriations power in the
Grassley-Levin bill might "be construed as an attempt to circumvent
the presentment clause" and therefore "any enforcement procedure
must not come into play until the legislative process on the agency
rule-of which Presidential action is obviously a major component
has been completed." 88
This argument is essentially predicated on the timing of the
point of order and the authority of Congress to invoke an internal
point of order at various stages in the legislative process. There are
three points at which the point of order could be raised : (1) before
the disapproval resolution has been formally presented to the President, (2) after presentment but during the regular ten-day period
for presidential action on a measure, 8 6 and (3) after the full period
for review by the President has expired. The Justice Department's
contention is that only a narrow window of opportunity (usually ten
days) exists for the executive to review legislation which Congress
has approved. According to the department, congressional action
through the invocation of a point of order before the President could
sign or veto the bill would encroach upon the ability of the executive
to exercise its presidential functions.
First, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that Congress would
consider an appropriations bill denying certain funds to the executive
prior to presentment of the joint resolution of disapproval, since appropriations are generally part of an annual cycle. More importantly, pursuant to its constitutional rulemaking authority, Congress
clearly has the prerogative to decide when it may permit points of
order to lie on appropriations bills at any juncture in the legislative
process. Because the point of order is an internal rule affecting the
congressional procedure for considering spending bills, the Presenttice raised its strongest constitutional objections. James Spears noted that section 804(d) constitutes an "unconstitutional legislative veto device . . . and should be deleted from the bill."
Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 30 n.2.
285. Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 22-23, reprinted in S. REP. No. 492,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986). See also Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 27-28, 40.
286. As a general rule, the President has 10 days to review legislation passed by both
Houses. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, provides in pertinent part:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not become law.
The only occasion when Congress is preempted-from attempting to override an executive veto
after the 10-day period of presidential review is under the so-called pocket veto after congressional adjournment. See generally Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Wright v. United
States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
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ment Clauses are not infringed by the section 807 model. As part of
this rulemaking authority, Congress may decide that the point of order should be triggered upon the occurrence of certain eventsbefore or during presentment or even after a veto. Accordingly, the
Grassley-Levin device qualifies as an action within one of the "narrow" exceptions to the bicameralism-presentment process."'
In order to remove the point of order from this constitutional
exception, the point of order mechanism would have to be shown to
be equivalent to a "legislative act," thereby mandating presentment
to the President. 8 8 However, the point of order mechanism is clearly
not a "legislative act" which requires presentment because its effect
is confined to the legislative branch (since no "legal rights, duties,
and relations or persons" outside of the House or Senate are impacted by its use).289 The device is simply a procedural one as it is
only binding on the "legislative arena": as designed in the GrassleyLevin bill, a member of the House or the Senate can raise a point of
order against an appropriations bill only upon the triggering event
(after a disapproval resolution has first been passed by both chambers). Once raised, the point of order only affects congressional consideration of the appropriation measure.
Moreover, the point of order is not automatic as it may be
waived, or, even if asserted, may be overcome by a majority vote. As
Stanley Brand, former counsel to the House of Representatives,
noted: "The full measure of [section 807's] totally intramural compass is substantiated by the fact that once an appropriation or bill
has passed, a point-of-order having been waived against it or not
asserted, the point-of-order has no bearing on the validity of the enacted law." 9" Further, the executive branch cannot enforce this internal rule if Congress fails to follow it."' The use of the point of
order involves congressional rulemaking authority. Consequently, the
presentment requirement need not be complied with when and if the
point of order is invoked.2 '
287. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-56 (1983) (noting exceptions to the regular
lawmaking process).
288. Id. at 952.
289. Id.
290. Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 74.
291. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where the executive branch, obtaining a sought
after appropriation, would not expend the funds because some aspect of the procedural point
of order was not properly satisfied.
292. Others considering the point of order mechanism in section 807 of S. 1145 have
concluded that it comports with the constitutional requirements forconsideration of legislation.
Eugene Gressman, constitutional law professor, University of North Carolina, noted, for ex-
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Not only does the point of order device fall within the rulemaking exception, but none of the presentment functions are circumvented by its use. First, the President need not defend against the
raising of the point of order because, as noted, its use affects only the
consideration of legislation within the congressional arena. Significantly, the President will get an opportunity to review the appropriations bill on which the point of order is raised if Congress ultimately sends him the measure. Second, there is no need at the point
of order stage for the President to minimize the chance of enactment
of "bad laws or improvident legislation" since the raising of the
point of order does not even result in legislation. The device merely
affects the manner of congressional consideration of spending legislation. Finally, the President does not need to bring a national perspective on the matter on which the point of order is exercised since
the device is a procedural housekeeping rule of the Congress and the
President will ultimately get an opportunity to approve or veto the
final spending measure adopted by the House and Senate. Accordingly, the use of the point of order is a legitimate exercise of Congress' rulemaking power and does not encroach upon the presentment objectives of the President.
The key issue raised by the point of order device is what legislative event or act should serve as a trigger. One suggestion has been
made to trigger the point of order if the President vetoed the joint
resolution of disapproval.2 9 Expanding on this proposal, the point of
order could be invoked as one of the last legislative events prior to
presentment, for example, during the enrollment of legislation. Enample, that section 807 "is probably constitutional, for Congress has virtually unlimited appropriation powers." Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 87. Stuart Eizenstat, former Chief
Domestic Policy Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, expressed his view that "the appropriations provision [is] clearly constitutional." Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 91. He
explained that "the appropriations provision is a matter of internal congressional procedure
.. . [and is] fully constitutional," Hearingson S. 1145, supra note 275, at 55, and concluded
that the point of order "is purely internal." Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 92.
Stanley Brand agreed, noting that section 807 comports with congressional rulemaking authority. Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 74.
293. Stuart Eizenstat, former Chief Domestic Policy Advisor to President Jimmy
Carter, recommended:
The process might be set in motion if the President vetoed a joint resolution of
disapproval, and Congress, seeking to avoid the route of overriding the veto and
its attendant requirement of a two-thirds vote, tried to accomplish the same result by passing an appropriations measure that prohibited promulgation of the
rule - one that would require but a majority vote. It is much less likely that a
President facing a major appropriations bill with hundreds of items in it would
veto it on account of one provision.
Hearinqs on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 66.
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rollment occurs after the Senate and House have approved an identical measure. It is the process during which the accuracy and similarity of measures approved by both chambers is examined and the
signature of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate are placed on the bill so that it can be officially presented to the
President.29 4 Thus, the Committee on House Administration and the
Secretary of the Senate, both delegated the task of examining legislation to see that it is properly enrolled, could be ordered to withhold
approval of the enrolled legislation unless the point of order was
overcome or otherwise waived. Therefore, assuming the validity of
Mr. Spear's concerns over encroachment on the presentment function, under this reasoning much of the department's challenge to the
provision would be mitigated by ensuring that the invocation of the
point of order occurred only upon some final act within the legislative arena.
The legitimacy of the point of order under Congress' rulemaking authority is further established when compared with similar internal congressional rules that restrict the substance of legislation
considered by the Congress. For example, under existing House and
Senate procedure, there is a general prohibition against consideration
of amendments to appropriation bills that "change[] existing law" or
involve "new or general legislation" during floor debate (so-called
legislative "riders").' 5 This restriction, like that under consideration
above, is asserted through a point of order and may be waived by
established procedure in chamber. It therefore constitutes an analogous type of housekeeping rule that Congress may impose on its consideration of legislation.29 6 Under this rule, new legislation authoriz294. In the House of Representatives, the Committee on House Administration is assigned the task of examining approved legislation. H.R. Rule X, cl. 4(d), CONSTITUTION,
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL & RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, § 697a, H.R. Doc.
No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 401 (1987) [hereinafter JEFFERSON'S MANUAL]. Interestingly,
under House precedent the signature on enrolled bills may be cancelled to correct enrollment
errors. "By unanimous consent where errors are found in enrolled bills that have been signed,
the two Houses by concurrent action may authorize the cancellation of the signatures and a
reenrollment, and in the same way the signature may be cancelled on a bill prematurely enrolled." Id. § 575, note, at 279-80 (citations omitted).

Under Senate Rules, the Secretary of the Senate is assigned the examination duty prior to
the signing of the enrolled bill by the President of the Senate. S. Rule XIV, cl. 5, SENATE
MANUAL: CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECT-

ING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 1, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
12 (1988) [hereinafter SENATE MANUAL].

295.

See, e.g., H.R. Rule XXI, 2(c) & (d), JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, supra note 294, at

573-74; S. Rule XVI, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 294, at 14-16.
296. See Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 92 (remarks of former Rep. Levitas)
(discussing House parliamentary procedure in defeating the motion for the committee of the
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ing a President's proposal for the use of troops or placing specific
congressional restrictions on their use could not first be considered
during floor debate on an appropriations bill.
As another illustration, the House Committee on Rules serves
as a "traffic cop" for legislation to be debated on the House floor. In
this capacity, the committee may propose a Resolution restricting the
manner of floor consideration, including, inter alia, the number and
type of amendments to be heard on any measure. While the committee-proposed Resolution could be defeated by a majority vote in the
House, this committee function (as an internal regulatory process of
the House) regularly has a powerful influence on the ultimate form
and substance of legislation to be deliberated. In fact, the proposed
Resolution of the House Rules Committee (establishing time and
amendment limits for a particular bill), has a determinative effect on
legislation considered in the House.
Another example is the procedural practice established during
the Eisenhower Administration requiring approval by the authorizing committee before any funds could be appropriated for certain
public buildings.297 Under this Public Buildings Act, unless committee approval was first obtained, Congress could not appropriate the
funds.29 In comparison to this procedure, the trigger requirement
for the point of order in the Grassley-Levin bill is stricter. Unlike
the easier committee approval requirement in the Public Buildings
Act, the Grassley-Levin bill requires bicameral approval as a condition precedent to a member raising the point of order.
As each of these examples demonstrates, the executive presentment authority is not infringed by such internal congressional rules
whole House to rise in order to consider the appropriation of funds to implement a
regulation).
297. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 75 (statement of Stanley
Brand) (discussing this practice and noting that "[aipparently, the Executive conceded the validity of this response").
298. Public Buildings Act of 1959, § 7(a), Pub. L. No. 86-249, 73 Stat. 480 (as
amended 40 U.S.C. § 606(a)) provided in part that:
[N]o appropriationshall be made to construct any public building or to acquire
any building to be used as a public building involving an expenditure in excess
of $100,000, and no appropriation shall be made to alter any public building
involving an expenditure in excess of $200,000, ifsuch construction, alteration,
or acquisition has not been approved by resolutions adopted by the Committee
on Public Works of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and
such approval has not been rescinded as provided in subsection (c) of this
section.
(emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 694, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1959), reprinted in
1959 U.S. CODE & CONG. ADMIN. NEWS at 2295-96; H.R. REP. No. 557, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1959).
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as section 807 of the Grassley-Levin bill. Each imposes limitations
on the mode of consideration of legislation on the floors of Congress.
These rules create a procedural presumption that a house of Congress will operate in a particular manner during deliberation of a
particular bill or subject area. Significantly, this presumption can be
overcome by a majority vote or other waiver process. No rights or
duties outside the legislative arena are affected by these housekeeping rules. Accordingly, section 807 is a legitimate exercise of the congressional rulemaking authority and does not require compliance
with the Presentment Clause. Congress can establish an internal rule
affecting its procedure and manner of consideration of a bill even
though the trigger for the internal rule is that prior legislation has
been presented to the President. As will next be shown, the point of
order procedure also advances and reinforces the functions the House
and Senate perform in the legislative process independent from and
prior to presentment.
3.

The Bicameral Requirement of the Lawmaking Process

To become the law of the land, legislation generally must receive the concurrence of the House, Senate, and President, or, in the
absence of executive approval, a two-thirds approval by both the
House and the Senate.299 Each of the three lawmaking institutions
clearly has a distinct function to serve in the constitutional lawmaking equation as each brings a different representational perspective
to the consideration of proposed legislation. Under the constitutional
design, the House is said to represent the people, the Senate the
States, and the President the nation. 30 0 The House and Senate, products of the Great Compromise during the Constitutional Convention,
are constituted by membership with different bases and terms of representation. The rules, practices, customs and constitutional requirements of each chamber also create significant differences in each
body, despite the subtle appearance of these distinctions. 3 0' In fact,
because each lawmaking institution represents different constituencies and is distinct in composition, concurrence among the lawmaking institutions is not always easily attained and might only result
after reconciliation and compromise.3 02 As the Supreme Court has
299. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7 (bicameralism requirement), § 7, cls. 2, 3 (presentment
requirement and veto process).
300. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948, 950-51 (1983).
301. See generally id. at 950.
302. In fact, under the Grassley-Levin proposal, the point of order may not be triggered
until both the House and Senate first concur on a disapproval resolution.
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noted, "[t]he bicameral requirement

. . .

699,

was of scarcely less concern

to the Framers than was the Presidential veto and indeed the two
concepts are interdependent." 8so As will be demonstrated, within the
formulation of the lawmaking procedure set forth in the Chadha decision, the point of order device may alternatively be said to fall
clearly within and promote the objectives of the bicameral phase of
the lawmaking process.
The Chadha Court recognized two primary purposes advanced
by the bicameral requirement of Article I. First, it is to provide "that
the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for
full study and debate in separate settings."3 0 4 The elected representatives have the chance to completely and carefully deliberate on the
wisdom and necessity of legislation prior to sending it to the President. This reviewing function by each chamber is similar to that assured the President under the Presentment Clauses. Second, the bicameral requirement serves to diffuse legislative authority. 0 3 The
legislative power is divided into two independent, but similar,
branches, thereby ensuring that legislative power is not unduly concentrated and maintaining separate review by bodies representing
different constituencies and institutions.3"'
The effectiveness of the congressional power to legislate depends
to a large extent on the sequential nature of the lawmaking process.3 07 Because presentment must be preceded by bicameral consideration, the President can only exercise the power to review legislation after the two legislative chambers have concurred. Although the
President has the power of the veto, which affords him considerable
303. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948.
304. Id. at 951.
305. Id. at 950 (discussing "need to divide and disperse power in order to protect
liberty").
306. See generally id. at 948-51.
307. The Constitution clearly contemplates a sequence to be followed in the enactment
of legislation. Congress must positively act before the constitutional role of the President may
affirmatively commence (although the threat of a veto may have an influential impact on legislation considered by the Congress). The Constitution provides that "Every* Bill which shall
have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis
added). See also id. cl. 3. Should both Houses or either House disapprove a measure, then the
presentment requirement is not triggered. The 10-day constitutional clock for executive review,
see supra note 286, does not commence until both legislative chambers take identical action.
The sequential nature of the lawmaking process is reiterated in the event of a veto, where the
measure must be returned to the originating House for reconsideration before it can be debated
in the other chamber. Id. cl. 2. Although the President obviously shares a role in the appropriation and authorization process, his role cannot interfere with the bicameral process.
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influence in negotiations with Congress,80 8 he is unable to dictate to
the co-ordinate lawmaking branch the particular form a legislative
package will take. Only Congress determines the language to be sent
(or which is not sent) to the White House. While it is largely
through the threat of executive veto that Congress finds it desirable
to reach an accommodation with the President, importantly, the presentment review may not take place until after the bicameral requirement is satisfied.
So long as the President is given an opportunity to approve or
veto a measure that has completed the bicameral phase, the President is not denied his constitutional role in the consideration of legislation. Even assuming arguendo that the section 807 device was not
within the rulemaking authority of Congress, it is nonetheless clearly
in compliance with the bicameral requirement (or pre-presidential
phase of the lawmaking process) and does not infringe the executive
role under the Presentment Clauses. Significantly, both the original
disapproval resolution triggering the eligibility of the point of order,
and the subsequent spending bill subject to the point of order, would
be presented to the President under section 807.
As noted, the primary objection to section 807 held by the Department of Justice is that the point of order mechanism should not
be eligible for invocation until after the President has had a complete
opportunity to review the first disapproval measure, presumably for
the full ten-day period. 0 9 However, the complete acceptance of this
contention would deny Congress the ability and discretion to exercise
fully its bicameral obligation during this period. Nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress, in fulfilling its bicameral function, from
first sending the President a disapproval resolution shortly followed
by an appropriation measure (which is consistent with the congressional position taken in the original disapproval resolution) before
the President has finally acted within the ten-day presentment window period on the first disapproval resolution. Congress need not
wait for the President's approval or disapproval before referring to
the executive branch a spending bill to accomplish the same end.
Simply as a matter of congressional prerogative, the legislature may
decide prior to presentment that submitting two bills to the White
House-the latter grounded on the plenary power of the purse-is
308. See, e.g., After Chadha, supra note 24, at 788 (quoting Mr. Wilson during the
Constitutional Convention noting that the "silent operation [of the then proposed absolute veto
in the executive branch] would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief [by the Congress]") (quoting 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 41, at 152).
309. For this argument, see supra text accompanying notes 284-85.
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the best way to signal the executive branch that Congress is firm and
insistent on its position.
The bicameral aspect of the section 807 point of order is further
demonstrated by the fact that this device is also an exercise of Congress' plenary power of the purse. The Constitution expressly provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by law."3' 10 Clearly, the President does not have an entitlement to receive certain spending bills or
spending measures containing certain provisions within them."'
Most significantly, the President's presentment function is not "circumvented," nor could it be, since the executive branch can veto or
approve both the initial disapproval resolution and the follow-up
spending prohibition after the bicameral obligation has been fully
exercised in both instances. Nothing about section 807 denies the
President the full ten-day period to review each measure.
After presentment, and in the event the President vetoes the disapproval measure, the bicameral branch is confronted with a strategic choice. It can either (1) attempt to override the veto, requiring
approval by the constitutional super-majority, (2) decide to back-up
its former position through the power of the purse, or (3) negotiate a
compromise with the President. Each of these options is part of the
give-and-take, dynamic nature of the Article I legislative process.
The particular avenue ultimately pursued is largely determined by
the prerogatives and imponderables of the moment. Therefore, even
assuming the unlikely argument that the section 807 device did not
qualify under the rulemaking power-an exception to the regular
lawmaking process-it nonetheless would comport with the bicameral phase of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" for the enactment of legislation.3 2
4.

Conclusions on the Grassley-Levin Model

It appears without question that the Grassley-Levin approach
embodied in section 807 qualifies as a valid exercise of the congressional rulemaking authority and does not violate the Article I lawmaking requirements. No rights, duties or relations of any person
310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
7 (emphasis added). For a listing of the congressional
spending powers, see supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
311. Because of the sequential nature of the legislative process, "[tihere would seem to
be little doubt," Stanley Brand has noted, "that Congress can deny itself, through its rulemaking authority, the power to enact legislation and thereby deny to the Executive the ability
to act." Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 75.
312. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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outside of Congress are affected by this device. Moreover, the procedural device merely concerns the manner in which Congress considers designated legislation.
However, even assuming arguendo that presentment were required, the section 807 procedure comports with the bicameral requirement. This procedural mechanism clearly qualifies as an exercise of the congressional power of the purse. Moreover, the President
is afforded a chance to review both the original disapproval measure
triggering the point of order as well as the subsequent spending bill
subject to this procedural device. Therefore, the section 807 mechanism does not circumvent the Presentment Clauses.
As a legitimate exercise of legislative authority, the proposed
Grassley-Levin section 807 device affords Congress greater constitutional leverage than it exerts under current law. Although Congress
presently has the constitutional power to accomplish the objectives
secured under the point of order mechanism without the adoption of
this device, section 807 establishes an internal statutory infrastructure. It is a flexible procedural tool, considering it may be waived.
Its flexibility allows Congress to choose not to invoke the point of
order on a particular spending bill. If established as a formal process
"[t]he real congressional leverage resides in the threat of" its use,
"promis[ing] to achieve its goal. as much through its specter as
through its actual exercise." ' Section 5 of the War Powers Resolution contains an automatic removal provision and two-house legislative veto, once referred to as a "two-barrel [shot gun] approach." ' 4
Ironically, the Grassley-Levin measure, intended to replace the unconstitutional legislative veto in the executive agency rulemaking
area, has been similarly termed a " 'shotgun behind the door' - a
prod to make agencies act more responsibly." ' As Stanley Brand
has stated, "[tihe appropriation cut-off provision [in section 807]
could prove to be the sleeping giant" within the bill."' As Stuart
Eizenstat has observed in the agency rulemaking context, "[tlhere is
no reason why Congress should not use all the institutional means at
its disposal to enforce its will."1a

7

With its constitutional legitimacy

313. Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 54 (statement of Stuart Eizenstat). See
also S. REP. No. 492, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.5 (1986) ("In fact, as with past veto legislation,
the real Congressional leverage will reside in the threat of a veto, which will normally persuade an agency to withdraw or modify an arbitrary rule.").
314. See supra text accompanying note 274.
315.
316.
317.

S. REP. No. 492, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.5 (1986).
Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 71.
Hearings on S. 1145, supra note 275, at 66.

1989]

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

affirmed, and in light of the need to reform the War Powers Resolution, it is proposed here that a similar vehicle be substituted for the
constitutionally infirm enforcement provisions of the War Powers
Resolution.
C.

H.R. 3912, Section 6(a): The Lungren Hostilities Act
1.' Operation of the Proposal

Section 6(a) of H.R. 3912 draws upon the Grassley-Levin
model and provides a point of order mechanism by which Congress
could impose funding limitations on the use of armed forces. 18 The
point of order device cannot be invoked until- the House and Senate
first approve legislation providing specific limitations on the use of
armed forces in hostilities pursuant to section 5(a). 19 While the sec318. Section 6(a) provides:
(a) Amendment In Order. - If the Congress has passed a bill or joint resolution imposing limitations described in section 5(a) (authorizing congressional restrictions on the use of Armed Forces] (and that bill or joint resolution has been
enrolled or is eligible for enrollment) but has not become law, it shall be in
order at any time after the enrollment of that bill to consider, any Rule of the
House of Representatives or the Senate to the contrary notwithstanding, the text
of such bill or joint resolution in the House of Representatives or the Senate as
a provision of or amendment to any bill or joint resolution making appropriations for the Department of Defense, except that this section (1) shall cease to apply if that bill or joint resolution is enacted, and
(2) shall not apply in a House of Congress if that House agrees to a resolution stating that this section shall not apply with regard to that bill or joint
resolution.
H.R. 3912, § 6(a), 134 CONG. REC. H252 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988).
319. Section 5(a) provides:
(a) Legislation Subject to Special Procedures. - This section applies with respect to any bill or joint resolution introduced in either House of Congress
which would, if enacted (1) impose limitations on the use of United States Armed Forces (A) which (as determined by the Congress in that bill or joint resolution)
have been introduced into or have otherwise become involved in hostilities;
(B) which (as determined by the Congress in that bill or joint resolution)
have been introduced into or have otherwise become involved in situations
where imminent hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; or
(C) in any situation which (as determined by the Congress in that bill or
joint resolution) would likely result in hostilities if United States Armed Forces
were introduced; or
(2) amend or repeal (A) an act or joint resolution described in paragraph (1) which has been
enacted under the procedures contained in this section, or
(B) the provisions of a bill or joint resolution described in paragraph (1)
which have been included in a bill or joint resolution making appropriations for
the Department of Defense pursuant to section 6 of this Act.
This section shall not apply if a bill contains any provision other than a provi-
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tion 5(a) hostilities legislation is intended to be applied on an ad hoc
basis as the situation may warrant, some of the possible limitations
include duration, troop size or composition, and spending level. 8"'
The point of order is not conditioned on a presidential veto. In fact,
the section 6 point of order applies to a "bill or joint resolution
[which] has been enrolled or is eligible for enrollment."3'21 Therefore,
the point of order operates whether or not the President signs the
original bill containing the limitation on the use or participation of
armed forces. Instead, the contingent event is the prior passage of
section 5(a) legislation by both chambers. Congressman Daniel Lungren, who introduced H.R. 3912, explained the intended operation
of these provisions, considered the "heart" of the reform proposal:3 22
Once the Congress approves section 5(a) legislation imposing
limitations on the use of armed forces, it is in order for Congress to consider whether to include similar funding restrictions
on defense appropriation measures [by use of the point of order]. . . .[Slection 6 establishes a new parliamentary procedure where Congress can determine whether it should utilize its
power of the purse on questions involving the use of armed
sion described in paragraph (1)and (2).
134 CONG. REc. H251 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988).
For a discussion of the three forms of hostilities - actual, imminent, and potential under section 5(a), see supra text accompanying notes 211-16, 230-37.
320. Section 5(b) provides four examples of possible limitations:
(b) Examples of Types of Limitations. - The types of limitations on United
States Armed Forces which a bill or joint resolution described in subsection (a)
could impose include (but are not limited to) limitations on -,
(1) the duration of involvement of United States Armed Forces;
(2) the size and composition of the United States Armed Forces involved;
(3) the amount of appropriated funds which may be expended for involvement of
United States Armed Forces; and
(4) the period during which appropriated funds will be available for expenditure for
involvement of United States Armed Forces.
H.R. 3912, § 5(b), 134 CONG. REC. H251 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988).
The section-by-section analysis accompanying this legislation notes that "[tihis exemplary
list is not intended to be exhaustive" and that "Itihese examples are clearly part of Congress'
constitutional authority to provide Armed Forces . . . and part of Congress' power of the
purse." 134 CONG. REC. H256 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988). A comprehensive listing of past examples where similar funding limitations were enacted is also provided. See id. at H257.
321. H.R. 3912, § 6, 134 CONG. REC. H252 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988).
322. As noted in the section-by-section analysis accompanying the legislation:
Sections 5 and 6 are the heart of the Hostilities Act since they enable Congress
to act under its constitutional war powers or rulemaking authority to impose
limitations on the use of U.S. Armed Forces in situations of hostilities or enable
Congress to use its power of the purse to include these limitations in appropriation measures.
134 CONG. REC. H256 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (emphasis added).

Id. § 5(a),
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forces in hostilities. 828
Under this proposal, any section 5(a) hostilities legislation that
does not become law (by veto or congressional failure to overrule a
veto) establishes an opportunity to raise a point of order on any subsequent defense funding bill that permits an appropriation inconsistent with the previously approved hostilities legislation.
This parliamentary procedure, allowing Congress to backup the
limitations passed under section 5(a) with its power of the purse, can
be avoided in three situations. 24 First, the procedural device would
not apply if the original section 5(a) legislation became law, either
by executive approval or veto override. If the President approves the
initial section 5(a) hostilities legislation, then it becomes unnecessary
for Congress to use the point of order mechanism. This procedural
device enables Congress to reinforce its position where the two lawmaking branches are not in accord. Second, Congress can adopt a
concurrent resolution overcoming the point of order, either if Congress changes its mind or under other circumstances (including concern over the safety of United States military forces in the field).
Finally, under existing rules of the House, the Committee on Rules
may waive section 6, subject, as always, to approval of a majority of
the House. Because the Senate lacks a similar waiver procedure, section 6(b) of H.R. 3912 provides the Senate a similar mechanism
whereby it can decide not to invoke the funding limitation provision.3 25 Therefore, at all times the will of the majority in both houses
will prevail and'either implement the spending restriction through
the point of order or overcome the funding limitation imposed by the
point of order device.
2.

Discussion

The section 6 proposal conforms with the Article I requirements set forth in Chadha. This proposal is expressly intended to
fall within the rulemaking power of the House and Senate, 26 one of
the "narrow, explicit, and separately justified" exceptions to the Ar323. Id. at H248 (remarks of Rep. Lungren).
324. See id.at H258 (section-by-section analysis) (discussing 3 modes of waiving the
point of order procedure).
325. H.R. 3912, § 6(b), 134 CONG. REC. H252 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988); 134 CONG.
REC. H258 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis) (explaining operation of section 6(b)).
326. Section 8 of the measure explicitly provides that sections 5 and 6, inter alia, are
enacted as an exercise of the article I rulemaking power of the House and the Senate. H.R.
3912, § 8, 134 Cong. Rec. H253 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988).
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ticle I legislative procedure.3 2 It is simply a parliamentary device
available for use by Congress to bind itself during consideration of
specified authorization and appropriation measures involving the use
or participation of armed forces abroad. Only when Congress has
approved section 5(a) hostilities legislation which failed to become
law is the funding limitation provision eligible for implementation.
Even if the funding limitation is invoked, Congress is able to change
its mind and, therefore, not adopt the limitation by one of the three
waiver mechanisms.
The funding limitation device is restricted to the legislative
arena and, therefore, does not implicate the presentment requirement. 8 ' This provision merely amends existing procedures used by
Congress in its consideration of appropriation and authorization
measures concerning the use or participation of armed forces.
Moreover, the procedural proposal also clearly comports with
the bicameral requirement of the lawmaking equation as Congress
exercises its power over appropriations or authorizations. First, all
proposed laws must be approved by both houses of Congress. Second, the Constitution expressly provides that all appropriation measures must first pass both chambers.
Because the use of armed forces abroad is often such a sensitive
matter, and because the Constitution assigns Congress a specific role
in considering such issues, Congress might decide that the funding
limitation provision may be a necessary and proper means for it to
call attention to the involvement of armed forces in hostilities after
both houses have voted to condition the use of troops. Therefore, the
establishment of special rules, like those contained in section 6, is
warranted. In this regard, the funding limitation provision acts as a
check on congressional consistency. Once triggered, the funding limitation brings to the attention of each chamber the fact that spending
legislation being considered is inconsistent with authorizing legislation previously sent to the President. If the will of the majority has
changed since the original passage of a measure imposing limitations
on the use of troops, the funding limitation provision does not have
to be adopted by Congress. In accord with the bicameral require327. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 (1983).
328. As an exercise of the congressional rulemaking authority, no rights, duties or relations of persons outside of Congress are affected. See id. at 952. Moreover, as the Chadha
majority recognized, the rulemaking " 'exception' [to the article I legislative process] only empowers Congress to bind itself and is noteworthy only insofar as it further indicates the Framers' intent that Congress not act in any legally binding manner outside a closely circumscribed
legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated instances." Id. at 956 n.21.
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ment, at all times the will of the majority prevails. This procedure
simply establishes the internal mechanism by which Congress can
consider these vital issues.
Additionally, there is no infringement of the Presentment
Clauses since both section 5(a) hostilities legislation and the spending limitation measure under section 6 are both submitted to the
President for review. Unlike section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, which completely denied presidential review of legislation removing military forces, proposed section 6 of the Hostilities Act allows the President to exercise his presentment function twice.
. In addition to comporting with the standards imposed by Article
I of the Constitution, section 6 also accomplishes many of the objectives intended by the enforcement provisions of the War Powers Resolution. The legislative history indicates that Congress sought to exercise its constitutional war powers by simple majority in both
chambers without being forced to garner a two-thirds vote to override a veto. " ' Proponents of the war powers statute sought to avoid
the possibility that one-third of the members plus one in either
chamber (voting to sustain a veto) could prevail over the simple
majority.
Chadha makes clear that the Article I requirements cannot be
disregarded. The lawmaking equation (consisting of both the bicameral and presentment clauses) was carefully crafted to include a
"step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process."3 ' At each "step"
in the legislative equation, it is the threat of a check by either branch
on the other that supplies legislative influence and power to each
lawmaking institutional. For example, rather than an absolute veto,
the President was assigned only a qualified check on legislative authority. 3 ' The legislative power was similarly divided into two coequal chambers.3 3 2 Therefore, in addition to establishing a process for
reviewing the propriety of all legislation, the coordinate branches
were provided with "checks and balances" against the other. The
primary deficiency of section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution was
a failure to comply with the presentment "step" in the lawmaking
process.
Proposed section 6 satisfies the constitutional requirements pronounced in Chadha as a "narrow" congressional rulemaking excep329. See supra text accompanying notes 267-74.
330. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
331. See supra note 281. See generally After Chadha, supra note 24, at 779-82 (discussing evolution of veto requirement during Constitutional Convention debate).
332. See supra text accompanying note 305.
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tion, and, conjointly all measures under the proposal are submitted
to the President. Moreover, the objective of establishing a legislative
vehicle for Congress to assert its position through a simple majority,
as currently embodied in section 5 of the War Powers Resolution, is
accomplished by the proposed section 6 and its reliance on the power
of the purse. Section 6 therefore overcomes some of the concerns
presented by the so-called "barrier of a Presidential veto." ' The
only requisite ingredient that neither the Constitution nor a procedural statute can supply is an insistent Congress capable of asserting
its war powers position (through a majority vote) by the section 6
funding limitation process. As long as this majority is sustained,
however, one-third of the members of either chamber will be prevented from thwarting the majority of both legislative bodies. While
Congress must rely on its spending power, it need not be forced to
garner a two-thirds vote in each chamber as long as Congress is able
to maintain its position.
Therefore, the original purposes of the section 5 central enforcement mechanism in the War Powers Resolution will be attained constitutionally through the proposed section 6 procedural device. With
viable constitutional means available, there is no need to allow the
approach under section 5-tainted by the Chadha decision-to remain on the books. Congress should adopt section 6 of the Hostilities
Act.
VIII.

THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REASSEMBLE ITSELF TO
CONSIDER WAR POWERS LEGISLATION OR REPORTS

Once the Senate and the House have adjourned at the end of a
congressional session, there is no provision under existing law by
which Congress may call itself back for the designated purpose of
considering legislation concerning the use of United States Armed
Forces in hostilities. Consequently, the "collective judgment" on war
powers matters provided by Congress may be denied during those
"window" periods in which Congress has adjourned either sine die
(concluding a session of a Congress)"3 4 or temporarily for more than
three days.
There are three constitutional means by which Congress can be
333. See supra text accompanying note 268.
334. Sine die is latin for an indefinite adjournment. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (5th ed. 1979) ("Without day; without assigning a day for a further meeting or
hearing."). Traditionally, a sine die adjournment resolution is used for adjournment at the end
of a congressional session or conclusion of a Congress.
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assembled."3 5 Of these, the only directly applicable method for reassembling an adjourned Congress is pursuant to the President's authority "on extraordinary Occasions." Because this is an executive
branch determination, without some other manner to reassemble itself following adjournment, the legislative branch is entirely dependent on an executive branch decision to reconvene for consideration
of any matter, including war powers legislation or reports. In looking illustratively to the most recently adjourned session, the 100th
Congress adjourned sine die on October 22, 1988.3"' The 101st Congress convened on January 3, 1989. Thus, hypothetically, had any
United States military forces been introduced into "hostilities" or
"imminent hostilities" during this period, including in the Persian
Gulf or off the coast of Libya for example, Congress would have
been without any means to reconvene itself and would have been
completely reliant on the President to call it back into session.
The question, therefore, is whether Congress may sua sponte
make an independent determination on the necessity of reassembling
after adjournment. A review of constitutional and statutory authorities, as well as of recent congressional practice, demonstrates that
Congress need not depend on the President for reassembly. Following a discussion of current law, the power of Congress to conditionally adjourn, as well as recent illustrations of congressional exercise
of such power, shall be explored.
A.

Current Law

The War Powers Resolution provides for the receipt by Congress of a war powers report when the legislative branch has adjourned at the end of a Congress or for more than three days. However, this statutory provision does not allow Congress the authority
to do anything more than receive the report.3 37 Precatory language
335. First, the Constitution specifies that "Congress shall assemble at least once in every
year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law
appoint a different day." U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2. The twentieth amendment superceded
part of art. I, § 4, cl. 2, which provided for the assembling of Congress on the first Monday in
December. Second, "on extraordinary Occasions," the President may convene the Congress, or
either the House or Senate. Id. art. II, § 3. Third, the twenty-fifth amendment provides that
Congress may be assembled "within 48 hours," when not in session, to determine the unique
issue "that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." Id. amend.
XXV, § 4, cl. 2. This rare circumstance is only invoked by procedures specified in the constitutional amendment.
336. H.R. Con. Res. 398, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H11,272, S17,343
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (sine die adjournment of House and Senate effective Oct. 22, 1988).
337. During the debate on the War Powers Resolution, a few members recognized the
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allows the Speaker of the House and the Senate President pro
tempore to "jointly request" the President to convene the Congress
in order that it may "consider the report and take appropriate action. ' 33 8 Alternatively, thirty percent of the members of either chamber may petition their respective congressional leaders to make a
supplicatory request to the President. With regard to the reconvening of Congress, the House Report accompanying the War Powers
Resolution noted that "the [House Foreign Affairs] committee recognizes that the Constitution states clearly that only the President may
reconvene Congress." ' 9 During debates on the War Powers Resolution, then subcommittee chairman and co-author, Congressman
Clement Zablocki, stated that it was likely the President would "call
Congress into session to consider his reasons for the commitment and
to seek approval for his actions" if the sixty-day automatic termination period fell on a day after Congress had adjourned. 4° However,
pursuant to his constitutional authority and the statutory War Powers Resolution mechanism, the President can lawfully exercise his
discretionary judgment and deny the congressional request to
reconvene.
B.

The Congressional Authority to Conditionally Adjourn
1. Constitutional and Statutory Authority

Congress has independent constitutional and statutory means by
which it may determine that it be reassembled after adjournment.
This authority is part of the congressional power to adjourn conditionally. The Constitution provides Congress with the power to adjourn: "Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, withpossibility that the expedited provisions under the bill would not be triggered if Congress had
adjourned sine die. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 33,861 (1973) (conference report debate) (remarks of subcommittee member Rep. Findley). Conferee Representative Frelinghuysen, recognizing this possibility, noted that "there is no provision in the conference report for what
happens if a crisis should arise between adjournment and the beginning of a new Congress."
Id. at 33,869 (conference report debate).
338. Section 5(a) provides, in pertinent part:
If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has
adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they
deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of
their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress
in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to
this section.
50 U.S.C. § 1544(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
339. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) (emphasis added).
340. 119 CONG. REC. 33,859 (1973) (conference report debate).
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out the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days.")3 4 '
Therefore, unless there was some unresolvable dispute over the adjournment time between the House and Senate that would have to be
constitutionally reconciled by the President, 42 Congress has plenary
authority to determine when it may adjourn during any congressional session. It follows that the exercise of this authority would
also include the concomitant power to adjourn conditionally. That is,
if Congress has the power to decide to adjourn or not to adjourn, it
may decide to adjourn under certain conditions. One of those conditions may include adjournment subject to reassembly under specified
circumstances. (The conditional aspect of this power shall be explored in the next section.)
Furthermore, as a separate constitutional basis, it seems established that determinations of congressional adjournment are an aspect of Congress' rulemaking authority. 4" In fact, the power to determine internal congressional rules was noted as part of the
authority for adopting an amendment to the adjournment statute.344
Accordingly, each or both chambers of Congress may decide the time
or manner of adjournment through a one-house or two-house (concurrent) resolution, neither of which mandates compliance with the
regular requirement of presentment of legislation to the President. 4 5
Moreover, Congress may utilize an existing adjournment statute
to reconvene itself." In the absence of a congressional declaration of
341. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
4.
342. The Constitution provides that "in Case of Disagreement between [both Houses],
with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, [the President] may adjourn them to such Time as
he shall think proper." Id. art. II, § 3.
343. Id. art. I, § 5, cl.2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings
344. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 461; H.R. REP.
No. 1215, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1970).
345. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 n.21 (1983) (noting that the congressional rulemaking authority is an exception to the general requirement that all legislation
comply with the Presentment Clauses of the Constitution). For a discussion of the congressional rulemaking authority, see supra text accompanying notes 238-56.
346. This statute provides:
(a) Unless otherwise provided by the Congress, the two Houses shall (1) adjourn sine die not later than July 31 of each year; or
(2) in the case of an odd-numbered year, provide, not later than July 31 of
such year, by concurrent resolution adopted in each House by roll-call vote, for
the adjournment of the two Houses from that Friday in August which occurs at
least thirty days before the first Monday in September (Labor Day) of such
year to the second day after Labor Day.
(b) This section shall not be applicable in any year if on July 31 of such year a
state of war exists pursuant to a declaration of war by the Congress.
2 U.S.C. § 198 (1982).
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war or "[u]nless otherwise provided by the Congress," the statute
provides for sine die adjournment by July 31st in even-numbered
years and for adjournment for more than one month until the second
day after Labor Day during odd-numbered years.347 In the war
powers context, and without a declaration of war, however, this statute would not allow Congress to consider a war powers report unless
it so "otherwise provided."
In sum, there are ample constitutional and statutory bases for
Congress to decide the manner and time of its adjournment. The
only executive role is limited to resolving irreconcilable disputes over
3 48
the time of adjournment between the Senate and the House.
2.

Congressional Practice

A review of congressional practice is useful in construing the
constitutional power to adjourn conditionally. As the Supreme Court
has noted, "in determining . . . the existence of a power, weight
shall be given to the usage itself - even when the validity of the
practice is the subject of investigation. '' 849 Justice Felix Frankfurter
restated this proposition when he wrote:
The Constitution is .a framework for Government. Therefore,
the way the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true nature. Deeply
embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot
supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning
to words of a text or supply them.330
Prior congressional practice clearly establishes the reliance of
Congress on its power to adjourn conditionally. It has become prevalent for Congress to adjourn sine die by concurrent resolution by
providing designated congressional leaders with explicit authority to
reassemble Congress upon the occurrence of some specified event or
determination.3 5 ' Pursuant to these measures, Congress becomes ad347.
348.

See S. REP. No. 202, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 50 (1969).
See supra note 342.

349. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915). See also Meyers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 152, 175 (1926); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27, 35-36
(1892); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1803).
350. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
351. For an excellent review of the congressional adjournment practice during the past
four decades, see R.S. BETH, ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS: PROVISIONS FOR THE REASSEMBLY OF CONGRESS CONTAINED

IN CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS PROVIDING FOR AD-

1947-1987 (Mar.- 12, 1987) [hereinafter REASSEMBLY STUDY]. This report references every sine die adjournment or adjournment of more than three days adopted by

JOURNMENTS,
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journed (at the end of a session or for more than three days) subject
to the reassembly provision or "callback mechanism." 5"
In light of the regular usage of the conditional adjournment
procedure, such provisions have been described as "common, ' 353 and
as "a proven formula" in the event of an emergency "so the House
and Senate could perform their constitutional responsibilities." 5 4
However, it is difficult to glean from the record the rationale or necessity for adopting each conditional adjournment because such resolutions often come up under procedures where debate it not
permitted. 55
A review of legislative adjournment custom and usage during
the forty-year period between the 80th Congress and the beginning
of the 100th Congress follows. This history will focus on the elements common to these resolutions, including the events triggering
reassembly, the congressional leaders designated with authority to
make the reassembly determination, the reassembly notification and
adjournment "window" periods, and other pertinent matters. This
review constitutes a representative snapshot of recent congressional
practice and further establishes the prerogative of Congress to decide
the manner of its adjournment, including the mechanism of a conditional adjournment. 5 "
concurrent resolution for the period from January 1947 to February 1987.
352. Dr. Beth noted from his review, "When an adjournment sine die is accompanied
by reassembly provisions, it must be regarded as a conditional sine die adjournment: if the
reassembly provisions are not used before the next session is scheduled to convene, the adjournment becomes a sine die adjournment." Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
353. 131 CONG. REC. S18,302 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Min. Leader
Byrd) (inquiring whether the pending adjournment resolution contains "the' common provisions that have been put into such adjournment resolutions recently allowing the House and
Senate to call themselves back").
354.
Baker).

130 CONG. REC. S1201 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Maj. Leader

355. See H.R. Rule XVI, cl. 4, reprinted in JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, supra note 294, at
519-20 (stating that a motion to adjourn "shall be determined without debate"); S. Rule XXII,
cl.
1, reprinted in SENATE MANUAL, supra note 294, at 21 (also removing debate from an
adjournment motion). See also 132 CONG. REc. H4322 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (colloquy
between Speaker pro tempore and Rep. Walker) (noting that an adjournment resolution is not
debatable in the House); 131 CONG. REC. S16,134 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1985) (remarks of
Senate presiding officer) (stating that "[t]he adjournment resolution is not debatable"); 94
CONG. REC. 10,185 (1948) (remarks of Senate presiding officer) (noting that the adjournment
resolution is not debatable in the Senate).
356.

This survey of congressional adjournment resolutions is based on Dr. Beth's
supra note 351, a study of such resolutions during four decades.
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The Triggerfor Reassembly

Numerous options for reassembly after adjournment avail themselves to Congress. For example, Congress might select as a reassembly trigger a particular event (e.g., completion of particular legislation) 357 or it might delegate the reassembly decision exclusively to
specified congressional leaders. Typically, the stipulated mechanism
for reassembly has been phrased in broad discretionary terms. In
1947, 1948, 1973 through 1976, and 1983 through 1987, for example, the resolution to adjourn by a specified date was subject to the
reassembling of Congress whenever in the opinion of the designated
congressional leaders "the public interest shall warrant it. ' '3 58 Twice,
357. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 232, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 37,601
(1979) (providing, inter alia, for Senate sine die adjournment "when the Senate completes
action on the Act providing loan guarantees for the benefit of the Chrysler Corporation").
358. During the period in question, this practice has been followed on 41 occasions. See
S. Con. Res. 33, § 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 10,521 (1947); H.R. Con. Res.
218, § 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 9158 (1948); S.Con. Res. 63, § 2, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 10,185 (1948); H.R. Con. Res. 412, § 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119
CONG. REC. 43,329 (1973); H.R. Con. Res. 475, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC.
10,944 (1974); H.R. Con. Res. 501, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 16,079 (1974);
H.R. Con. Res. 610, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 29,925 (1974); S. Con. Res.
120, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 36,038 (1974); H.R. Con. Res. 697, § 2, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 41,659 (1974); S.Con. Res. 27, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
121 CONG. REC. 8947 (1975); S.Con. Res. 42, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC.
15,882 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 324, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 21,033
(1975); S.Con. Res. 54, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 25,220 (1975); H.R. Con.
Res. 424, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 32,687 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 485, § 2,
94th Cong., 1stSess., 121 CONG. REC. 37,429 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 518, § 2, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 41,973 (1975); S. Con. Res. 92, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REC. 2622 (1976); S. Con. Res. 111, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 10,561
(1976); H.R. Con. Res. 646, §§ 2-3, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 15,695 (1976) (§ 2
authorizing the Speaker of the House, § 3 authorizing the President pro tempore of the Senate); H.R. Con. Res. 669, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 21,702 (1976); H.R.
Con. Res. 707, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 26,411 (1976); S.Con. Res. 136, §
2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 28,592, 28,860 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 153, § 2,
98th Cong., 1stSess., 129 CONG. REC. SI1,196 & H6016 (daily ed. July 29, 1983); H.R.
Con. Res. 221, § 2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC.S16,858 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983);
H.R. Con. Res. 255, § 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S1201 & H691 (daily ed.
Feb. 9, 1984); S.Con. Res. 103, § 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H2742 (daily ed.
Apr. 11, 1984), as modified, S. Con. Res. 104, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H2878
(daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984) (providing for adjournment from Apr. 12, 13 or 14, 1984 or pursuant to provisions of S. Con. Res. 103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.); H.R. Con. Res. 334, § 2, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H7533 (daily ed. June 29, 1984); H.R. Con. Res. 351, § 2,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984); S. Con. Res. 3, § 2,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H36 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); S.Con. Res. 12, § 2,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H346 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985); S.Con. Res. 54, § 2,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H5108 (daily ed. June 27, 1985); H.R. Con. Res 179,
§ 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S10,730 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985); H.R. Con. Res.
267, § 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H13,328.& S18,302 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
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in 1970 and 1973, the adjournment resolutions provided that the
specified congressional leaders could callback Congress upon their
determination that "legislative expediency so warrants." ' Many of
these resolutions have also regularly allowed the Majority Leaders
or Minority Leaders of each respective chamber to request the reassembly of Congress "for the consideration of legislation." 860 In 1979,
the conditional adjournment resolution allowed the Speaker of the
House and the Senate Majority Leader to convene their respective
chambers or both houses upon the exercise of their discretion and
without specification of any standard.3 6 '
In a comparative sense, the effect of such expansively phrased
triggers for reassembly essentially leaves congressional leaders with
about as much substantial discretion as the President is constitutionally delegated for reconvening the Congress. Thus, there is very little
1985); S. Con. Res. 107, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H379 (daily ed. Feb. 6,
1986); H.R. Con. Res. 304, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S3281 (daily ed. Mar.
24, 1986); S. Con. Res. 144, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H3137 (daily ed.
May 21, 1986); H.R. Con. Res. 364, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H4322 (daily
ed. June 26, 1986); H.R. Con. Res. 380, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H6147
(daily ed. Aug. 13, 1986); S. Con. Res. 1, § 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H92
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987); H.R. Con. Res. 36, § 2, 100th Cong., istSess., 133 CONG. REC.
H549 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987). See also H.R. Con. Res. 79, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG.
REC. H1154 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985) (providing for House adjournment, but not Senate adjournment, and authorizing the Speaker of the House to reassemble when he determines "the
public interest shall warrant it"); H.R. J. Res. 421, § 2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. S16,858 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (providing for the convening of the 98th Congress, 2d
Session).
359. H.R. Con. Res. 689, § 2, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 27,795, 28,037
(1970); S. Con. Res. 42, § 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 26,657 (1973).
360. From 1947 to 1987, this format has been utilized 20 times. See S. Con. Res. 42, §
2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 26,657 (1973); H.R. Con. Res. 412, § 2, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 43,329 (1973); H.R. Con. Res. 475, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120
CONG. REC. 10,944 (1974); H.R. Con. Res. 501, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC.
16,079 (1974); H.R. Con. Res. 610, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 29,925 (1974);
S. Con. Res. 120, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 36,038 (1974); H.R. Con. Res.
697, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 41,659 (1974); S. Con. Res. 27, § 2, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 8947 (1975); S.Con. Res. 42, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121

CONG. REC. 15,882 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 324, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC.
21,033 (1975); S.Con. Res. 54, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 25,220 (1975);
H.R. Con. Res. 424, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 32,687 (1975); H.R. Con.
Res. 485, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 37,429 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 518, § 2,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 41,973 (1975); S.Con. Res. 92, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 2622 (1976); S.Con. Res. 111, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG.
REC. 10,561 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 646, §§ 2-3, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC.
15,695 (1976) (§ 2 authorizing the Maj. and Min. Leaders of the House, § 3 authorizing the
Maj. and Min. Leaders of the Senate); H.R. Con. Res. 669, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REC. 21,702 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 707, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC.
26,411 (1976); S.Con. Res. 136, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 28,592 (1976).
361. H.R. Con. Res. 232, § 4, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 37,601 (1979).
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distinction (if any) between the latitude in the executive branch "extraordinary Occasion" determination and the congressional decision
to reassemble in "the public interest" or because of "legislative expediency." While Congress could select a narrower standard, these
broad triggers establish the custom and usage of Congress to delegate
the reassembly decision substantially to the discretion of specified decision-makers.
b.

The Determination to Reassemble

The congressional leaders given authority to jointly reassemble
the Congress have normally been the same, but with some variation.
Usually, the Speaker of the House and the Senate President pro
tempore or Senate Majority Leader have been assigned this task,
with some form of consultation with the minority party leaders.
During the forty-year period under review, these designated decision-makers can be grouped into three general categories (with and
without a consultive role for the minority). First, on three occasions
in 1947 and 1948, the decision for reassembly was authorized by the
joint action of the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore
of the Senate, and the Majority Leaders of the two chambers. 62 Second, nineteen times from 1973 to 1976, the callback authority was
delegated to the joint action of the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President pro tempore, and, at the same time to the possible
alternative joint request of the Majority Leaders of the two chambers
or the Minority Leaders of both bodies. 6 ' A similar mechanism was
362. See S. Con. Res. 33, § 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 10,521 (1947)
(providing for adjournment from July 27, 1947 to Jan. 2, 1948 or pursuant to the reassembly
provision); 93 CONG. REc. 10,400 (1947) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 218, § 2, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 9158 (1948) (providing for adjournment from June 20, 1948
to Dec. 31, 1948 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 94 CONG. REC. 9348 (1948)
(House adoption); S. Con. Res. 63, § 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 10,185 (1948)
(providing for adjournment from Aug. 7, 1948 to Dec. 31, 1948 or pursuant to reassembly
provision); 94 CONG. REC. 10,247 (1948) (House adoption).
363. See S. Con. Res. 42, § 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 26,657 (1973)
(providing for adjournment from Aug. 3, 1973 to Sept. 5, 1973 or pursuant to the reassembly
provision); 119 CONG. REC. 26,427 (1973) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 412, § 2, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 43,329 (1973) (providing for adjournment sine die commencing on Dec. 22, 1973 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 119 CONG. REC. 43,327
(1973) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 475, § 2, 3d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC.
10,944 (1974) (providing for adjournment on Apr. 11, 1974 until notified in accordance with
the reassembly provision); 120 CONG. REC. 10,775 (1974) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res.
501, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 16,079 (1974) (providing for adjournment of
the House from May 23, 1974 to May 28, 1974 or pursuant to the reassembly provision and
for the adjournment of the Senate on May 22, 1974 until notified in accordance with the
reassembly provision); 120 CONG. REC. 16,150 (1974) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 610,
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used when the chambers were authorized to be reassembled respectively by either the Speaker of the House or the Senate President pro
tempore or upon the joint written request of the Majority and Minority Leaders of the respective house."'
§ 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 29,925 (1974) (providing for adjournment of the
House from Aug. 22, 1974 to Sept. 11, 1974 or pursuant to the reassembly provision and for
the adjournment of the Senate from Aug. 22, 1974 to Sept. 4, 1974 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 120 CONG. REC. 30,078 (1974) (House adoption); S. Con. Res. 120, § 2,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 36,038 (1974) (providing for adjournment from Oct. 17,
1974 to Nov. 18, 1974 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 120 CONG. REc. 36,102
(1974) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 697, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC.
41,659 (1974) (providing for sine die adjournment commencing on Dec. 20, 1974 or pursuant
to the reassembly provision); 120 CONG. REC. 41,815 (1974) (House adoption); S. Con. Res.
27, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 8947 (1975) (providing for conditional adjournment from Mar. 26, 1975 to Apr. 7, 1975 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 121
CONG. REc. 8626 (1975) (Senate adoption); S. Con. Res. 42, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REC. 15,882 (1975) (providing for conditional adjournment from May 22, 1975 to
June 2, 1975 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 121 CONG. REC. 15,674 (1975) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 324, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 21,033 (1975)
(providing for conditional adjournment from June 26, 1975 to July 8, 1975 or pursuant to the
reassembly provision); 121 CONG. REC. 20,812 (1975) (House adoption); S. Con. Res. 54, § 2,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 25,220 (1975) (providing for conditional adjournment
from Aug. 1, 1975 to Sept. 3, 1975 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 121 CONG. REC.
24,109 (1975) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 424, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG.
REC. 32,687 (1975) (providing for conditional adjournment of the House from Oct. 9, 1975
and the Senate after consideration of specified legislation to Oct. 20, 1975 or pursuant to the
reassembly provision); 121 CONG. REC. 32,551 (1975) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 485,
§ 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 37,429 (1975) (providing for conditional adjournment from Nov. 20, 1975 to Dec. 1, 1975 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 121 CONG.
REC. 37,288 (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 518, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG.
REC. 41,973 (1975) (providing for conditional sine die adjournment on Dec. 19, 1975); 121
CONG. REC. 42,254 (1975) (Senate adoption); S. Con. Res. 92, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REC. 2622 (1976) (providing for conditional House adjournment from Feb. 11, 1976 to
Feb. 16, 1976 and conditional Senate adjournment from Feb. 6, 1976 to Feb. 16, 1976 or
pursuant to the reassembly provision); 122 CoNG. REC. 2602 (1976) (Senate adoption); S.
Con. Res. 111, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 10,561 (1976) (providing for conditional adjournment from Apr. 14, 1976 to Apr. 26, 1976 or pursuant to reassembly provision);
122 CONG. REC. 10,426 (1976) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 669, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 21,702 (1976) (providing for conditional adjournment from July 2,
1976 to July 19, 1976 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 122 CONG. REC. 22,039
(1976) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 707, § 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC.
26,411 (1976) (providing for conditional House adjournment from Aug. 10, 1976 and conditional Senate adjournment from Aug. 11, 1976 to Aug. 23, 1976 or pursuant to the reassembly
provision); 122 CONG. REc. 26,622 (1976) (Senate adoption); S. Con. Res. 136, § 2, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 28,592, 28,860 (1976) (providing for conditional Senate
adjournment from Sept. 1, 1976 to Sept. 7, 1976 and for conditional House adjournment from
Sept. 2, 1976 to Sept. 8, 1976 or pursuant to the reassembly provision).
364. See H.R. Con. Res. 646, §§ 2-3, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 15,695
(1976) (providing for the conditional House adjournment from May 27, 1976 to June 1, 1976
or pursuant to the reassembly provision in § 2, and the conditional Senate adjournment from
May 28, 1976 to June 2, 1976 or pursuant to the reassembly provision in § 3); 122 CONG.
REc. 15,752 (1976) (Senate adoption).
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Starting in 1979, the Senate President pro tempore was no
longer designated a role in the reassembly of either the Senate or the
Congress. This authority has since been assigned to the Senate Majority Leader. For example, this third modified form of delegation of
the reassembly determination allowed for the convening of the two
Houses or either of them upon determination by the Speaker of the
House and/or the Senate Majority Leader after consultation with
their respective Minority Leaders.8" 5
It is noteworthy that in contrast to earlier callback mechanisms,
a greater obligation of consultation with minority party leaders has
been imposed in recent years. For example, on four occasions, reassembly has been authorized subject to the Speaker of the House consulting first with the House Minority Leader, and the Senate Majority Leader, also first consulting with the Senate Minority Leader.
Under the plain meaning of these resolutions, consultation need not
involve concurrence; consultation merely entails meeting and conferring. After such consultation, the Speaker and the Senate Majority
Leader, acting jointly, could then invoke the reassembly provision."'
On one occasion, a joint resolution was used to postpone the convening of a second session of Congress by incorporating a similar reassembly trigger prior to the specified convening date."6 7 A similar
365. See H.R. Con. Res. 232, § 4, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 37,601 (1979)
(providing, after sine die adjournment, for the conditional convening of either or both chambers pursuant to the reassembly provision); 125 CONG. REC. 37,317 (1979) (House adoption).
366. See H.R. Con. Res. 221, § 2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S16,858
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (providing for sine die adjournment of each chamber from either
Nov. 17, 18 or 19, 1983 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 129 CoNG. REc. H10,105
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 267, § 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
131 CONG. REC. H 13,328 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (providing for sine die adjournment after
Dec. 20, 1985 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 131 CONG. REC. S18,302 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1985) (Senate adoption); S. Con. Res. 107, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG.
REC. H379 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1986) (providing for adjournment of each chamber from either
Feb. 6 or 7, 1986 to Feb. 18, 1986 for the House and to Feb. 17, 1986 for the Senate or
pursuant to the reassembly provision); 132 CONG. REC. S1044 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1986) (Senate
adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 304, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S3281 (daily ed.
Mar. 24, 1986) (providing for House adjournment on Mar. 25, 1986 and Senate adjournment
on Mar. 26 or 27, 1986 to Apr. 8, 1986 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 132 CONG.
REC. H3137 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1986) (House adoption).
367. H.R. J. Res. 421, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S16,858 (daily ed. Nov.
18, 1983) (providing for the convening of the 98th Congress, 2d Session on Jan. 23, 1984 or
pursuant to the reassembly provision); 129 CONG. REC. HI0,105 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983)
(House adoption). According to Dr. Beth's study, "This is the only instance found [during the
forty year period reviewed] in which a reassembly procedure was provided in a joint resolution." REASSEMBLY STUDY, supra note 351, at 14 n.D.
The U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2, enables Congress by law to set the date that a congressional session shall be convened. See supra note 335.
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mechanism requiring prior consultation with the Minority Leaders
of each chamber was used in 1986 without the requirement of joint
action by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority
Leader.36 While more recently a requirement that the Speaker of
the House or the Senate Majority Leader consult with the Majority
or Minority Leaders has been regularly imposed, this practice has
not always been followed. For example, in 1983 the Speaker of the
House and the Senate Majority Leader were authorized to reassemble their members without consultation. 6 9 A modified version of the
consultation requirement has been used eleven times, whereby the
Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader were required
to act jointly in consulting with the House and Senate Minority
Leaders prior to jointly reassembling the Congress.""0
368. See S. Con. Res. 144, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H3137 (daily ed.
May 21, 1986) (providing for adjournment of the House from May 22,'1986 to June 3, 1986
and of the Senate from May 21, 1988 to June 2, 1986 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 132 CONG. REC. S6331 (daily ed. May 21, 1986) (Senate adoption).
369. See H.R. Con. Res. 153, § 2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S11,196 &
H6016 (daily ed. July 29, 1983). However, the Senate Majority Leader gave his assurance
that he would consult with the Minority Leader prior to any such reassembly determination.
See 129 CONG. REC. S11,196 (daily ed. July 29, 1983) (colloquy between Sen. Maj. Leader
Baker and Sen. Min. Leader Byrd).
370. See H.R. Con. Res. 255, § 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S1201 &
H691 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1984) (providing for adjournment of the House from Feb. 9, 1984 to
Feb. 21, 1984 and the adjournment of the Senate from Feb. 9 or 10, 1984 to Feb. 20, 1984 or
pursuant to the reassembly provision); S. Con. Res. 103, § 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG.
REC. H2742 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1984) (providing for adjournment of the Senate from Apr. 11,
12 or 13, 1984 and of the House from Apr. 12 or 13, 1984 to Apr. 24, 1984 or pursuant to the
reassembly provision); 130 CONG. REc. S4300 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1984) (Senate adoption), as
modified, S. Con. Res. 104, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H2878 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1984) (providing for adjournment from Apr. 12, 13 or 14, 1984 or pursuant to provisions of S.
Con. Res. 103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.); H.R. Con. Res. 334, § 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. H7533 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (providing for adjournment of the House from
June 29, 1984 and the adjournment of the Senate on June 29 or 30, 1984 until July 23, 1984
or pursuant to the reassembly provision), 130 CONG. REC. S8978 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)
(Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 351, § 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H8991
(daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (providing for adjournment from Aug. 10, 1984 to Sept. 5, 1984 or
pursuant to the reassembly provision), 130 CONG. REC. S10,493 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984)
(Senate adoption); S. Con. Res. 3, § 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H36 (daily ed.
Jan. 3, 1985) (providing for adjournment from Jan. 7, 1985 to Jan. 21, 1985 or pursuant to
the reassembly provision); 131 CONG. REC. S12 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (Senate adoption); S.
Con. Res. 12, § 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H346 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985)
(providing for Senate adjournment on Feb. 7 or 8, 1985 to Feb. 18, 1985 and for House
adjournment on Feb. 7, 1985 to Feb. 19, 1985 or pursuant to reassembly provision); 131
CONG. REC. S1226 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (Senate adoption); S. Con. Res. 54, § 2, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H5108 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (providing for conditional
adjournment of either chamber on June 27 or 28, 1985 to July 8, 1985 or pursuant to reassembly provision); 131 CONG. REC. S8957 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (Senate adoption); H.R.
Con. Res. 179, § 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S10,730 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985)
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Similar reassembly provisions have been followed when only
one chamber has conditionally adjourned. Once, when only the
House adjourned and the Senate remained in session, the Speaker of
the House alone was given the authority to callback the House, 7
and on another occasion the Speaker of the House was authorized to
reassemble the House after consultation with the House Minority
Leader. s7M However, on one occasion the Senate adjourned without a
callback mechanism while the Speaker of the House, after consultation with the Minority Leader, was afforded the power to reassemble the House.87 3
c. Notification Period
Upon the callback by congressional leaders, a question arises
over how much notification should be afforded for the members of
Congress to reassemble. The answer has typically been explicitly
spelled out in the adopted adjournment resolution. The earlier resolutions specified a three-day notification period,87 4 while the more
(providing for conditional adjournment of either chamber from Aug. I or 2, 1985 to Sept. 4,
1985 for the House and to Sept. 4 or 9, 1985 for the Senate or pursuant to the reassembly
provision), 131 CONG. REC. H6893 (daily ed. July 31, 1985) (House adoption); H.R. Con.
Res. 364, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H4322 & S8677 (daily ed. June 26,
1986) (providing for conditional adjournment on June 26 or 27, 1986 to July 14, 1986 or
pursuant to the reassembly provision); H.R. Con. Res. 380, § 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132
CONG. REC. H6147 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1986) (providing for House adjournment from Aug.
15 or 16, 1986 and Senate adjournment from the "legislative day" of Aug. 11, 1986 to Sept. 8,
1986 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); H.R. Con. Res. 36, § 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
133 CONG. REc. H549 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) (providing for adjournment of the Senate from
Feb. 5 or 6, 1987 to Feb. 16, 1987 and of the House from Feb. 11, 1987 to Feb. 18, 1987 or
pursuant to the reassembly provision); 133 CONG. REC S1834 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) (Senate
adoption).
371. H.R. Con. Res. 689, § 2, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 27,795 (1970)
(providing for the adjournment of the House from Aug. 14, 1970 to Sept. 9, 1970 or pursuant
to the reassembly provision); 116 CONG. REC. 28,037 (1970) (House adoption).
372. H.R. Con. Res. 79, § 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1154 & S2858
(daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985) (providing for adjournment of the House from Mar. 7, 1985 to Mar.
19, 1985 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 131 CONG. REC. S2858 (daily ed. Mar. 7,
1985) (Senate adoption).
373. See S. Con. Res. 1, § 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H92 (daily ed.
Jan. 6, 1987) (providing for adjournment of the Senate and House on Jan. 6, 7, 8 or 9, 1987
to Jan. 12, 1987 without a reassembly provision and for the adjournment of the House from
Jan. 8, 1987 to Jan. 20, 1987 or pursuant to the reassembly provision); 133 CONG. REc. SI01
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) (Senate adoption). This result is most likely explained by the fact that
the Senate adjourned for less than a week while the House adjourned for twelve days.
374. This form was utilized 4 times. See S. Con. Res. 33, § 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93
CONG. REC. 10,400, 10,521 (1947); H.R. Con. Res. 218, § 1, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG.
REC. 9158 (1948); S. Con. Res. 63, § 1, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 10,185 (1948);
H.R. Con. Res. 689, § 1, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 27,795 (1970).
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recent resolutions have afforded two days notice. 7 5 Once, each
chamber was adjourned subject to the being called back upon
twenty-four hours notice,8 76 and twice, no time period for notifica3

tion was designated.

375.

77

From 1973 to 1987, this approach was adopted on 37 occasions. See S. Con. Res.

42, § 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 26,657 (1973); H.R. Con. Res. 412, § 1, 93d

Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 43,329 (1973); H.R. Con. Res. 475, § 1, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 10,944 (1974); H.R. Con. Res. 501, § 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120
CONG. REc. 16,079 (1974); H.R. Con. Res. 610, § 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC.
29,925 (1974); S. Con. Res. 120, § 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 36,038 (1974);
H.R. Con. Res. 697, § 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 41,659 (1974); S. Con. Res.
27, § 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 8947 (1975); S. Con. Res. 42, § 1, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 15,882 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 324, § 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REC. 21,033 (1975); S. Con. Res. 54, § 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC.
25,220 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 424, § 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 32,687
(1975); H.R. Con. Res. 485, § 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 37,429 (1975); H.R.
Con. Res. 518, § 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 41,973 (1975); S. Con. Res. 92, §
1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 2622 (1976); S. Con. Res. 111, § 1, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 10,561 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 646, § i, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REc. 15,695, 15,752 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 669, § 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REC. 21,702 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 707, § 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC.
26,411 (1976); S. Con. Res. 136, § 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 28,592, 28,860
(1976); H. Con. Res. 153, § 1, 129 CONG. REC. S11,196 & H6016 (daily ed. July 29, 1983);
H.R. Con. Res. 221, § 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S16,858 (daily ed. Nov. 18,
1983); H.R. Con. Res. 334, § 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H7533 (daily ed. June
29, 1984); H.R. Con. Res. 351, § 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed.
Aug. 10, 1984); S. Con. Res. 3, § 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H36 (daily ed.
Jan. 3, .1985); S. Con. Res. 12, § 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H346 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1985); S. Con. Res. 54, § 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H5108 (daily ed.
June 27, 1985); H.R. Con. Res. 179, § 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S10,730
(daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985); H.R. Con. Res. 267, § 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC.
H13,328 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985); S. Con. Res. 107, § 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG.
REC. H379 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1986); H.R. Con. Res. 304, § 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132
CONG. REC. S3281 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1986); S. Con. Res. 144, § 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132
CONG. REC. H3137 (daily ed. May 21, 1986); H.R. Con. Res. 364, § 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.,
132 CONG. REC. H4322 (daily ed. June 26, 1986); H.R. Con. Res. 380, § 1, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H6147 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1986); S. Con. Res. 1, § 1,100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H92 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987); H.R. Con. Res. 36, § 1,100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H549 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987). See also H.R. Con. Res. 79, § 1, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1154 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985) (providing for House adjournment but no Senate adjournment); H.R. J. Res. 421, § 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. S16,858 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (providing for the convening of the 98th Congress, 2d Session).
376.

H.R. Con. Res. 232, § 4, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 37,601 (1979).

377. H.R. Con. Res. 255, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H584 (daily ed. Feb.
8, 1984), S1201 & H691 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1984); S. Con. Res. 103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. H2742 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1984), as modified, S. Con. Res. 104, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H2878 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984) (providing for adjournment from Apr.
12, 13 or 14, 1984 or pursuant to provisions of S. Con. Res. 103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

d. Adjournment "Window" Periods
An examination of common practice during the four decades
under review indicates the amount of time Congress has adjourned.
Between January 1947 and February 1987, there were thirty-five
conditional adjournment resolutions containing reassembly provisions. The conditional adjournment resolutions have been used with
greater frequency since 1973. Of the seven sine die (or end of the
session) conditional adjournment resolutions during this span, one,
(involving only the Senate) lasted two weeks, 378 four lasted about one
month, 17 9 another lasted two months, s8 while still another lasted
just under five months.3 8 ' Perhaps a better sense of past adjournment
"window" periods is measured by the more than thirty non-conditional sine die adjournment resolutions between the 80th and 99th
Congresses. Of the non-conditional adjournment resolutions concluding a session of Congress, seven lasted for adjournment periods of
less than one month, 8s five lasted about one month (or not less than
three weeks), 8 3 one lasted more than two months, 84 six lasted less
378. H.R. Con. Res. 232, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 37,601 (1979) (conditional sine die adjournment of 14 days for the Senate).
These periods in notes 378-89 are calculated on Dr. Beth's study which indicates the
dates of adjournment and reconvening of the Congress during the 40 years reviewed. See
REASSEMBLY STUDY, supra note 351.
379. See H.R. Con. Res. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REG. 43,329 (1973)
(conditional sine die adjournment of 30 days); H.R. Con. Res. 697, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120
CONG. REC. 41,659 (1974) (25 days); H.R. Con. Res. 518, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG.
REC. 41,973 (1975) (31 days); H.R. Con. Res. 267, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC.
H13,328 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (32 days).
380. See H.R. Con. Res. 221, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S16,858 (daily ed.
Nov. 18, 1983) (conditional sine die adjournment of 66 days).
381. See S. Con. Res. 63, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 10,185 (1948) (conditional adjournment of 146 days).
382. See H.R. Con. Res. 127, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 11,700 (1947) (sine
die adjournment for 18 days); 93 CONG. REC. 11,757 (1947) (House adoption); H.R. Con.
Res. 224, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CONG. REC. 10,257 (1948) (sine die adjournment for three
days); 94 CONG. REC. 10,265 (1948) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 297, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., 96 CONG. REC. 17,120 (1951) (sine die adjournment for one day); 96 CONG. REC.
17,130 (1951) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 248, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC.
25,663 (1963) (sine die adjournment for eight days); 109 CONG. REC. 25,555 (1963) (House
adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 799, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 44,516 (1971) (sine die
adjournment for 19 days); 116 CONG. REC. 44,308 (1970) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res.
459, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 34,308 (1980) (sine die adjournment for 20 days);
126 CONG. REC. 34,333 (1980) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 438, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
128 CONG. REC. H10,523 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1982) (sine die adjournment for 11 days); 128
CONG. REC. S13,410 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (Senate adoption).
383. See H.R. Con. Res. 604, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 37,114 (1967)
(sine die adjournment for 31 days); 113 CONG. REC. 37,190 (1967) (House adoption); H.R.
Con. Res. 475, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 41,147 (1969) (sine die adjournment for
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than three months,"' 5 six lasted more than three months,"'6 four
lasted about four months,"8 7 three lasted more than five months,"'
27 days); 115 CONG. REc. 40,981 (1969) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 498, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 47,656 (1971) (sine die adjournment for 32 days); 117 CONG. REC.
47,676 (1971) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 442, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
39,132 (1977) (sine die adjournment for 35 days); 123 CONG. REC. 38,948 (1977) (House
adoption); S. Con. Res. 57, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 31,850 (1981) (sine die
adjournment for 40 days); 127 CoNG. REC. 32,114 (1981) (Senate adoption).
384. H.R. Con. Res. 148, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REC. 15,017 (1949) (sine die
adjournment for 76 days); 95 CONG. REC. 15,091 (1949) (House adoption).
385. See H.R. Con. Res. 527, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REC. 28,406 (1965)
(sine die adjournment for 79 days); 111 CONG. REC. 28,653 (1965) (House adoption); H.R.
Con. Res. 1048, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 28,856 (1966) (sine die adjournment
for 80 days); 112 CONG. REC. 28,893 (1966) (House adoption); S. Con. Res. 83, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 114 CONG. REC. 31,312 (1968) (sine die adjournment for 81 days); 114 CONG. REC.
31,296 (1968) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 726, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC.
37,320 (1972) (sine die adjournment for 77 days); 118 CONG. REC. 37,061 (1972) (House
adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 377, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H12,269 (daily ed. Oct.
11, 1984) (sine die adjournment for 83 days); 130 CONG. REC. S14,538 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1984) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 417, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 CONG. REC. S17,300
(daily ed. Oct. 18, 1986) (sine die adjournment for 80 days); 132 CONG. REC. H11,573 (daily
ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (House adoption).
386. See H.R. Con. Res. 171, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CONG. REC. 13,710 (1951) (sine
die adjournment for 80 days); 97 CONG. REC. 13,777 (1951) (House adoption); S. Con. Res.
55, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 107 CONG. REC. 21,528 (1961) (sine die adjournment for 105 days);
107 CONG. REC. 21,371 (1961) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
108 CONG. REC. 23,472 (1962) (sine die adjournment for 88 days); 108 CoNG. REc. 23,515
(1962) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 371, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CoNG. REc. 23,934
(1964) (sine die adjournment for 93 days); 110 CONG. REC. 23,785 (1964) (House adoption);
S. Con. Res. 211, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 35,336 (1976) (sine die adjournment
for 95 days); 122 CONG. REC. 34,417 (1976) (House adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 760, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 38,642 (1978) (sine die adjournment for 92 days); 124
CONG. REC. 38,081 (1978) (Senate adoption). See also H.R. Con. Res. 266, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., 100 CONG. REC. 15,554 (1954) (sine die adjournment for the House for 138 days and
for the Senate for 34 days); 100 CONG. REC. 15,414 (1954) (Senate adoption); S. Res. 331,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 100 CONG. REC. 16,142 (1954) (providing for Senate adjournment from
Nov. 18, 1954 to Nov. 29, 1954); 100 CONG. REC. 16,401 (1954) (Senate adjournment by
unanimous consent adjourning sine die after Dec. 2, 1954).
387. H.R. Con. Res. 229, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 103 CoNG. REC. 16,734 (1957) (sine
die adjournment for 130 days); 103 CONG. REC. 16,759 (1957) (House adoption); S. Con.
Res. 123, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CoNG. REC. 19,711-12 (1958) (sine die adjournment for
136 days); 104 CONG. REC. 19,554 (1958) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 440, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 19,746 (1959) (sine die adjournment for 114 days); 105
CONG. REC. 19,682 (1959) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 745, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106
CONG. REC. 19,030 (1960) (sine die adjournment for 124 days); 106 CONG. REC. 19,128
(1960) (House adoption).
388. S. Con. Res. 53, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REC. 11,153 (1953) (sine die
adjournment for 156 days); 99 CoNG. REC. 10,968 (1953) (Senate adoption); S. Con. Res. 57,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 CONG. REC. 13,062 (1955) (sine die adjournment for 154 days); 101
CoNG. REC. 12,858 (1955) (Senate adoption); H.R. Con. Res. 276, 84th Cong., 2d Sets., 102
CoNG. REC. 15,129 (1956) (sine die adjournment for 160 days); 102 CoNG. REC. 15,267
(1956) (House adoption).
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and one lasted six months. 8 9
Predictably, the conditional intrasession adjournment periods

typically involved shorter periods, usually of only about a week or
two, but sometimes longer. This duration also approximates the periods of non-conditional intrasession adjournment resolutions.
In the absence of some reassembly provision, had the War Powers Resolution been enacted at any time during this forty-year period, this survey provides a guide on the span of time Congress
might have been foreclosed from exercising its "collective judgment"
on war powers matters.
e. Receiving Reports During Congressional
Adjournment
Some adjournment resolutions have also made explicit provision
for the Congress to be able to receive specified documents or reports

during the period of adjournment. For example, some resolutions
have allowed "the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the

House, respectively,

... to receive messages,

messages, from the President of the United States."'

including veto
90

(For reasons

that could not be ascertained from the record, this authorization,
however, has not been provided in more recent resolutions.) The
War Powers Resolution similarly allowed for the receipt of transmitted presidential war powers reports during a congressional
adjournment.

91

389. See H.R. Con. Res. 240, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 98 CONG. REC. 9726 (1952) (sine
die adjournment for 180 days); 98 CONG. REC. 9743 (1952) (House adoption).
390. See S. Con. Res. 136, § 3, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 28,592, 28,860
(1976). See also S. Con. Res. 120, § 3, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 36,038 (1974);
H.R. Con. Res. 689, § 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 37,594 (1974); S. Con. Res.
27, § 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 8947 (1975); S. Con. Res. 42, § 3, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 15,882 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 324, § 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REC. 21,033 (1975); S. Con. Res. 54, § 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc.
25,220 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 424, § 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 32,687
(1975); H.R. Con. Res. 485, § 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 37,429 (1975); H.R.
Con. Res. 518, § 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 41,973 (1975); S.Con. Res: 92, §
3, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 2622 (1976); S. Con. Res. 111, § 3, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 10,561 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 646, § 4, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REC. 15,695, 15,752 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 669, § 3, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REC. 21,702 (1976); H.R. Con. Res. 707, § 3, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC.
26,411 (1976).
391. See supra note 338; H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973); H.R. REP.
No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) (conference report).
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Congressional Authority for Conditional Adjournment

Although authority to adjourn conditionally is well within the
realm of Congress' adjournment and rulemaking authority, the experience of the last forty years clearly establishes the congressional
practice of utilizing this conditional power as a means of ensuring
that Congress could be called back sua sponte if necessary after adjournment. In exercising its power to conditionally adjourn, Congress has utilized a variety of reassembly mechanisms, including the
delegation of such power to certain congressional leaders (with or
without a requirement of consultation with the minority party), and
has adjourned for varying spans of time. Accordingly, Congress may
wish to tailor future adjournment resolutions with similar reassembly provisions to its institutional need to consider potential war
powers reports or legislation.
D. The Hostilities Act Proposal: H.R. 3912, Section 7
One recent war powers reform measure, introduced by Congressman Daniel E. Lungren, draws upon the congressional adjournment practice in order to allow for the reassembly of Congress
to consider specified "hostilities" legislation or a war powers report
submitted by the President. 9 2 The section-by-section analysis accompanying this measure describes the justification for this
mechanism:
392. Section 7 of H.R. 3912 provides:
(a) Reconvening - Whenever the two Houses of Congress have adjourned pursuant to a concurrent resolution providing for an adjournment sine die or for
more than 3 days to a day certain, the two Houses of Congress shall stand in
adjournment pursuant to the provisions of that resolution unless the members
are notified to reassemble pursuant to subsection (b).
(b) Conditions for Reconvening - The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the Senate shall notify the Members of the
House and the Senate, respectively, to reassemble (1) for the consideration of a bill or joint resolution described in section
5(a) ["hostilities" legislation], regardless of whether such a bill or joint resolution has been introduced; or
(2) for the consideration of a [war powers] report submitted pursuant to
section 4(a) and for the taking of appropriate action with respect to the matters
described in that report; if either (A) the Speaker and the Majority Leader of
the Senate, after consultation with the Minority Leader of their respective
Houses, deem the reconvening of Congress for that purpose to be appropriate,
or (B) the Speaker and the Majority Leader of the Senate are each petitioned by
at least 40 percent of the membership of their respective Houses to reconvene
the Congress for that purpose.
H.R. 3912, § 7, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H252-53 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988).
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Because it is often impossible to foresee whether it may be necessary for Congress to be reassembled to exercise its war powers
after it has adjourned sine die or to a date certain, section 7
would preserve this ability of Congress to reassemble itself on
its own motion as an exercise of Congress' adjournment
authority.8"

Two procedures are employed under the proposed Hostilities
Act. First, consistent with current congressional adjournment resolution practice, the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority
Leader may reassemble the Congress after consultation with their
Minority Leaders. This conforms with the most recent adjournment
procedure authorizing the Senate Majority Leader, rather than the
Senate President pro tempore, as provided under the War Powers
Resolution.894 The second callback mechanism is patterned in part
upon the War Powers Resolution, which allows thirty percent of
each chamber to petition the House Speaker and Senate President
pro tempore to merely request the President to convene the Congress
pursuant to his constitutional authority.895 Instead, section 7 of the
Hostilities Act legislation requires the Speaker and Senate Majority
Leader to reassemble the Congress after forty percent of each chamber has presented a reassembly petition. This forty percent threshold
is the same as other provisions in the bill mandating the use of expedited provisions.8 9
Two objectives are served by this legislation. First, the reassembly determination is left in the hands of the legislative leaders. In
contrast to the War Powers Resolution, which only acknowledges
the executive authority to reconvene Congress "on extraordinary Occasion," the Hostilities Act proposal is predicated on Congress' clear
constitutional authority to adjourn conditionally. The provision also
393. 134 CONG. REC. H259 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (emphasis added). See also id. at
H249 (remarks of Rep. Lungren) (stating that section 7 "is an important addition in the war
powers area because it ensures that Congress will never be foreclosed from exercising its constitutional War powers when such occasion may have been unforeseeable at the time of
adjournment").
394. Id. at H258-59 (section-by-section analysis). For a discussion of this recent change
in practice, see supra text accompanying note 365.
395. For a reproduction of section 5(a) of the War Powers Resolution, see supra note
338.
396. See H.R. 3912, §§ 5(a), 5(d)(1)(A), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H256,
H257 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (providing that legislation to limit the use of armed forces
receiving co-sponsorship by forty percent or more of a House is subject to specified expedited
procedures for consideration).
For a discussion of the operation of these expedited procedures under this measure, see
infra text accompanying notes 446-52.
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mandates consultation with the minority party leaders of the House
and the Senate, which also comports with recent adjournment practice.89 The second purpose of this procedure is to provide for reassembly in the face of a recalcitrant leadership upon some sufficient
threshold level of congressional sentiment to do so. If forty percent of
the membership in each chamber desire the Congress be reassembled
to consider war powers legislation or a report, then the congressional
leadership should not deny the will of such a substantial number of
members of Congress. The forty percent threshold strikes a balance
between competing ends. On the one hand, the congressional leadership is put on notice of growing congressional will on a particular
war powers matter. On the other hand, a threshold established too
low has the potential of usurping the authority of congressional leaders. For example, a political minority of twenty or thirty percent
should not control the determination of whether Congress is to be
reassembled. It is noteworthy that a thirty percent level was used in
the War Powers Resolution. However, the attainment of this level in
the Resolution only mandates a petition be submitted and does not
automatically trigger the reassembly of Congress as it would under
the proposed bill. The forty percent level requirement also establishes a vehicle for informing the President of substantial legislative
concern over a pending hostilities situation.
While the Hostilities Act legislation does not specify a particular notification period, prior practice suggests that Congress should
use a short period, such as twenty-four hours, given the unforeseeable nature of war powers matters and in order to provide for immediate reassembly. Alternatively, the notification period could be left
to the determination of the designated leaders.
Because the proposed language of the Hostilities Act proposal
applies to any adjournment of Congress longer than three days
(which would require, under the Constitution, the consent of both
the Senate and the House),' 8" it is unnecessary to include the conditional boilerplate language in each adjournment resolution in order
to preserve the possible consideration of war powers legislation or
report. Thus, under the Hostilities Act provision, "Congress shall
stand in adjournment pursuant to the provisions of [any] adjournment resolution unless the terms of section 7[] become operative." '9 9
397. See supra text accompanying notes 366-73.
398. See supra text accompanying note 341.
399. H.R. 3912, § 7, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H249-50 (daily ed. Feb.
4, 1988) (emphasis added).
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Some Reassembly Conclusions

While the authors of the War Powers Resolution believed that
reconvening Congress was only possible through the discretionary
exercise of executive authority, this article suggests to current war
power reformers that Congress has constitutional authority to retain
the legislative key by which it may be reassembled after adjournment. By the inclusion of an appropriate reassembly provision in any
war powers reform measure, Congress can ensure that it will never
be foreclosed from exercising its constitutional war powers authority
after adjournment and that it can sua sponte be reassembled. This
capacity is essential given the unforeseen necessity of such exercise
and if Congress is to at all times be able to proffer its "collective
judgment" on war powers matters. While it may be assumed that the
President would likely reconvene Congress pursuant to his authority
under the Constitution, given the divided nature of the war powers,
each branch should retain the ability to exercise its respective constitutional authority to its fullest potential.
IX.

EXPEDITED PROCEDURES FOR LEGISLATIVE
CONSIDERATION

A.

Overview

One ripe area in which Congress may improve its involvement
in war powers matters is through the adoption of expedited procedures for the consideration of war powers legislation. Such procedures, enacted pursuant to the congressional rulemaking authority, 00 would give certain legislation priority or privileged status for
consideration in each house upon the occurrence of some contingent
event. Such provisions have already been enacted in other legislative
areas, including the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act,40 1 the so-called "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings" Act,40 2 the
National Emergencies Act,40" and the Energy Policy Act,40 4 to name
0
but a few.' 5
400. For a discussion of this constitutional authority, see supra text accompanying notes
239-54.
401. Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 305, 88 Stat. 310-12 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 636 (1982)).
402. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
§ 254, 99 Stat. 1078-82 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 904 (Supp. III 1985)).
403. Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 202(c), 90 Stat. 1255, as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-93, §
801, 99 Stat. 448 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1622(c) (Supp. III 1985)).
404. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871, as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-102, § 103, 93
Stat. 751-55 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6421 (1982)).
405. For a listing of statutes containing expedited procedures and their frequency of use
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Because legislative fast-track provisions represent a departure
from the standard, deliberative manner of congressional consideration, it should preliminarily be recognized that expedited procedures
are not without their tradeoffs. In fact, in enacting any such reforms
in the war powers area, Congress must cautiously balance the benefits against the burdens. Depending on how these provisions are
designed, the congressional leadership, majority party, and committees of jurisdiction may each lose some degree of existing control over
the timing and substance of legislation subject to the fact-track procedures.4 " Illustratively, the leadership may lose some power over the
scheduling or packaging of subject legislation as a result of
mandatory time periods for consideration or limitations on amendments. A designated minority might derive greater influence in
bringing legislation to the floor for a vote. Further, a committee
might be deprived of jurisdiction through some discharge process unless the committee affirmatively acts prior to a specified deadline.4 07
Another concern is that the priority provisions, in commencing a
timed sequence of events, might be too rigid under certain circumstances, thereby unintentionally eliminating flexibility in some unforeseeable situations.' 0 8 The point, in sum, is that a variety of expedited provisions are available. Each type must be justifiable, in light
during the period of 1975 to 1983, see Legislative Veto After Chadha: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Rules, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 704-05 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 House Rules
Comm. Hearings] (prepared by Roger Davidson, Senior Specialist in American National Government and Public Administration, Congressional Research Service).
406. For an excellent discussion and overview of the tradeoffs involved in the adoption
of expedited procedures, see id. at 674-89 (statement of Dr. Stanley Bach, Congressional Research Service).
407. Dr. Bach has identified at least five variables affecting a congressional vote on
legislation:
Whether or when the House or Senate votes on a measure usually depends on
(1) agenda decisions made by the committee of jurisdiction, (2) the schedule set
by the committee in light of competing demands for its attention, (3) action by
the House Rules Committee in reporting a special rule for consideration by the
House (unless the measure is called up under suspension of the rules), and the
prospects for limiting debate by unanimous consent in the Senate, (4) floor
scheduling decisions usually made by the majority party leadership in cooperation with the appropriate committee leaders, and (5) the interest of members in
debating and amending the measure.
Id. at 689. These are the primary variables, inter alia, that expedited procedures may modify
or otherwise affect in providing for prompt congressional consideration.
408. However, this problem may be alleviated to some degree by provision of appropriate "escape" clauses allowing a majority in either house to vote to deviate from the expedited
provisions. The drawback, however, is that the House may have to vote on an issue which it
may not have otherwise.
For a discussion of the "escape" clauses within the War Powers Resolution, see infra
note 423 and text accompanying notes 432-33.
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of its drawbacks, for the unique situation to which is to be applied.
The ultimate objective of such procedures is to provide for a
timely floor vote on specified matters without undue legislative delay
or diversion. In accomplishing this aim, one senior legislative specialist, Dr. Stanley Bach of the Government Affairs Division of the
Congressional Research Service, has noted that five elements are necessary for effective expedited procedures. Under his model, these
provisions should:
(1)set a time limit for the committee of jurisdiction to report;
(2) provide for automatic discharge or a privileged motion to
discharge, with no debate or limited debate, if the committee
fails to report;
(3) make the resolution privileged for floor consideration, either
immediately or after a brief layover period, whether the resolution has been reported or the committee has been discharged;
(4) prohibit amendments, including committee amendments, and
impose stringent time limits on debate during floor consideration of the resolution; and
(5) provide for prompt floor consideration and little or no debate on an identical companion resolution from the other chamber (if each chamber has acted initially on its own measure). 0 9
In contemplating the applicability of expedited procedures, the
role of political will and legislative inaction must be taken into account. It is generally accepted that "when Congress wants to act, it
can do so through its own internal rules; it does not need to have
expedited procedures in statute, and the fact that they are in statute
does not mean that they will be used."4 10 With isolated exception, all
congressional decisions are the product of political will, not a
mandatory legislative time table for action. Therefore, expedited provisions may be superfluous where political will already drives legislation and a hindrance where these procedures try to force an unwilling Congress to vote on an issue it otherwise wishes to avoid.
While such provisions have their proper time and place and must be
409. 1984 House Rules Comm. Hearings, supra note 405, at 678. These requirements
are imposed to provide for three objectives ensuring an opportunity for a vote: "(1) that the
resolution cannot be blocked or delayed unduly in committee, (2) that the resolution, whether
or not reported from committee, can reach the floor promptly for consideration, and (3) that a
final floor vote within the time permitted cannot be prevented through delay." 1984 House
Rules Comm. Hearings, supra note 405, at 678.
410. 1984 House Rules Comm. Hearings, supra note 405, at 646 (statement of Dr.
Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service).
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enacted carefully, they may prove integral under war powers
circumstances.
The utility of legislative inaction must also be recognized as an
important screening device for unwanted or ineffective proposals.4 1
Generally, legislative inaction may be the result of considered judgment, leading to the termination of a proposal. However, as Dr.
Bach has noted, inaction under expedited procedures has an opposite
consequence, as those in power-the leadership, the majority party,
or committee-may lose some measure of control over a legislative
proposal by their failure to act.412 Effective expedited procedures
must therefore preclude legislative inaction at the various points in
the legislative process it can be employed. This is the essential premise underlying the five-part Bach model.4 "
Notwithstanding the potential tradeoffs, carefully tailored expedited provisions might bring about legislative efficiencies otherwise
unachievable in their absence. This article proposes that fast-track
provisions are put to their best use only when applied to those measures toward which a substantial congressional sentiment has already
been demonstrated. Through properly balanced and carefully created
procedures in the war powers context, for example, Congress will:
(1) become a more active participant in matters concerning the involvement of United States troops in hostilities by ensuring expeditious action; (2) send a signal to the executive branch, once the procedures are invoked, that the Congress will seriously consider and act
upon the triggered legislation, thereby promoting dialogue between
the branches on the specifics of the proposal; and (3) assure a floor
vote on war powers legislation within a short time after the priority
provisions are invoked, thereby avoiding potential detours or delay
411. Dr. Louis Fisher remarked, "Inaction is used routinely and responsibly by all
three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial." 1984 House Rules Comm.
Hearings, supra note 405, at 648. Dr. Stanley Bach noted the valuable function of committee
inaction commending "the service they perform by doing nothing - by deciding not to act, as
they screen and filter the thousands of measures that are introduced every Congress." 1984
House Rules Comm. Hearings, supra note 405, at 674. Dr. Bach commented further, "The
agenda control of the majority leadership is more effective as a negative than as an affirmative
power; as a general matter, these leaders in either chamber are better able to prevent consideration of measures they oppose than to secure consideration of measures they support." 1984
House Rules Comm. Hearings, supra note 405, at 683.
412. 1984 House Rules Comm. Hearings, supra note 405, at 681 (statement of Dr.
Stanley Bach).
413. In Dr. Bach's words, "[Tlhe absence in any set of [expedited] procedures of one or
more of the elements [in the model] jeopardizes the utility of the procedures by leaving open
some significant opportunity for inaction or delay." 1984 House Rules Comm. Hearings,
supra note 405, at 688.
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within the legislative branch. After a review of the expedited provisions in the War Powers Resolution, this article will explore specific
proposals giving Congress, through its constitutional rulemaking authority, a more effective means for considering war powers issues.
B.

Existing Law

The War Powers Resolution contains some rudimentary priority procedures for the consideration of a joint or concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to that statute.4 4 A review of the legislative
history illustrates the necessity for such provisions in the war powers
context, as perceived by Congress during consideration of the War
Powers Resolution. The Senate committee wished to ensure that
control would remain "in the hands of the majority" and to "safeguard against the possibility that Congressional action with respect
to such measures could be obstructed or [d]elayed through a filibuster or committee pigeonholing."'"5 The House committee also expressed an interest in adopting " 'antifilibuster' provisions" and establishing "the status of relevant legislation as 'privileged
motions.' "416 The need to prevent a Senate filibuster,41 and to deter
a committee from bottling-up a measure from floor consideration
were also matters of concern frequently echoed by members during
414. See 50 U.S.C. § 1545 (1982) (concerning bills or joint resolutions introduced pursuant to section 1544(b)); id. § 1546 (concerning concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant to
section 1544(c)); id.§ 1546(a) (concerning Senate consideration of measures requiring the
removal of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities).
415. S.REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1973).
416. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1973). See also H.R. REP. No. 547,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) (conference report) (adopting House provisions, with some
modifications).
417. For example, committee member Representative Mailliard commented:
I do not anticipate any problem, frankly, under the rules of the House, but I am
a little concerned about the rules of the other body where such a resolution
could be filibustered if a few of the Members of the other body were of a mind
to do so.
119 CONG. REC. 24,656 (1973). Representative White expressed his concern of "a filibuster in
the Senate during a hostility in which our troops were engaged by the action of the President,
which would continue because of such a procedural tie up." Id. at 24,667. In response to such
a concern, Senator Javits remarked that priority procedures provide "a safeguard against the
possibility that congressional action with respect to such measures could be obstructed or
delayed through a filibuster." Id. at 24,542.
Further, during the veto override debate, Representative Brown noted his concern that the
bill does not "preclude[] the operation of the [Senate] rules . . . which require a two-thirds
vote for cloture," giving "one-third of the Members of the (Senate not only power to] subvert
the will of even a unanimous House, but also the will of just less than two-thirds of the
[Senate]." Id. at 36,212.
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the 1973 debate.4 18
With these objectives in mind, priority procedures were established under the War Powers Resolution for the consideration of legislation introduced pursuant to section 5(b) (mandating the automatic removal of United States Armed Forces after sixty days in the
absence of specified congressional or presidential action),419 similar
to those established under section 5(c) (providing a concurrent resolution mechanism for the removal of United States Armed Forces
within the first sixty days of their introduction into hostilities).42
Four stages are anticipated under the two priority provisions in the
statute: (1) committee referral upon the introduction of war powers
legislation, (2) chamber priority consideration of the legislation, (3)
the referral of approved legislation to the other chamber, and (4)
conference report consideration. Notably, a low invocation threshold
triggers the expedited procedure as only one member of the House or
Senate need introduce war powers legislation in order to commence
the process of priority consideration.4 21 Thus, there is no initial re418. Committee member Representative Mailliard remarked that without a priority
procedure, "a committee that may not have the same view that the House as a whole has,
could button up a measure that might disapprove the President's action." Id. at 24,673. Fellow
committee member Representative Bingham also remarked that a provision must be made for
"adequate consideration" by the committee. Id. Similarly, Senator Javits commented
that priority procedures prevent "committee pigeonholing." Id. at 24,542.
419. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982). For the full text of this section, see supra note 80.
420. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982). For the full text of this section, see supra note 261.
421. 50 U.S.C. § 1545(a) (1982) (providing congressional priority procedures for "[ahny
joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to" section 5(b)) (emphasis added); id. § 1546(a)
(providing congressional priority procedures for "[any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to" section 5(c)) (emphasis added).
The virtues of this low threshold trigger were repeatedly touted during the congressional
debate. For example, subcommittee chairman Representative Zablocki remarked that "[iut
takes only 1 member out of 535 Members of the House or Senate to trigger the mechanism
that requires that both bodies eventually are called upon to take an 'up or down' vote." 119
CONG. REC. 24,654 (1973). Similarly, committee member Representative Fountain observed,
"After all, it takes only one Member of either body - 1 out of 535 - to drop in such a bill or
resolution of support for the President," id. at 21,213, and committee member Representative
Whalen stated that "(f]or section 5 to become operative all that is required is the submission of
a bill or resolution by only 1 of the 535 Members of the House and Senate." Id. at 33,862
(conference report debate).
Committee member Representative Fascell contrasted the House committee bill allowing
one member to trigger the priority provisions with Representative Regula's substitute amendment requiring one-third House co-sponsorship in order to trigger such procedures. Id. at
24,673. Committee member Representative Biester noted that "any Member may take advantage of the priority procedures through the introduction of a concurrent resolution." Id. at
24,696. During the conference report debate, Representative Zablocki observed, "The conference agreement retains the important feature of [the House bill] that legislation approving the
President's action can be introduced by a single Member of either House and that once introduced it must be considered on a privileged basis." Id. at 33,859. Likewise, Representative
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quirement of demonstrating a wide base of legislative support for a
specific legislative proposal. Under the Resolution, "any" member,
including one affiliated with the party in opposition to the President
or outside the mainstream of the majority or minority parties, can
trigger these provisions.
Upon the introduction of "any" section 5(b) or 5(c) legislation,
the Resolution first mandates referral of such measures to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs or the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. The committees are then required to report out legislation
within a specified number of calendar days,"22 unless either house
decides to modify the priority procedure.42 While both the House
and Senate versions of the War Powers Resolution contained priority
procedures, the Senate proposal, which also would have required
that one-third of the members first co-sponsor the measure, would
have bypassed committee consideration by allowing "any pertinent
bill or joint resolution . . . to be considered as reported directly to

the floor of the House in question unless otherwise decided by the
yeas and nays."' 24 This approach was rejected by the conference
committee in favor of the House procedure, thereby assuring preliminary committee consideration of all section 5 legislation.
Second, the war powers legislation reported out of committee
becomes "the pending business of the House in question . . . and
shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter."' 2 Again,
either house can alter this requirement by majority vote.' 26 Third,
Findley remarked that "any Member in this body who has the will can introduce a resolution
of support for the President's policy and be assured that it will be dealt with on an up or down
vote at some stage within the period provided." Id. at 33,861. Commenting further on the
contents of the bill, Representative Bingham remarked during the veto override debate, "[Tihe
bill contains elaborate filibuster-proof provisions so that, once a resolution is introduced by any
Member, it must be brought to a vote within the required time." Id. at 36,209.
422. The period to report for section 5(b) legislation is calculated by counting back from
the 60-day period for automatic removal of military forces, while the time for a committee to
report out a bill introduced under section 5(c) is a specified number of days. See 50 U.S.C. §
1545(a) (1982) (requiring committee action "not later than twenty-four calendar days before
the expiration of the sixty-day period specified" under section 5(b)); id. § 1546(a) (requiring
committee action "within fifteen calendar days" after introduction and committee referral of
section 5(c) legislation).
423. Id. § 1545(a) (providing congressional priority procedures for section 5(b) legislation "unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays"); id. § 1546(a)
(providing congressional priority procedures for section 5(c) legislation "unless such House
shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays"). This "escape" clause was added in the
conference report. See H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973).
424. Id.
425. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545(b), 1546(b) (1982).
426. Id.
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upon the passage by one chamber of either section 5(b) or 5(c) legislation, the Resolution mandates referral of such legislation to the
other body. The legislation must be reported out by committee
within a specified time period42 and then becomes the pending business of that house to be voted upon within three days."' Under these
provisions, unlike the standard manner of legislative consideration,
the consequence of approval by one chamber mandates consideration
by the committee and body of the other house. However, this procedure may be avoided by majority vote.4 9 Finally, where the two
houses are in disagreement over war powers legislation passed under
either section 5(b) or 5(c), the Resolution provides for the appointment of conferees who must report back within a specified period of
time. 30 Where such disagreement is not reconcilable within fortyeight hours, no mechanism for resolution is provided. In that case,
the conferees "shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement."4 " Of note, an "escape" clause allows each house either
to depart from or to utilize an alternative procedure by the recording
of a majority vote at any juncture.4 2 Accordingly, at all times the
procedural means for consideration of war powers legislation is "in
the hands of the majority."43 The Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution adopted priority procedures patterned on section 5(c) of
427. Id. § 1545(c) (requiring that section 5(b) legislation "shall be reported out not
later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period"); id. § 1546(c)
(requiring that section 5(c) measures "shall be reported out by such committee together with
its recommendations within fifteen calendar days").
428. Id. §§ 1545(c), 1546(c).
429. Id.
430. Id. § 1545(d) (requiring that "the committee of conference shall make and file a
report with respect to [section 5(b) legislation] not later than four calendar days before the
expiration of the sixty-day period"); id. § 1546(d) (requiring that "the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to [section 5(c) legislation] within six calendar
days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference"). This provision concerning conference report action was added by the conferees to the War Powers Resolution. See
H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973).
431. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545(d), 1546(d) (1982).
432. See id. §§ 1545, 1546 (1982) (qualifying the explicit priority procedures with the
language "unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays"). See also 119
CONG. REC. 24,542 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (noting that in the Senate version "the
respective Houses of Congress can modify the priority consideration provisions by majority
vote"). As "escape" clause examples, Senator Javits noted that a house may wish to "direct[] a
committee to hold hearings and report back by a certain date." Id.
433. 119 CONG. REC. 24,542 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits). See also id. at 33,550
(conference report debate) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("[lIt is provided that either body can
modify the mandated procedure at any stage by yea and nay vote. This is included to assure
full flexibility to the Congress.").
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the War Powers Resolution.""'
A separate procedure, added by amendment in 1983, pertains to
legislation mandating "the removal of United States Armed Forces
engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its
possessions and territories, without a declaration of war or specific
statutory authorization."4 5 Such legislation only applies to the Senate and conforms the manner of consideration of such legislation to
the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976,
section 601(b),"86 which includes, inter alia, time limits on debate
and a committee discharge requirement when the committee has not
timely reported out a measure.
In comparison to other expedited procedures, the War Powers
Resolution provisions are not complex or burdensome. However,
some omissions and other matters deserve reform, or at least clarification. This becomes apparent after evaluating the priority procedures under the Bach model. ' For example, although the statute
requires the committee to report out war powers legislation within a
specified period of time, there exists no enforcement mechanism for a
disobedient or recalcitrant committee, such as a discharge or privilege motion procedure allowing a floor member to automatically
bring up the measure for consideration. The War Powers Resolution
procedures also do not expressly make the reported legislation privileged. Instead, the measure becomes the pending business of the
chamber and must then be voted upon within three calendar days. It
is therefore possible that after becoming the pending business of the
particular house, the bill might not be fully or adequately considered. Other than the requirement for a vote within three days and
that the time in the Senate shall be equally divided, there are no
limitations on amendments or floor debate. Thus, the second, third,
and fourth elements of the Bach model are not accounted for in the
priority procedures of the War Powers Resolution. It is therefore
434. Compare Pub. L. No. 98-119, § 8, 97 Stat. 805, 807-08 (1983) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1541 note (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) with 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982).
435. Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 & 1985, Pub. L. No.
98-164, Title X, § 1013, 97 Stat. 1062 (1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1546a (1982 & Supp.
V 1987)). See also H.R. REP. No. 563, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1983) (conference report),
reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1608.
436. Pub. L. No. 94-329, Title VI, § 601(b), 90 Stat. 765 (1976). See also S. Rep. No.
876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976) (explaining Senate necessity for such provisions); H.R.
REP. No. 1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1433; H.R. REP. No. 1272, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1976) (conference report),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1543.
437. See supra text accompanying note 407.
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questionable whether the original objective of precluding delay or
filibuster is attainable under current law.
Some features of the War Powers Resolution priority provisions
require explication of their operation. For example, it is not clear
how the "escape" clause operates. Can any member request a vote to
depart from the priority procedures at any time? Can such a vote be
requested during committee consideration or floor debate? Further, it
is possible that a conference report may be subjected to a filibuster
since no limits on conference report time or amendments are authorized. Perhaps consideration should also be given to extending these
fast-track procedures (including a specified number of hours of debate) to deliberation on the overturning of a possible presidential
veto of war powers legislation. Finally, Congress might wish to review the threshold requirement for invoking these procedures, since
under current law the mere introduction of war powers legislation
has the effect of requiring immediate committee and floor action, in
the absence of an affirmative vote under the "escape" clause.
C.

Alternative 1973 Debate Proposals

In considering reform of the priority procedures, it is useful to
consider some of the other proposals introduced during the 1973 war
powers debate. The Senate approved bill, for example, contained expedited provisions that would not be triggered unless "sponsored or
cosponsored by one-third of the members of the House of Congress
in which it [was] introduced." 438 A similar provision was offered as a
substitute amendment in the House of Representatives by Congressman Regula.' 39 However, this proposal was criticized in the House
on two grounds. First, some believed it required too many members
to invoke the expedited procedures, as contrasted with the one-member trigger in the House committee bill.440 Second, it did not provide
sufficient time for committee consideration, 4 ' since the proposal required floor consideration one day after introduction if cosponsored
by one-third of the members of the chamber, unless determined otherwise by a majority."" The amendment was defeated in the
House44 and the proposal did not survive conference committee
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.

S. 440, § 7(a), 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 25,120 (1973).
119 CONG. REC. 24,672 (1973).
Id. at 24,673 (remarks of Rep. Fascell).
Id. (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
Id. at 24,672 (remarks of Rep. Regula).
Id. at 24,676.
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action. 4"
In a separate proposal, Senator Griffin introduced a war powers
amendment triggering legislative consideration of either a funding
prohibition bill or a bill approving executive action, both within five
days after a war powers report was submitted by the President." 5
This amendment also specified the periods for committee and chamber action, the time allowed for debate, the manner of consideration
of legislation referred from the other body, and conference committee
consideration.
D. Some Current Reform Proposals
Given the existing operation of priority procedures under the
War Powers Resolution, it is useful to consider some reform suggestions that might improve the congressional process of debating war
powers measures.
1. The Hostilities Act Proposal: H.R. 3912, Sections 5(a)-(k)
a.

Threshold Trigger

Compared with the War Powers Resolution, in which "any"
legislation introduced pursuant to section 5(b) or 5(c) receives priority consideration,' 46 a relatively more stringent trigger to commence
the fast-track process is advocated under the reform proposal embodied within H.R. 3912. The standard procedure for legislative consideration (including potential committee inaction, hearings, or markup of legislation) prevails under this proposal until "actual" or "imminent" hostilities legislation is cosponsored by forty percent of the
members of either house. The attainment of this cosponsorship
threshold then commences the specified priority procedures." 7 Normally this forty percent requirement translates into 174 members in
the House and forty Senators, barring any absentees.
444. H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) (conference report).
445. 119 CONG. REC. 25,098 (1973) (amend. No. 368, § 4(c), introduced by Sen.
Griffin).
446. See supra note 421.
447. Under H.R. 3912, there are three forms of hostilities legislation: actual, imminent,
or potential. A forty percent threshold trigger is used for the first two forms, while a fifty
percent level is utilized for potential hostilities. H.R. 3912, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., §§
5(d)(1)(A) (forty percent), 5(d)(1)(B) (fifty percent), 134 CONG. REC. H251 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1988). Only voting members of Congress are counted toward the forty percent or fifty percent
calculation. See id. § 5(k).
For a discussion of these three forms of hostilities legislation under the proposal, see
supra notes 230-32.

1989]

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

In a comparative sense, the forty percent threshold may be considered "modest" when contrasted with the "any" member trigger
under the War Powers Resolution.4 4 However, the higher threshold
under H.R. 3912 advances several functions, unobtainable under the
current War Powers Resolution mechanism. First, it forces members
of Congress to cosponsor war powers legislation in order to start the
priority procedures. Instead of allowing only one or a few members
to call for action, the focus is placed on the level of overall congressional support for a specific legislative proposal. After all, the ultimate measure of success is whether a particular bill can garner sufficient support to be passed and be sent to the President for review.
Under this approach, it is possible that competing bills, introduced
by members of opposing congressional factions, will vie for expedited
consideration. Of course, prior to attainment of the forty percent cosponsorship level, the traditional manner of committee consideration
is preserved and followed.
Second, by highlighting specific legislative measures, the cosponsorship trigger signals to the executive branch that there is increasing congressional sentiment on a specific war powers position.
Accordingly, an atmosphere is established in which, in the face of a
potential legislative-executive branch confrontation, accommodation
and compromise alternatives may be explored, thus promoting comity between the branches. Under current procedure, although a substantial level of co-sponsorship informs the President of significant
congressional sentiment on a war powers issue, it does not invoke the
important timing requirements that normally bring legislation to a
congressional vote.
Third, the forty percent requirement recognizes that Congress
only acts affirmatively when there is sufficient political will. Expedited provisions are ineffectual when they attempt to force political
will on a particular issue, instead of when used as an indicator or
measure of such political will. In contrast, the one-member threshold
under the War Powers .Resolution may or may not have the support
of a considerable number of members. Why should the House or
Senate go through the exercise of expedited consideration of legislation if the requisite votes will ultimately be lacking? Under these
circumstances, why should either house be forced to disengage the
priority procedures under the "escape" clause? For these reasons,
448.

See 134 CONG. REC. H257 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis of

H.R. 3912) (comparison of the relative modesty of the H.R. 3912 expedited procedure trigger
to that of the War Powers Resolution).
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the proposed expedited process is contingent on an initial showing of
substantial support. As the Supreme Court noted on one occasion:
The two houses of Congress are legislative bodies representing
larger constituencies. Power is not vested in any one individual,
but in the aggregate of the members who compose the body, and
its action is not the action of any separate member or number of
members, but the action of the body as a whole; and the question which has over and over again been raised is, what is necessary to constitute the official action of this legislative and representative body.449
The central problem in this debate is determining the threshold
level that is an appropriate price to pay in order to deviate from the
regular manner of legislative consideration. The utility of a substantial threshold requirement for the co-sponsorship trigger can be
demonstrated by exploring the effects of modifying the trigger level.
For example, a thirty percent level, such as that proposed under the
Senate version of the War Powers Resolution and by Congressman
Regula during the 1973 debate,450 would give greater power to a
minority group in forcing congressional consideration of a war powers bill than would the proposed forty percent level. While the composition of the cosponsoring group reveals whether the congressional
support has, in fact, a wide base, a lower threshold level increases
the possible influence of the party in opposition to the President or
even a minority fringe group within the majority party.
Another possible modification to the threshold level would require thirty-three percent plus one, thus corresponding with the constitutional number that could prevent a veto override.""' This threshold level would be relevant with regard to legislation considered
under the priority procedures which provides congressional authorization for the President's position. It would be ironic if the "vetoproof" level were adopted as the threshold requirement for invoking
the expedited provisions in light of the congressional desire repeated
often during the 1973 War Powers Resolution debate that a minority group should not have the power to control war power matters.4 52
However, when contrasted with the easy trigger requirement under
the War Powers Resolution, these higher threshold levels seem more
reasonable.
449.
450.
451.
452.

United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892).
See supra text accompanying notes 424, 438-44.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3 (noting two-thirds veto override requirement).
See supra notes 267-70.
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Given these concerns, a forty percent threshold requirement is
the most appropriate trigger. This level is only obtainable with a
wide base of congressional support, thereby justifying the priority
procedures. A higher level would be superfluous since fifty percent
plus one would be sufficient to pass the legislation anyway. Most
importantly, this approach focuses specifically on a legislative proposal that has obtained strong support, rather than on war powers legislation introduced, potentially without merit, by only one or a few
members of Congress.
b.

Other Features of H.R. 3912

While the forty percent co-sponsorship level is one of the most
important features of the proposal for expedited provisions, other aspects of the expedited procedures under H.R. 3912 are worth reviewing. Some of these provisions are based on the War Powers Resolution priority provisions, while others are not found in that statute.
1) Joint or Sequential Committee Referral
All hostilities legislation introduced pursuant to H.R. 3912 is
first referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and/or the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in a fashion similar to the
War Powers Resolution."5" However, the measure also specifies that
such legislation may be jointly or sequentially referred to the House
and Senate Committees on Appropriations and/or Armed Services,
where these committees would have jurisdiction, for example, over
any proposed funding prohibition applied to the armed forces or any
action under the Department of Defense Authorization bill.4 54
Unlike the Senate passed version of the War Powers Resolution, which allowed legislation to completely bypass the committee
process,4 55 priority procedures should allow at least initial committee
consideration of all war powers measures. It is through the jurisdictional committee process that Congress usually applies its expertise.
At the same time, it is important to deny any committee, after it has
had a sufficient chance to consider legislation, the power to prevent
453. H.R. 3912, §§ 5(c)(1), 5(c)(2), 100th Cong., 2d
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988). This is similar to the initial mode of
Resolution. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545(a), 1546(a) (1982).
454. H.R. 3912, §§ 5(c)(3), 5(c)(4), 100th Cong., 2d
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988). See 134 CONG. REC. H257 (daily
section analysis) (explaining the provision).
455. See supra text accompanying note 424.

Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H251
referral under the War Powers
Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H251
ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-
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either chamber from voting on a measure that carries the substantial
support of the members. H.R. 3912 takes into account both of these
concerns. Under the first legislative track under the proposal, "it is
left to committee discretion to determine whether hearings or
markup should be held or whether inaction is the best course."'"" As
already discussed, the second legislative track for expedited consideration is triggered only when the sufficient level of co-sponsorship is
attained. Once this occurs, the committees must report out hostilities
legislation "not later than 21 calendar days after the requisite number of cosponsors has been attained."'

5

7

The expedited process there-

fore assures that the committee will have at least three weeks for
consideration of legislation, after which time the measure must either
be reported out or discharged for floor consideration.
2) Escape Clause
The bill provides an "escape" clause to allow for departure
from the expedited process. During the twenty-one day period of
committee review, any member may offer a privileged motion that
the committee shall not be required to report out the hostilities legislation under the expedited provisions.458 Although it is unlikely that
this escape provision would frequently be used, given the high level
of co-sponsorship required to commence the expedited procedure, it
does assure that the majority will retain control over the manner of
consideration. This was one of the paramount concerns expressed
during the War Powers Resolution debate. 59 Providing an "escape"
clause is also consistent with the view that expedited procedures
should not be contrary to the political will of Congress. The escape
provision is also included as a reform proposal in order to improve
existing law. It is not clear how a similar mechanism under the War
Powers Resolution would be considered. 6 0 This statute specifies that
the fast-track process must be followed "unless such House shall
otherwise determine by the yeas and nays."'' 1 In order to overcome
the uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the escape clause,
456. 134 CONG. REC. H257 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis).
457. H.R. 3912, § 5(d)(1), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H251 (daily ed.
Feb. 4, 1988).
458. Id. § 5(d)(2).
459. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 415-18.
460. See 134 CONG. REC. H257 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis).
461. See supra note 423. There are six such "escape" clauses under the War Powers
Resolution priority procedures. See supra text accompanying notes 423, 432-33 for a discussion of these clauses under the statute.

19891

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

H.R. 3912 permits a member to submit a privileged motion, limits
debate on such motion to one hour, and allows each member to submit only one motion during the twenty-one days of committee
consideration. 8 2
3) Committee Discharge
Upon the failure of a committee to report after twenty-one days
and in the absence of chamber approval of the motion to "escape"
the expedited procedures, under the proposal the jurisdiction of the
committee is discharged and the hostilities legislation is automatically
placed on the floor calendar for consideration.46 The measure is
then subjected to a privileged motion for immediate consideration." 4
This proposal will correct the deficiency under the War Powers Resolution involving the lack of an enforcement feature to bring up a
measure the committee has failed to report out for floor consideration. This feature also conforms with the second prong under the
Bach model for effective priority procedures. The discharge process
under H.R. 3912, therefore, may be avoided only if either the escape
clause is invoked or the committee reports out legislation within the
465
requisite number of days.

4) Consideration of a Measure Passed by the Other
House
The provisions for expedited consideration under H.R. 3912
also establish a similar procedure for twenty-one day committee consideration of hostilities legislation that has been passed by the other
body.' 66 This addresses the fifth element under the Bach model.
Such a clause is necessary if the priority procedures are to be meaningful in advancing consideration of the approved legislation and in
precluding one chamber from pigeonholing measures. However, it is
notable that the forty percent co-sponsorship requirement, when coupled with passage in one house, has the effect of forcing the other
chamber's committee to consider the measure. Failure of the committee to timely report out the legislation that has already been ap462. H.R. 3912, § 5(d)(2), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H251 (daily ed.
Feb. 4, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. H257 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis).
463. Id. § 5(e).
464. See infra text accompanying notes 469-73.
465. See 134 CONG. REC. H257 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis).
466. H.R. 3912, § 5(0(1), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H251 (daily ed. Feb.
4, 1988).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

proved in the other chamber also results in automatic discharge of
jurisdiction.""1 In the event a committee has already reported a companion measure when the measure approved by the other house is
referred, then the bill reported by that house's own committee may
be considered.468 No such provision is made under the procedures in
the War Powers Resolution. These features are intended to facilitate
the deliberative process and the manner in which bills proceed to
conference.
5) Floor Consideration
A discharged or committee reported measure is subject to a nondebatable, privileged motion in the House and Senate that places
designated war powers legislation in immediate consideration."6 9
This feature conforms with the third prong of the Bach model for
expedited procedures. The non-debatable, non-amendable nature of
the motion simply requires an up or down vote on the question of
the bill's immediate consideration and ensures that this issue cannot
be delayed or otherwise modified. The proposal also specifies that no
intervening motions can preclude consideration of this privileged
70
motion.
Two procedures may be utilized for floor consideration under
the proposal. A committee reported measure may be called up at any
time by the chair of the committee. 47' This is generally consistent
with the current legislative practice of retaining this control in the
chairman of the committee with jurisdiction over the measure. However, if after three days following the reporting of the bill the chairman has not moved for its consideration, any floor member may raise
the privileged motion for immediate attention. 4 7 Two objectives are
served by this proposal. First, prompt deliberation is guaranteed. All
committees will be cognizant of the futility in attempting to bottle-up
legislation that has already received the requisite level of support of
members. Second, the process contains a built-in incentive for committees chairmen to exercise their influence and control over the
measure. 7 31 Since non-committee members can force committee or
floor action, this proposal preserves at least an opportunity for the
467.

id.

468.
469.
470.

Id. § 5(0(2).
Id. § 5(g).
Id.

471.
472.

Id. § 5(g)(l)(A).
Id. § 5(g)(I)(B).

473.

See 134 CONG. REC. H258 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis).

19891

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

committee and their chairmen to exercise their role of expertise over
the subject area. Critically, at all times prompt floor consideration is
assured.
6) Debate and Amendment Limitations
In attempting to apply the fourth Bach requirement for effective
priority procedures, H.R. 3912 specifies limitations on floor debate
and amendments. A total of twenty-six hours for debate and amendment is provided in both the House and Senate."7" Some expedited
provisions, including those in the War Powers Resolution, specify a
number of days for full consideration. This aspect of H.R. 3912,
which is modeled in part on the time provisions in the Congressional
Budget and, Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 475 opts instead to
specify the number of hours of debate in order to ensure thorough
and sufficient time for deliberation and amendment. The twenty-six
hour time period would likely be spread out over three to five days.
If, in contrast, three days of debate were stipulated in the absence of
a specified number of hours, for example, it is possible that less actual time for debate and amendments would be allowed. Presumably,
the expedited procedures under H.R. 3912 would only be invoked
during those infrequent occasions in which United States Armed
Forces become involved in hostilities and legislation receives forty
percent co-sponsorship. Consistent with the deliberative function of
Congress and its substantial constitutional war powers, on these expectedly rare occasions it is important to allow ample time for debate
on such vital national issues. While a motion to limit debate may be
offered, thereby leaving control in the hands of. the majority at all
times, such motions are not debatable.4 7" The proposal also provides
that time for debate on committee reported or discharged legislation
shall be equally divided between the majority and minority.
7) Conference
The War Powers Resolution provides for the appointment of
conferees and requires expedited consideration by the conference
474. H.R. 3912, §§ 5(h), 5(i), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H251 (daily ed.
Feb. 4, 1988).
475. 134 CONG. REC. H258 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis) (citing
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 305,
88 Stat. 310-13 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 636 (1982))).
476. H.R. 3912, §§ 5(h)(1) (House), 5(i)(2) (Senate), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG.
REC. H252 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988).
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committee. 4 7 H.R. 3912 builds on this procedure, but places a
shorter, three-day limit on the conference committee's action.478 Like
the War Powers Resolution, the conferees must report back within
forty-eight hours in the event of disagreement. Unlike the statute,
time limits for consideration of a reported conference report are imposed in order to prevent any filibuster or delay. 47 19 While many enforcement devices can ensure that delay does not occur in committee
or on the floor, it is also important to provide prompt attention at the
conference level.
8) Some Conclusions on H.R. 3912
Not dissimilar with other expedited provisions, the proposal in
H.R. 3912 was tailored with some definite principles in mind. First,
the committee process (and concomitant jurisdictional expertise)
should certainly be given an initial opportunity to operate in these
war power deliberations. Therefore, even under the fast-track procedure, the committee is first permitted ample time and opportunity to
report out legislation. Failure to do so results in automatic discharge.
Further, the committee chairman is assigned at least a preliminary
role in calling up the reported measure. Additionally, H.R. 3912
would allow for sequential or joint referral to related committees
where the expertise of those committees may come into play.
Second, these proposed provisions are designed to take into account developing congressional political will on a specific war powers
measure, instead of compelling the exercise of political will. This is
accomplished through (1) the forty percent co-sponsorship trigger,
requiring a substantial level of support before proceeding to the expedited process, (2) the escape clause, allowing the will of a majority
to prevail and to modify or depart from the fast-track procedures at
anytime, and (3) the allowance of ample, yet specific periods of time
for debate and amendment.
Third, consistent with the Bach model, H.R. 3912 attempts to
eliminate any opportunity for legislative inaction on a war powers
measure that has received forty percent co-sponsorship, unless an affirmative vote under the "escape" clause is exercised. The proposal,
therefore, includes a process for discharging legislation from committee, procedures for considering legislation in one body when the
477.

See supra text accompanying notes 430-31.

478.

H.R. 3912, § 5(j), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H252 (daily ed. Feb. 4,

1988).
479.

See 134 CONG. REC. H258 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (section-by-section analysis).
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other chamber has approved similar legislation, and time limits for
consideration of conference reports.
The expedited provisions of H.R. 3912 serve as a model for
reform so that war powers procedures may be effectively empowered.
2.

S. J. Res. 323

By way of comparison, a review of the priority procedures proposed in one of the central Senate reform bills introduced during the
100th Congress is useful. S. J. Res. 323 was sponsored by Senate
Majority Leader Robert Byrd and cosponsored by Senators Sam
Nunn, John Warner, and George Mitchell. Its priority provisions,
which are in large part similar to those of H.R. 3912 and other bills,
offer some additional innovative suggestions that shall be briefly
noted.
Rather than allow a single member to impose the expedited
procedures (as under the War Powers Resolution) or require forty
percent co-sponsorship (as under H.R. 3912), these fast-track procedures do not commence until a designated member of a "permanent
consultative group" introduces legislation either mandating troop
disengagement from hostilities or providing authorization of continued engagement. Such legislation must first be approved by a majority of this group.4 80 The proposed permanent consultative group,
consisting of eighteen congressional leaders, would act, inter alia, as
a preliminary screen for legislative proposals. 81
The legislation is then referred to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
which shall have seven calendar days to consider the legislation or
the bill is subject to discharge. 8" Once this measure is either discharged or reported out, no other measure may be reported or discharged from committee while the first one is before the House, in
480. S.J. Res. 323, § 4, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (defining joint resolution); id. § 6
(priority procedures for joint resolutions).
481. These designated leaders are: the Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of
the Senate, the House Majority Leader, the House Minority Leader, the Senate Majority
Leader, the Senate Minority Leader, the chairman and ranking minority member of the
.House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the chairman and ranking minority member of the
House Committee on Armed Services, the chairman and ranking minority member of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the chairman and ranking minority member
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Id. § 3(c)(1).
482. Id. § 6(c)(1).
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conference, or before the President. 48" Like H.R. 3912, a privileged
motion to proceed to immediate floor consideration may be made.
However, once this motion is approved, "the joint resolution shall
remain the unfinished business of the respective House, to the exclusion of all other business, until disposed of," unless otherwise specified.4 A time limit of twelve hours for debate is imposed, to be
equally divided between the majority and minority parties, and time
limits for germane and relevant amendments are also provided. 485 In
the event the Minority Leader was unable to offer an amendment
during the twelve hours of debate, then the measure permits one
such amendment.4 8 ' Expedited procedures are similarly provided
when one house receives an approved measure from the other
body.487 Three hours of debate are permitted in each house for consideration of a conference report. 48 8 Finally, this proposal allows
twenty hours of debate in the event the joint resolution is vetoed by
the President.""'
E. The Necessity for Effective Expedited Procedures on War
Powers Measures
The central issue surrounding consideration of expedited procedures is whether the placing of certain war powers legislation in a
privileged status creates sufficient benefits to warrant deviation from
the traditional, deliberative process of congressional consideration. A
strong argument can be made that carefully tailored expedited provisions are justified. As a general matter, congressional deliberation on
measures concerning war is of sufficient special and unique importance to warrant priority consideration. Congress may decide that
pursuant to its rulemaking authority and as a necessary and proper
means of exercising its power to declare war, raise and support an
army and provide a navy, expedited means of consideration are warranted. The need for such provisions in the war powers context was
first recognized in the War Powers Resolution.
However, an even more persuasive argument can be made
where Congress initially indicates a strong sentiment on specific war
powers legislation. The forty percent co-sponsorship threshold is
483. Id. § 6(c)(2).
484. Id. § 6(d)(1)(A).
485. Id. §§ 6(d)(2)(A), 6(d)(2)(B).
486. Id. § 6(d)(2)(C).
487. Id. §§ 6(e), 6(f).
488. Id. § 6(g)(I)(B).
489. Id. § 6(g)(2).
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proposed in recognition of the fact that there must be sufficient political will for congressional action. Thus, little is gained by triggering
expedited procedures if sufficient support is not already present. As
noted at the beginning of this section, many forms of priority procedures are available. Some may be inappropriate under certain circumstances, particularly where Congress is forced to confront an issue on which it already lacks support for final approval.
Congressional inaction may serve a valuable function of filtering out
such proposals. It is an entirely different matter, however, where the
congressional leadership or a committee is utilizing inaction or delay
to deny deliberation on an issue that has substantial support. Under
this scenario, effective priority procedures must be crafted to eliminate the possibility of delay or inaction.
Expedited provisions may also have the concomitant benefit of
fostering an environment promoting deliberation within the Congress
and negotiation, accommodation, and perhaps compromise between
the branches. It is interesting to note from the legislative history that
the primary concern of Congress in adopting the priority procedures
of the War Powers Resolution was to overcome internal obstacles
within Congress, such as filibustering and committee pigeonholing.4 9 Effective provisions, taking into account the concerns highlighted under the Bach model, can better enable Congress to consider
and vote on designated issues. Significantly, incentives should be incorporated into these procedures to encourage committee and other
legislative action. However, expedited procedures might also promote
comity between the branches, particularly on this separation of
power issue. Thus, as the forty percent co-sponsorship requirement
is approached and finally attained, an important signal would be
sent to the executive branch. If the legislative position is contrary to
that of the President, then either branch may wish to negotiate or
compromise before an interbranch constitutional confrontation surfaces. This proposal is not advanced with the aim of encouraging
compromise between the branches on all occasions. The dividing of
the war powers suggests that circumstances were contemplated in
which neither of the two branches will be in accord. However, the
nature of these separated powers also intimates that accommodation
or compromise may regularly be in the best interests of the nation.
In this regard, the proposal also aims to foster comity between the
branches, which is often vital in this constitutional area. Accordingly,
the expedited procedures advance this objective through the estab490. See supra text accompanying notes 414-18.
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lishment of a legislative infrastructure.
Few would dispute the necessity of these procedures in war
powers decisions. Instead, the debate appears focused on the efficacy
of current procedures. This discussion has served to demonstrate the
need to improve certain "loopholes" in the priority procedures of the
War Powers Resolution. While many forms of expedited procedures
exist, any reform procedures finally adopted must be carefully and
properly designed to serve the decision-making process to which they
are applied.
X.

CONCLUSION

This review has illustrated that the sixteen-year statute is in
need of significant reform if the original objective of "collective judgment" is to be attained. 9 This article has undertaken comprehensive consideration of several essential reforms of the War Powers
Resolution. 92 Ultimately, any reform effort will have to be the product of bipartisanship and interbranch comity and accord. The recommendations set forth here are offered as serious proposals for the
inevitable reform debate. It is apparent from this review that a viable, active role for Congress, as a full co-equal partner with the executive branch, is constitutional, possible, and necessary.
Although made against the backdrop of the divided constitutional war powers, none of the reform proposals has sought to define
or clarify substantively this authority by statutory means. Instead,
the recommendations have sought to address only the process of war
powers decision-making. The words of Senator John Stennis during
the 1973 debate are appropriate to this point: "There is no assurance
of wisdom in Congress any more than in the Presidency. As Professor Alexander Bickel has said, 'the only assurance there is lies in
process - in the duty to explain, justify and persuade, to define the
491. See supra text accompanying note 9.
492. To be sure, there are other possible reforms equally as important but which have
not been considered, including reform of the consultation and reporting provisions of the War
Powers Resolution. See, e.g., H.R. 3912, § 3, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H25053 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (proposing consultation requirement reform); 134 CONG. REC.
H254-55 (section-by-section analysis); H.R. 3912 § 4, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC.
H251 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (proposing reporting requirement reform); 134 CONG. REC.
H255-56 (section-by-section analysis).
While these communicative provisions are not without dispute between the branches,
comparatively, there is less controversy on these aspects of reform as these statutory channels
have become, in significant part, accepted. See, e.g., supra notes 79 (discussing consultation
requirement), 94, and 63 (discussing reporting requirement).

1989]

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

national interest by evoking it, and to act by consent.' ""' Of course,
the objective of establishing a process is to serve the development of
foreign policy as forged by the political departments, albeit frequently through the "invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."49 4 Therefore, by avoiding the implementation of arbitrary elements that impose major policy
ramifications (such as section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution) in
any reform statute, both Congress and the President will be better
able to apply their respective powers "co-extensive with all the possible combinations of [the infinite] circumstances" that threaten "the
safety of nations."4 95 Statutory reform efforts should therefore be
designed to serve this "policy tailoring" objective. Disagreement between the branches is a deliberate and inherent part of the constitutional framework. Reconciliation is not always easily attained, but is
possible. As one commentator has concluded with regard to the constitutional war powers: "in the absence of judicial elucidation, the
Congress and the President have been required to accommodate
themselves in the controversy to accept from each other less than
each has been willing to accept but more than either has been willing to grant."'14 " Reform should therefore concentrate on the process
by which decisions are made to introduce United States Armed
Forces into hostilities and on the methods by which the political
branches cooperate, notwithstanding their differences over constitu493. 119 CONG. REc. 24,545 (1973). As one congressional aide noted:
[Wjhat 1 think the War Powers gives you - and what you didn't have before
- is a structured process by which you can directly and effectively confront the
issue before you. First of all, you should have some prior consultation and even
more after the fact. Beyond that, you should have information that you didn't
have before the Act. In effect you have a stage on which to carry out this debate,
as to whether or not the presence of those armed forces is legitimate and politically or strategically desirable for a variety of reasons.
1988 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 126 (remarks of George Berdes, former senior staff
consultant, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (emphasis added).
494. See supra note I (quoting Edwin Corwin).
495. See supra note 59 (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
496. CONG. RES. SERVICE, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis
and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 64, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 328-29 (1980).
Former Attorney General and Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson echoed this view:
Whatever the characterization of the legal situation, it seems to me that only one
conclusion can be drawn - in order for our system to work effectively, some
accommodation has to be reached between the Executive Branch and Congress.
It is a situation, in my view, that calls for comity. Comity, of course, rests on a
recognition that without mutual understanding, cooperation, and indeed, ultimately trust, the result can only be a breakdown in the effectiveness with which
the United States is able to addresswhat may in fact be a critical situation.
1988 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 136.
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tional or institutional principles.
This article has served to point out that an effective statutory
infrastructure can result in attendant benefits to the war powers decision-making process. Significantly, not all of these benefits need the
approval of both Congress and the President. Through the legislative
rulemaking authority, Congress may on its own initiative improve
the manner in which it considers war powers legislation. As seen, for
example, Congress may develop internal mechanisms to make sua
sponte determinations on the existence of "hostilities," thereby triggering the war powers statute, and to reassemble itself for the purpose of considering war powers reports or legislation if Congress has
already adjourned for more than the constitutional period of three
days. Critically, the central enforcement embodied in section 5 of the
War Powers Resolution, which has been nullified by the Supreme
Court's Chadha decision, can be replaced by a procedure which
serves much of the original objective of section 5 through the
rulemaking power and the congressional power of the purse.
However, no legislation can supply the essential ingredient: the
political will to act. As Justice robert Jackson stated:
I have no illusion that any decision by the Court can keep
power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in
meeting its problems. A crisis that challenges the President
equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress. If not good
law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use them."
We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in
the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent
power from slipping through its fingers. 9 '
Without diminishing executive authority, this article has clearly
demonstrated that Congress has the tools by which it may fully and
vigorously exercise its constitutional duties on war power matters.

497. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). The bottom line, in the view of Senator Griffin during the 1973 debate of the
War Powers Resolution, was that "Congress has the power to act - but sometimes it lacks
the will to act." 119 CONG. REC. 25,100 (1973).

